Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets.

Artfilms, Handicrafts and Other Cultural Goods: The Case for Subsidy

Though widespread, the practice of public subsidies for cultural activity lacks a rigorous and consistent economic rationale. We analyze a canonical market structure that characterizes much cultural activity: the competition of mass-produced goods with heterogeneous non- standardized goods that are imperfect substitutes. We analyze several types of market failure: uncertainty about preferences (we do not know what we like, and we do not know what we might like in the future); endogeneity of preferences (we like what our neighbors talk about, and we like what we're accustomed to); and externalities associated with production (future production costs are determined by current production). The model provides a basis for cultural subsidies to promote social welfare and economic development.