920 research outputs found

    Organizational Diseconomies of Scale

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    This paper models strategic behavior within firms. The principal (e.g., the firm's owner) is handicapped by not knowing as much about the firm's capabilities as the agent(s) (e.g., the manager). The agent can extract some rents from his private information. The principal can retrieve some of these rents at the expense of introducing a distortion, paying the agent less than the full value of his marginal product. As a result the firm operates inefficiently. The degree of this inefficiency varies with demand elasticity and with the length of the firm's managerial hierarchy. The costs of operating the hierarchy create a limit to the size of the firm

    Bidding rings

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    We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members

    Bidding Rings

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    We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members

    Auctions with a Stochastic Number of Bidders

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    Competition for Agency Contracts

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    The Revelation Principle with Costly Communication

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    Auctions and Bidding

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    Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions

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    We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.Auctions; Multi-Object Auctions; Spectrum Auctions

    Visualizing Genetic Influences on Human Brain Functions

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    AbstractEgan and colleagues (2003), in this issue of Cell, integrate genetics and functional brain imaging by showing that variation in the human brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) gene is associated with variation in episodic memory ability and in hippocampal neurochemistry and function
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