Nash equilibrium for coupling of CO2 allowances and electricity markets

In this note, we present an existence result of a Nash equilibrium between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions covered

Game theory analysis for carbon auction market through electricity market coupling

In this paper, we analyze Nash equilibria between electricity producers selling their production on an electricity market and buying CO2 emission allowances on an auction carbon market. The producers' strategies integrate the coupling of the two markets via the cost functions of the electricity production. We set out a clear Nash equilibrium on the power market that can be used to compute equilibrium prices on both markets as well as the related electricity produced and CO2 emissions released.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1311.153

Effects of symmetry on Braess-like paradoxes in distributed computer systems - A numerical study

Abstract Numerical examples of a Braess-like paradox in which adding capacity to a distributed computer system may degrade the performance of all users in the system have already been reported. Unlike the original Braess paradox, this behavior occurs only in the case of finitely many users and not in the case of infinite number of users in the models examined. This study examines a number of numerical examples around the Braess-like paradox such as above. The numerical examples suggest that the Braess-like paradox is stronger, i.e., the performance degradation of all users in the Brass-like paradox is larger when the system has a higher degree of symmetry and, in particular, is strongest in the completely symmetrical system whereby the parameter values describing each user are identical, which is against our previous intuition

Using Viscosity Solution for Approximations in Piecewise Deterministic Control Systems

In [15] a numerical approximation scheme is proposed for the solution of piecewise deterministic control systems (PDCS). This approximation scheme is based on a time discretization which reformulates the original PDCS into a stochastic program. In this paper we prove the convergence of the approximating vector value function to the vector value function of the original PDCS as the discretization's step tends to zero

Minimal information sensor system for indoor tracking of several persons

In this paper, we introduce an ongoing experimentation in our laboratory for indoor tracking of several persons with a minimal set of informations, based on photoelectric beam barrier sensors. Incremental design, data analysis and acceptance concerns are discussed

Using game theory for the electricity market

We consider a static game model to describe a spot electricity market in which \calS suppliers offer electricity. Each supplier submit a price function to the market, to which the market reacts by fixing the quantities bought to each supplier. The objective of the market is to satisfy its fixed demand, whenever possible, at minimal price. We investigate two cases. In the first case, each of the suppliers strives to maximize its market share on the market; in the second case each supplier strives to maximize its profit. We also make some remarks when suppliers may bring electricity on several markets

Etude d'un jeu dynamique en information incomplete: "le jeu du chasseur et du lapin"

SIGLEINIST T 74278 / INIST-CNRS - Institut de l'Information Scientifique et TechniqueFRFranc

Approximation of the Value Function for a Class of Differential Games with Target

We consider the approximation of a class of differential games with target by stochastic games. We use Kruzkov transformation to obtain discounted costs. The approximation is based on a space discretization of the state space and leads to consider the value function of the differential game as the limit of the value function of a sequence of stochastic games. To prove the convergence, we use the notion of viscosity solution for partial differential equations. This allows us to make assumptions only on the continuity of the value function and not on its differentiability. This technique of proof has been used before by M. Bardi, M. Falcone and P. Soravia for another kind of discretization. Under the additional hypothesis that the value function is Lipschitz continuous, we prove that the rate of convergence of this scheme is of order p h where h is the space parameter of discretization. Some numerical experiments are presented in order to test the algorithm for a problem with discont..