Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --Corruption,inequality,development.

Structure and evolution of a European Parliament via a network and correlation analysis

We present a study of the network of relationships among elected members of the Finnish parliament, based on a quantitative analysis of initiative co-signatures, and its evolution over 16 years. To understand the structure of the parliament, we constructed a statistically validated network of members, based on the similarity between the patterns of initiatives they signed. We looked for communities within the network and characterized them in terms of members' attributes, such as electoral district and party. To gain insight on the nested structure of communities, we constructed a hierarchical tree of members from the correlation matrix. Afterwards, we studied parliament dynamics yearly, with a focus on correlations within and between parties, by also distinguishing between government and opposition. Finally, we investigated the role played by specific individuals, at a local level. In particular, whether they act as proponents who gather consensus, or as signers. Our results provide a quantitative background to current theories in political science. From a methodological point of view, our network approach has proven able to highlight both local and global features of a complex social system.Comment: 15 pages, 10 figure

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic Development

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, financial liberalisation

Financial Liberalisation, Bureaucratic Corruption and Economic

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government- appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds, an opportunity that is made more attractive by financial liberalisation which, at the same time, raises efficiency in capital production. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption is always bad for economic development, but its effect is worse if the economy is open than if it is closed; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development and openness of the economy; (3) financial liberalisation is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption,development,financial liberalisation

Il mare che e... Un intervento psicosociale sui giovani autori di reato di Palermo

I progetti di intervento sui minori autori di reato possono creare un utile servizio ad un adeguato percorso rieducativo dei beneficiari, mirato ad una crescita personale e ad un incremento di responsabilit\ue0. Infatti le azioni proposte dai progetti non solo possono creare una rete tra istituzioni e privato-sociale atta a supportare l'intervento della giustizia minorile, ma hanno anche la capacit\ue0 di contribuire alla riduzione del rischio di recidiva e alla promozione del reinserimento sociale dei giovani coinvolti. Questi i presupposti per i quali due associazioni di volontariato e sportive del palermitano, con la supervisione dell'Universit\ue0 degli studi della citt\ue0, per l'estate 2015 hanno proposto all\u2019Istituto Penale per i Minorenni "Malaspina" un progetto avente come strumento lo snorkeling, escursione subacquea che si pratica in acque di bassa profondit\ue0, e come obiettivo quello di favorire l'integrazione sociale dei beneficiari (5 giovani) contrapponendosi alla discriminazione e, ancora, di incrementare nuove capacit\ue0 d'analisi dei processi di sfida e di confronto. Il mare, scenario del progetto, ha ulteriormente stimolato lo sviluppo e la consapevolezza sia delle potenzialit\ue0 del singolo sia delle opportunit\ue0 offerte dal territorio. L'esito positivo del progetto ha esortato alla sua conferma per gli anni successivi e al coinvolgimento di altre associazioni e di altri minori e giovani adulti dell'istituto. L'evento pubblico conclusivo, finalizzato alla conoscenza e alla diffusione dell'iniziativa, ha inoltre contribuito a sensibilizzare i presenti all' esperienza detentiva dei minori e dei giovani adulti ed esortato alla riflessione sul possibile cambiamento degli autori di reato

Foreign Aid - a Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarised as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmes; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption, development, foreign aid.

Weighted SAW reflector gratings for orthogonal frequency coded SAW tags and sensors

Weighted surface acoustic wave reflector gratings for coding identification tags and sensors to enable unique sensor operation and identification for a multi-sensor environment. In an embodiment, the weighted reflectors are variable while in another embodiment the reflector gratings are apodized. The weighting technique allows the designer to decrease reflectively and allows for more chips to be implemented in a device and, consequently, more coding diversity. As a result, more tags and sensors can be implemented using a given bandwidth when compared with uniform reflectors. Use of weighted reflector gratings with OFC makes various phase shifting schemes possible, such as in-phase and quadrature implementations of coded waveforms resulting in reduced device size and increased coding

Foreign Aid – A Fillip for Development or a Fuel for Corruption?

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by government-appointed bureaucrats. Corruption may arise due to the opportunity for bureaucrats to embezzle public funds which are otherwise used to provide productive public goods and services. Our main results may be summarized as follows: (1) corruption impedes economic development and compromises the effectiveness of aid programmers; (2) the incidence of corruption may, itself, be affected by both the development process and the donation of aid; (3) foreign aid is good for development when governance is good, but may be bad (perhaps very bad) for development when governance is bad; and (4) corruption and poverty may co-exist as permanent, rather than just transitory, fixtures of an economy.Corruption; Development; Foreign aid