How Terrorism Spreads: Emulation and the Diffusion of Ethnic and Ethnoreligious Terrorism

Previous research on the causes of domestic terrorism has tended to focus on domestic determinants. Although this approach can be helpful to understand many causes of terrorism, it implicitly disregards how the tactical choices made by similar non-state actors elsewhere in uence a group's decision to resort to terrorist tactics. This study argues that the adoption of terrorism among ethnic and ethnoreligious groups results from a process of conditional emulation. Groups are more likely to emulate the terrorist choice of others with whom they are connected by shared political grievances and spatial networks. The theory is tested on a new and original group-level dataset of ethnic and ethnoreligious terrorism (1970 -2009) using geospatial analysis and spatial econometric models. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized mechanism leading to the diffusion of terrorism, and suggest that emulation - more than domestic and contextual factors - substantially influences dissidents' tactic choice

Ethnic inclusion, democracy, and terrorism

Previous research has shown that ethnic exclusion and restricted political access can motivate ethnic groups to resort to violence. Although these links are better established for civil wars or conventional conflict, we believe that the same logic should be applicable to ethnic terrorism as well. If so, can reforms towards greater ethnic inclusion also reduce terrorist risks? We argue that reform and changes towards greater ethnic inclusion and democratization should induce substitution and reduce the volume of terrorist violence, even if attacks by splinter groups may persist. We develop propositions on terrorist attack frequency, given group characteristics and accommodation. We take advantage of the large changes towards democratization, decreased discrimination, and increased ethnic accommodation since the third wave of democratization and the end of the Cold War, as well as new data linking domestic terrorist organization in the Global Terrorism Data to specific ethnic groups in the Ethnic Power Relations data. Our group-level analyses suggest considerable support for a decline in terrorism following accommodation

The Quality of Terrorist Violence: Explaining the Logic of Terrorist Target Choice

Existing research on terrorism as a strategy has largely neglected the apparent differences in what groups target. Whereas some organizations primarily target undefended civilians, other attack mainly official and hard targets. I develop an explanation of terrorist groups’ relative target preferences based on how a group’s ties to its constituency and specific government repressive strategies either constrain or incentivize terrorist attacks against soft civilian vs. hard/official targets. Specific sources of support and the degree of out-group antagonism in their constituency shape terrorist groups’ primary targeting strategy. While groups with transnational support are generally more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, not all groups with local support are restrained. Groups with low out-group antagonism and local civilian support incur high political costs for targeting civilians and focus primarily on official targets. Instead, groups with domestic support but high out-group antagonism have mixed incentives. When facing indiscriminate government repression these groups become more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, because they can justify such a response to their audience, direct attacks against out-group civilians, and radicalize local constituents. Indiscriminate repression, however, does not change the targeting strategy of groups who face high political costs for attacking civilians. I examine the observable implications of the theory in a comparative analysis of terrorist organizations (1995-2007) as well as an over-time analysis of repression and targeting in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (1987-2004), and find strong support for the theoretical argument

Twisting arms and sending messages: Terrorist tactics in civil war

We examine the strategic rationale for terrorist tactics in civil war. We identify conditions that favor terrorism as a tactic in armed civil conflicts as well as the specific targets as a function of rebel characteristics, goals, and government responses to political demands. Terrorist tactics can be helpful as an instrument to coerce the government in asymmetric conflicts, as rebels are typically weak relative to the government. But terrorism can also help communicate the goals and resolve of a group when there is widespread uncertainty. We consider the strategic importance and rationale for terrorism in terms of the frequency of attacks and specific targets, and analyze our propositions using new data linking actors from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Data and the Global Terrorism Database. Consistent with our expectations, we find that terrorism is used more extensively in civil conflicts by weaker groups and when attacks can help the group convey its goals without undermining popular support. Groups with more inclusive audiences are more likely to focus on ‘hard’ or official targets, while groups with more sectarian audiences are more likely to attack ‘soft’ targets and civilians

Trojan Horse, Copycat, or Scapegoat? Unpacking the Refugees-Terrorism Nexus

Widespread fear that hosting refugees will mean more terrorism in host states is at theheart of the ‘refugee crisis’. Yet, we lack rigorous evidence for such claims. This articletheoretically unpacks how and under what conditions transnational refugee movementsplausibly lead to different types of terrorist outcomes. Combining original data witha multi-pronged approach involving a treatment-placebo design as well as instrumentalvariable estimation, we provide systematic and robust evidence that sheds new light onthe security implications of transnational forced migration. Our findings challenge theclaim that hosting refugees heightens the risk of “importing” terrorist attacks againstnationals of host countries, especially in developed countries. However, in these coun-tries refugees themselves are particularly prone to becoming the targets of retaliatoryterrorist attacks by natives, driven by fear. Dominant policy responses to the refugeecrisis that raise fears and suspicions are therefore not only ill-suited, but potentiallycounterproductive