Evaluation of oral Lanzhou lamb rotavirus vaccine via passive transfusion with CD4+/CD8+ T lymphocytes

AbstractLanzhou Lamb derived Rotavirus (RV) Vaccine (namely LLR) for children is only used in China. Since there were no reports on evaluation of LLR, even the data of phase IV clinical trial, we proceed the evaluation of LLR through focusing on T-cell to investigate whether LLR could induce the potential function involving in protection as a vaccine. Four groups of nude mice were transfused with CD4+/CD8+ T-cells isolated from LLR-immunized (primed) and LLR-unimmunized (naïve) mice via intraperitonea (i.p.) respectively. Consequently, the adoption mice were challenged with mice-origin wild rotavirus EDIM (Epizootic Diarrhea of Infant Mice) by intragastric administration. Series of fecal/serum samples were collected and viral shedding, then serum IgA/IgG and secreted IgA were assayed. Compared to the mice transfused with T lymphocytes from naïve mice, the nude mice transfused with CD4+ T lymphocytes from primed mice induce fecal and serum IgA increasing more rapidly, and have a shorter duration of virus shedding too. Whereas, no significant difference in virus clearance was found between the mice transfused with CD8+ T lymphocytes isolated from primed and naïve mice. Therefore, we cleared the distinct roles of transfused CD4+/CD8+ T lymphocytes for rotavirus clearance in nude mice, that the viral clearance conducted by CD4+ T lymphocytes. Meanwhile, it has ability to help induction of LLR specific immunogenicity. Comparing with the transfusion of cell from primed and naïve mice, LLR can induce CD4+ T lymphocytes memory which is a potential index to reflect the immunogenicity and protection, while CD8+ T lymphocytes remove rotavirus by CTL with little memory ability

Does independent directors’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring