Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and “Quiet Diplomacy”

South Africa’s “quiet diplomacy” has been often used to reject the notion of South African leadership or regional hegemony in southern Africa. This article finds that this evaluation is founded on a misguided understanding of regional hegemony, which is based on conventional hegemony theories that are mostly derived from the global role of the United States after World War II. Alternatively, this article uses a concept of hegemony that, for example, takes into account the “regionality” of South Africa’s hegemony, which both allows external actors to impact on regional relations and allows South Africa to pursue its foreign policy goals on the global level of international politics. This concept helps to systemically analyze South Africa's foreign policy in the Zimbabwean crisis and to better integrate this policy into the broader framework of its regional and global ambitions.regional powers, hegemony, South Africa, Zimbabwe, quiet diplomacy

India and South Asia in the world: on the embeddedness of regions in the international system and its consequences for regional powers

Regions and the regional powers that characterize them stand in multiple inter-relations with the world system. Yet, theories of International Relations struggle with the conceptualization of this global-regional nexus. This article introduces an analytical tool that allows for the evaluation of the ‘embeddedness’ of regions into the international system and its consequences for a regional power in ‘its’ region. The theoretical tool shows in particular that regional powers do not necessarily have an inherent interest in ‘their’ region and its stabilization or, in general, the provision of public goods. Instead, global interests can prevail. Thus, the decision to engage positively in the region is one that does not automatically follow from relative preponderance as it is assumed by many analysts of regional powerhood in the case study chosen here, South Asia, and across the globe. The applicability of this analytical tool is illustrated with the help of two specific examples – India's conflict management in Sri Lanka and its role in the democratization process in Nepal

Competition and Cooperation: India and China in the Global Climate Regime

The need to cooperate in matters of climate change requires partnerships among states, such as India and China, that in other contexts are competitors - if not rivals. This simultaneity of cooperation and competition is one of the key features of the emerging multipolar order and should take centre stage for both policy and research. Climate change is the key challenge for the coming decade, requiring cooperation from major emitters on mitigation, adaptation, climate finance, and the decarbonisation of the energy supply. No state will be able to achieve sufficient climate action alone. Simultaneously, geopolitical and geo-economic tensions between these actors in the increasingly multipolar global order are growing, not only in today's most obvious case of Ukraine but also on the Indo-Chinese border. This juxtaposition of cooperation and conflict also plays out in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: at COP26 in 2021, India and China aligned to ensure that in the final agreement the commitment to a global coal phase-out became to a coal phase-down. Despite regional and global rivalry, cooperation at the intersection of issue-specific interests can yield both positive and negative outcomes. For example, the decarbonisation of energy systems and the expansion of renewables, including solar power and (green) hydrogen offers such a field of competition over technology and trade leadership. This competition increasingly draws in the European Union and other global actors who are looking for new and reliable energy partners. Climate change is a global challenge and requires cooperation at that level. Germany and the EU have an important role in helping to foster such cooperation even despite clashes of values and interests. Engagement with India has been given greater impetus more recently, also regarding diversification of energy sources. In the face of escalating geopolitical tensions this will be more difficult in the case of China, though nevertheless still crucial to achieve the Paris goals

Differentiation as Affirmative Action: Transforming or Reinforcing Structural Inequality at the UNFCCC?

Structural inequality is at the heart of the struggle to prevent dangerous climate change. This makes the global climate regime a particularly interesting case, when it comes to conceptualising and assessing the role of international institutions as sites for the reproduction and transformation of macro-level inequalities that structure the international system. This article uses these interlinkages to, first, assess, in how far the debates, conflicts and doubts regarding effectiveness and justifications of affirmative action at the domestic level, introduced as a reaction to domestic structural inequality, can teach us something about the actual potential of and the obstacles to the transformation of structural inequalities through differentiation internationally. Second, it assesses whether and how institutional mechanisms of categorisation and (re-)distribution within the UNFCCC have led and are likely to lead in the future to a reinforcement or a transformation of global structural inequalities

