CORPORATIONS-TORTS-LIABILITY OF A CORPORATE OFFICER FOR INDUCING CORPORATION TO BREACH ITS CONTRACT

Defendant corporation elected to redeem its outstanding preferred stock at a price of $65 a share including accumulated dividends. When plaintiff tendered its certificates of the preferred stock for transfer to the corporation, the company refused to accept the certificates or to pay for them at their redemption price. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Vincent, president of defendant corporation and owner of most of its common stock, conspired with and induced the company to break its stock redemption contract with plaintiff after plaintiff\u27s refusal to agree to share with Vincent 50 p.er cent of any profits that might accrue from redemption of the stock, in order to secure for himself a share of the benefits resulting from the breach. In a suit for breach of contract against the defendant corporation, and against defendant corporate officer for inducing and conspiring with the company to break its contract with plaintiff, held, no cause of action was stated against the officer, for as an agent of the corporation he was clothed with the same privileges as the company, which was immune from tort liability for inducing the breach of its own contract. J. E. Brulatour, Inc. v. Wilmer & Vincent Corp., (N.Y. S. Ct. 1946) 63 N.Y.S. (2d) 54

GIFTS--BANKING--GIFT OF JOINT SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS

A, the mother of B, transferred three savings bank deposits from her sole account to the account of A or B-either or survivor. Two of the depositors\u27 signature cards contained this language: \u27\u27We hereby certify that this account and all moneys to be credited to it belong to us as joint tenants, and will be the absolute property of the survivor of us. There was evidence that one of the reasons for A\u27s transferring her deposits to the joint account was to enable B to draw money therefrom for A while A was in the hospital. A retained sole possession of the bank books and, upon her death intestate, B claimed as owner the balance in the three joint accounts. Held, that the transfers of the accounts to A and B, jointly, did not constitute gifts to B, for there was no donative intent and there was no surrender of control over the bank accounts to B. Rush v. Rush, (N.J. Eq. 1946) 49 A. (2d) 238

TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-INVASION OF PRIVACY THROUGH FICTIONAL WORKS

The New York Civil Rights Law prohibits the use of a person\u27s name, portrait, or picture without his consent in writing, for advertising or trade purposes, under penalty of civil and criminal liability. Plaintiff, senior civil affairs officer of the American Military Government in the town of Licata, Sicily, during its occupation by Allied Armies of World War II, brought suit under the statute against the author of the book A Bell for Adana, and others, alleging that he occupied the position of the book\u27s and play\u27s principal character, Major Victor Jappolo in the fictitiously named town of Adano; and that the book and play exploited his acts, personality, and life without his consent. Neither plaintiff\u27s name nor picture was used in the fictitious productions. Held, with one justice dissenting, action dismissed. Toscani v. Hersey, 271 App. Div. 445, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 814 (1946)

WILLS--CONSTRUCTION-LAPSE- HEIRS AS SUBSTITUTIONARY

Testator in his will bequeathed one half of his estate share and share alike to his three brothers, naming them, being to each a one-third part thereof, to them and their heirs forever. Two of the brothers were to testator\u27s knowledge dead at the time he made his will, and the third brother predeceased the testator. In proceedings brought for a construction of the will, held, that the residuary legacies to the brothers did not lapse, but the legacies vested in the respective heirs of deceased brothers. In re Britt\u27s Estate, (Wis. 1946) 23 N.W. (2d) 498

CONTRACTS--lMPRACTICABILITY OF PERFORMANCE AS AN EXCUSE FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

ln a recent federal case, plaintiff construction company contracted to enlarge a dam for defendants, which would involve, according to the original estimates, the excavation of 30,000 cubic yards of earth. During the performance of the contract, defendants ordered further excavation in order to reach a firm foundation so that ultimately a total of 84,000 cubic yards were removed. It was defendant\u27s claim that the plaintiff was obliged to perform this additional work to fulfill its contract. Plaintiff sued in quantum meruit for the value of labor and materials for the entire project; defendants stood upon the contract, contending that mere unanticipated difficulty or expense did not excuse the plaintiff\u27s late performance of the contract or furnish a basis for additional compensation. Holding that uncontemplated circumstances (presumably unusual soil and rock conditions underlying the surface) had made radical changes in the character, amount, and expense of. the work to be performed, the court found that the contract should be deemed abrogated and allowed full recovery on a quantum meruit basis. This decision is noteworthy because not only does it accept the doctrine of impracticability of performance as an excuse for non-performance of contractual duties, but it carries the doctrine to the extreme of charging the promisee with the additional expense incurred in rendering impracticable performance

