An improvement of the Berry--Esseen inequality with applications to Poisson and mixed Poisson random sums

By a modification of the method that was applied in (Korolev and Shevtsova, 2009), here the inequalities $$\rho(F_n,\Phi)\le\frac{0.335789(\beta^3+0.425)}{\sqrt{n}}$$ and $$\rho(F_n,\Phi)\le \frac{0.3051(\beta^3+1)}{\sqrt{n}}$$ are proved for the uniform distance $\rho(F_n,\Phi)$ between the standard normal distribution function $\Phi$ and the distribution function $F_n$ of the normalized sum of an arbitrary number $n\ge1$ of independent identically distributed random variables with zero mean, unit variance and finite third absolute moment $\beta^3$. The first of these inequalities sharpens the best known version of the classical Berry--Esseen inequality since $0.335789(\beta^3+0.425)\le0.335789(1+0.425)\beta^3<0.4785\beta^3$ by virtue of the condition $\beta^3\ge1$, and 0.4785 is the best known upper estimate of the absolute constant in the classical Berry--Esseen inequality. The second inequality is applied to lowering the upper estimate of the absolute constant in the analog of the Berry--Esseen inequality for Poisson random sums to 0.3051 which is strictly less than the least possible value of the absolute constant in the classical Berry--Esseen inequality. As a corollary, the estimates of the rate of convergence in limit theorems for compound mixed Poisson distributions are refined.Comment: 33 page

General-elimination stability

General-elimination harmony articulates Gentzen's idea that the elimination-rules are justified if they infer from an assertion no more than can already be inferred from the grounds for making it. Dummett described the rules as not only harmonious but stable if the E-rules allow one to infer no more and no less than the I-rules justify. Pfenning and Davies call the rules locally complete if the E-rules are strong enough to allow one to infer the original judgement. A method is given of generating harmonious general-elimination rules from a collection of I-rules. We show that the general-elimination rules satisfy Pfenning and Davies' test for local completeness, but question whether that is enough to show that they are stable. Alternative conditions for stability are considered, including equivalence between the introduction- and elimination-meanings of a connective, and recovery of the grounds for assertion, finally generalizing the notion of local completeness to capture Dummett's notion of stability satisfactorily. We show that the general-elimination rules meet the last of these conditions, and so are indeed not only harmonious but also stable.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

The open future, bivalence and assertion

It is highly intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘there will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents is untenable. Intuition favours bivalence

A Bell Inequality Analog in Quantum Measure Theory

One obtains Bell's inequalities if one posits a hypothetical joint probability distribution, or {\it measure}, whose marginals yield the probabilities produced by the spin measurements in question. The existence of a joint measure is in turn equivalent to a certain causality condition known as ``screening off''. We show that if one assumes, more generally, a joint {\it quantal measure}, or ``decoherence functional'', one obtains instead an analogous inequality weaker by a factor of $\sqrt{2}$. The proof of this ``Tsirel'son inequality'' is geometrical and rests on the possibility of associating a Hilbert space to any strongly positive quantal measure. These results lead both to a {\it question}: ``Does a joint measure follow from some quantal analog of `screening off'?'', and to the {\it observation} that non-contextual hidden variables are viable in histories-based quantum mechanics, even if they are excluded classically.Comment: 38 pages, TeX. Several changes and added comments to bring out the meaning more clearly. Minor rewording and extra acknowledgements, now closer to published versio

Limits of Abductivism About Logic

I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to solve by abduction

From nominal sets binding to functions and lambda-abstraction: connecting the logic of permutation models with the logic of functions

Permissive-Nominal Logic (PNL) extends first-order predicate logic with term-formers that can bind names in their arguments. It takes a semantics in (permissive-)nominal sets. In PNL, the forall-quantifier or lambda-binder are just term-formers satisfying axioms, and their denotation is functions on nominal atoms-abstraction. Then we have higher-order logic (HOL) and its models in ordinary (i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel) sets; the denotation of forall or lambda is functions on full or partial function spaces. This raises the following question: how are these two models of binding connected? What translation is possible between PNL and HOL, and between nominal sets and functions? We exhibit a translation of PNL into HOL, and from models of PNL to certain models of HOL. It is natural, but also partial: we translate a restricted subsystem of full PNL to HOL. The extra part which does not translate is the symmetry properties of nominal sets with respect to permutations. To use a little nominal jargon: we can translate names and binding, but not their nominal equivariance properties. This seems reasonable since HOL---and ordinary sets---are not equivariant. Thus viewed through this translation, PNL and HOL and their models do different things, but they enjoy non-trivial and rich subsystems which are isomorphic

Analytic Tableaux for Simple Type Theory and its First-Order Fragment

We study simple type theory with primitive equality (STT) and its first-order fragment EFO, which restricts equality and quantification to base types but retains lambda abstraction and higher-order variables. As deductive system we employ a cut-free tableau calculus. We consider completeness, compactness, and existence of countable models. We prove these properties for STT with respect to Henkin models and for EFO with respect to standard models. We also show that the tableau system yields a decision procedure for three EFO fragments

Radical anti-realism and substructural logics

We first provide the outline of an argument in favour of a radical form of anti-realism premised on the need to comply with two principles, implicitness and immanence, when trying to frame assertability-conditions. It follows from the first principle that one ought to avoid explicit bounding of the length of computations, as is the case for some strict finitists, and look for structural weakening instead. In order to comply with the principle of immanence, one ought to take into account the difference between being able to recognize a proof when presented with one and being able to produce one and thus avoid the idealization of our cognitive capacities that arise within Hilbert-style calculi. We then explore the possibility of weakening structural rules in order to comply with radical anti-realist strictures