Requirements for a Successful COP 26: Commitment, Responsibilities, Trust

On 1 November 2021, 197 countries will gather for the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP 26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This summit should have taken place in 2020 already but was postponed because of the COVID-19 pandemic. The agenda for this year's event foresees, among other issues, the conclusion of negotiations on implementation rules for the Paris Agreement and the setting of more ambitious targets by the parties in their renewed nationally determined contributions. Non-governmental organisations and countries from the Global South expect higher emission-reduction targets and greater financial contributions from developed countries. In turn, developed states expect emerging powers to contribute more as well. A strong mismatch between expectations and outcomes could inflict a serious setback on the climate change regime. Countries were obliged to hand in updated emission targets by the end of 2020, but only 114 had actually done so by the time of writing. Observers have found the latest submissions of multiple big emitters to be insufficient. In the context of the pandemic, countries from around the world have stressed the need for a "green recovery" and have mobilised significant capital to alleviate the crisis. However, short-term concerns regarding stabilising the conventional economy seem to outweigh environmental aspirations, particularly for big emitters with large, impoverished populations like Brazil, China, and India. Many countries have struck a more moderate tone on contentious issues such as ideal approaches to international cooperation, but substantial disagreement remains. Diverging expectations and responsibility attributions are a significant obstacle for COP 26. European decision-makers need to enhance the trust developing and emerging countries feel towards them by making concrete additional commitments helping close the remaining finance and emission gaps. The latter could then follow suit and agree on an ambitious deal enhancing their own actions and concluding the remaining open negotiation items

Wahlen in Indien: Lackmustest für die globale Klimapolitik

Indien hat sich unter der Regierung von Premierminister Modi den Ruf erarbeitet, eine globale Führungsrolle beim Klimaschutz eingenommen zu haben. Angesichts populistischer Tendenzen weltweit und der Abkehr von globaler Zusammenarbeit zum Klimaschutz ist der Ausgang der Wahlen in Indien im Frühjahr 2019 von großer Bedeutung. Indien ist als momentan drittgrößter Emittent von CO2 und als am schnellsten wachsende Volkswirtschaft für eine effiziente globale Klimapolitik als ­zentraler Akteur unabdingbar. Premierminister Modi hat sich beispielsweise mit der Gründung der International Solar Alliance international einen guten Ruf erarbeitet. Auf nationaler Ebene überwiegen jedoch Berichte über die wachsende Luftverschmutzung und die Priorisierung von Industriebelangen vor Klimaschutzanliegen. Mit der Wiederwahl von Narendra Modi zum indischen Premierminister gibt es jetzt die Möglichkeit, die nationale und globale Klimapolitik neu auszurichten. Ein Blick in die Wahlprogramme der beiden wichtigsten Parteien in Indien sowie die Analyse der dominierenden Wahlthemen zeigen allerdings, dass Umwelt- und Klimathemen von allen Parteien stark nachrangig behandelt werden. Ein Vergleich mit anderen einflussreichen Akteuren im globalen Klimaregime, die sich in der Zeit von "Fridays for Future" wichtigen Wahlen gestellt haben oder stellen müssen (Australien, Brasilien, EU, Indonesien), zeigt deutlich, dass die Bedeutung des Klimawandels auf der politischen Agenda immer mehr wächst. Dennoch müssen Wähler gezielt mobilisiert werden, wenn sich umweltpolitische Belange auch in den Wahlergebnissen niederschlagen sollen. Für die in der zweiten Jahreshälfte stattfindenden globalen Klimaverhandlungen ist das Wahljahr 2019 richtungsweisend. Die bisherigen Wahlergebnisse weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass wachsendes Problembewusstsein kein Garant für eine progressive Klimapolitik ist. Wenn auf deutscher oder europäischer Ebene Interesse an konstruktiver Zusammenarbeit für den Klimaschutz besteht, ist eine intensive Zusammenarbeit mit Indien, insbesondere auch mit der Zivilgesellschaft, unabdingbar

Regional Powers Still Matter!

Economic and domestic political crises as well as global structural shifts that have resulted in a much tighter interconnection of events, actors, and institutions across the national, regional, and global levels have called into question the ability of so-called regional powers, such as Brazil, India, and South Africa, to have a serious impact on global politics in the remainder of the twenty-first century. Regional powers have been considered important contributors to regional and global order because they are expected to, for example, ensure stability and effective regional cooperation in a world that is increasingly difficult to govern. Yet, the actual outcomes of their regional projections have been mixed. While some regional powers, such as Brazil or South Africa, seem to have lost clout in the past few years, other countries, such as Saudi Arabia or Turkey, are striving for regional power status. Regional powers face contradictory demands in regard to their global and regional policies. Being at the interface between regional and global politics poses particular challenges and often leads to indecisive, reluctant, and sometimes contradictory policy choices. New and old regional powers are, further, facing important domestic ­challenges, such as significant downturns in their economies, corruption, and reduced state capacity to mobilise resources, as well as growing populist sentiments and even a drift towards authoritarianism. These issues create disruption in their foreign policies and represent potential challenges, due to unpredictability, for both research and policymaking. Nevertheless, "regional powers" is still a useful analytical concept with which to make sense of some of these trends by focusing on the regional dimension of international politics. Being a regional power does not preclude being a rising power or even a great power in global terms. Germany's and other Western countries' foreign policies often treat rising and regional powers as hubs of stability and economic prosperity. Yet, in a -changing world order, a better understanding of regional dynamics and tensions is ­needed: regional powers do not automatically serve as multipliers of policies within their regions given the sometimes low degree of regional integration. Their ability and willingness to influence their neighbourhood may change over time and policy fields; this variance should not be underestimated