LABOR LAW-TORTS-LIABILITY OF LABOR UNION FOR INDUCING BREACH OF CONTRACT

During the past fifteen years the law as a whole has moved rapidly in the direction of favoring union activity. A labor policy expressed in numerous federal and state laws and important judicial decisions has generally recognized and protected in the courts the workers\u27 right to be free from employer interference, to strike, to engage in peaceful picketing, and to conduct primary boycotts. Within this liberalizing judicial concept of the rights of labor, the present status of the action against labor unions for inducing breach of contract presents an interesting study of the tenacity of an early common law theory of liability in labor\u27s mid-twentieth century struggle for a greater share of the fruits of industry

TRUSTS--CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS--EFFECT OF INTER-VIVOS TRANSFER OF LAND ON ORAL TRUST TO RECONVEY TO TRANSFEROR

Plaintiff, who had courted defendant for six years and had proposed marriage, conveyed a lot and house to defendant after various discussions and immediately upon the written suggestion of defendant. Later their romance terminated when she went abroad and plaintiff turned his attention to another woman. In a suit to cancel deed to the premises, held, that because of the confidential relationship which had existed between the parties and in order to prevent defendant from completing her fraud, defendant held title as constructive trustee for plaintiff. Kausky v. Koten, (Wash. 1947) 179 P. (2d) 950

FUTURE INTERESTS-DEEDS-CONSTRUCTION OF LANGUAGE TO CREATE A TRUST AND A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT

A deed conveyed land to a named schoolmaster of Bristol and his successors forever for their support for instruction of the children of the town, . . . Provided always . . . that if the said town shall neglect to place a good and sufficient Grammar schoolmaster in the said town at the death or removal of any schoolmaster . . .for the space of twelve months after the said death or removal, that the land shall revert to me . . . and my heirs as fully and as effectively as if this deed had not been made and executed. In a bill in equity for the construction of the deed, held, the deed conveyed a fee simple in trust upon a condition subsequent which reserved a right of reverter in the grantor and his heirs. Bristol v. Nolan, (R.I. 1947) 53 A. (2d) 466

EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-IMPEACHMENT OF HEARSAY BY DECLARANT\u27S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS

In an action of trespass to try title to land claimed through adverse possession by defendant, the date when defendant first asserted a hostile claim to the premises so as to start the ten year statute of limitations was in issue. Plaintiff\u27s witness, W, was allowed to testify that defendant had told him and others that plaintiffs owned individual interests in the land and that he did not exclusively claim the land. Defendant\u27s witness, Y, then testified over objection that witness, W, had told him that defendant had long claimed the land, and had farmed and fenced the tract. Held, the testimony of witness, Y, was hearsay evidence which should not have been admitted for purposes of impeachment because no foundation had been laid for that purpose. Payne v. Price, (Tex. 1947) 203 S.W. (2d) 544

Portfolio Vol. II N 3

Jeffers, Robinson. From \u27The Beaks of Eagles\u27 . Poem. 6. Clement, Harry. Mr. Bigger Tries Faith . Prose. 7. Shaw, A.A. Students of Denison . Prose. 9 Deweerd, H.A. New German War Prophets . Prose. 11. West, Bill C. Reproach . Poem. 14. West, Bill C. Dilemma . Poem. 14. Manship, Paul. Dancer and Gazelles . Picture. 14. Saunders, Paul. Review of New Books . Prose. 15. Smith, Bob. Review of New Records . Prose. 15. Picasso, Pablo. Nude (Pink) . Picture. 16. Korbel, Mario. The Andante . Picture. 16. Bethune, Don. Review of \u27Susan and God\u27 . Prose. 17. Baily, Bernard. Thornton Wilder\u27s \u27Out Town Reviewed . 17. Maxwell, Robert. Reflections . Poem. 18. Carter, Clarence Holbrook. July . Picture. 18. Browne, Phil. The Drag . Picture. 2. Browne, Phil. A Faithful Servant . Prose. 19. Hanna, Stanley. Jazz . Poem. 20. Hanna, Stanley. M.A. . Poem. 20. Whistler, James McNeill. Rotherhithe . Wager, Dick. Black . Poem. 22. Wager, Dick. Ruthless . Poem. 22. Wager, Dick. Train . Poem. 22. Martindale, Virginia. Song of a Cynic . Poem. 22. Blazys, Alexander. Russian Dancers . Picture. 22. Price II, Ira. The Rains Fell . Prose. 5