Der 6. BRICS-Gipfel: Rückschritt oder Institutionalisierung?

Am 15. Juli 2014 treffen sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs Brasiliens, Russlands, Indiens, Chinas und Südafrikas zum sechsten Gipfeltreffen der BRICS-Staaten in Fortaleza, Brasilien. In einer Phase verlangsamten wirtschaftlichen Wachstums in den BRICS-Staaten und des Wiedererstarkens der westlichen Wirtschaften bekommt die politische Institutionalisierung des Staatenbundes größere Bedeutung. Die anstehenden Wahlen in Brasilien machen es jedoch unwahrscheinlich, dass der Gipfel zu einer verstärkten Institutionalisierung führen wird. Auch die Krise in der Ukraine wird nicht zwangsläufig zu einer größeren Annäherung der BRICS-Staaten untereinander führen. Vor allem mit Blick auf die Wahlen in ihrem Land versucht die Präsidentin Brasiliens, Dilma Rousseff, den BRICS-Gipfel nicht zu sehr in den Fokus der Öffentlichkeit zu rücken. Die brasilianische Regierung als Gastgeberin misst dem Gipfel eher wenig Bedeutung bei. Dies zeigt sich an formalen Faktoren, wie der Wahl des Zeitpunkts und des Ortes, sowie an der allgemein eher zögerlichen Vorbereitung des Gipfels. Es bleibt abzuwarten, wie sich die Situation in der Ukraine auf das Verhältnis der BRICS-Staaten untereinander auswirkt. Nachdem Russland bis auf Weiteres aus dem G8-Format ausgeschlossen wurde, ist zu erwarten, dass der BRICS-Gipfel vonseiten Russlands dazu genutzt wird, sich des Rückhalts der anderen BRICS-Staaten zu versichern – der jedoch keinesfalls qua BRICS-Mitgliedschaft gegeben ist. Der wichtigste Schritt zur Institutionalisierung des Staatenbundes ist derzeit die Operationalisierung der geplanten BRICS-Entwicklungsbank. Diese stellt auch die wichtigste Aufgabe des Gipfels dar. Allerdings sind bislang noch keine Details über etwaige Fortschritte an die Öffentlichkeit gedrungen. Die wichtigsten Streitfragen scheinen weiterhin ungeklärt

G20: The Global South's New Status-Seeking Platform?

Status matters to all states. For some from the Global South, status ambitions drive foreign policies. International venues like the G20 are perfect tools to pursue such ambitions. How, then, does status drive the foreign policies of the Global South and how does it inform their leadership of the G20? How and why should the Global North engage with such status ambitions? Status is about one's standing in a social hierarchy and can be understood as a set of shared beliefs about a state. States often communicate their status ambitions through "vanity projects" such as a space programme or become diplomatically very proactive in international forums. On the one hand, status ambitions can contribute to efforts that strengthen international stability and global governance, such as conflict mediation and humanitarianism. They can also deepen instability in the form of revisionism, regional interventions, and challenges to the rules-based international order. The year 2023 will see an Indian presidency of the G20. For a country that has long aspired to a seat in global multilateral institutions, India is mobilising the platform - and will continue to do so - to amplify its status ambitions. With India's rise potentially impacting the global balance of power, a careful reading of its status concerns as manifested in its G20 presidency is both valuable and necessary. At the current conjuncture of a global polycrisis, it is imperative to create conditions conducive to cooperation between large developing countries and the European Union / Germany. Attention to status concerns implies acknowledgement of hierarchies between states and can create the foundations for establishing relations and partnerships on a level playing field. Seeking status is an important driver of foreign policy in the Global South. Intangible and challenging to identify, status considerations sometimes explain puzzling policy outcomes. They draw attention to the role of the reputational gains that lead states to prioritise certain issues over others. For European decision-makers, attention to status concerns when engaging with the Global South can make for better understanding among partners and help strengthen diplomatic interaction