Exploring Animal Rights as an Imperative for Human Welfare

This Article explores why these two seemingly persuasive arguments in support of animal rights have not produced dramatic changes in the legal rules regarding exploitation of animals as a source of food, clothing, research, entertainment, and income, among other things. It shows that these claims reflect a highbrow approach that is detached from the realities of societal ordering, and cultural reality in the United States and around the world. In Part II of this Article, I describe the historical and continuing subjugation of animals by humans and the evolution of legal protection to curb or end such abuse. This Part notes that animal rights activists vary both in philosophy and strategy, and describes the theories and practices intended to effect legal change.Part III looks at the abolition of black slavery as a legal anchor for animal rights. Specifically, it explores the claim that the assignment of property status to animals is the ultimate barrier to proper treatment and an end to human exploitation. This Part notes the strong similarities between black slavery and ongoing animal exploitation and the many similarities between animal-rights and civil-rights activism. This Part also shows that despite the strong similarities, consensus to change the property classification does not seem imminent. It concludes by suggesting that the emphasis on the property label is misplaced. And using the evolution of the law of employment discrimination as an example, it shows that animal exploitation will likely continue even with the elimination of the property label.Part TV evaluates the claim that animal abuse and human abuse are linked. This Part looks at the sources of this claim and their many limitations and contradictions. Specifically, the predictive value of studies and anecdotal evidence linking animal cruelty to interpersonal violence is considered. Further, it considers the indictment that animal rights advocates are themselves cruelbecause of their indifference to human suffering, demonstrated for example, by their support for abortion rights. It also looks at other examples of insensitivity to human suffering by individuals who exhibit strong affection for animals and shows the obstacle this presents for animal activism.The last Part of this Article addresses animal exploitation as a universal cultural norm that academic theories are incapable of greatly influencing.This Article explores why these two seemingly persuasive arguments in support of animal rights have not produced dramatic changes in the legal rules regarding exploitation of animals as a source of food, clothing, research, entertainment, and income, among other things. It shows that these claims reflect a highbrow approach that is detached from the realities of societal ordering, and cultural reality in the United States and around the world. In Part II of this Article, I describe the historical and continuing subjugation of animals by humans and the evolution of legal protection to curb or end such abuse. This Part notes that animal rights activists vary both in philosophy and strategy, and describes the theories and practices intended to effect legal change.Part III looks at the abolition of black slavery as a legal anchor for animal rights. Specifically, it explores the claim that the assignment of property status to animals is the ultimate barrier to proper treatment and an end to human exploitation. This Part notes the strong similarities between black slavery and ongoing animal exploitation and the many similarities between animal-rights and civil-rights activism. This Part also shows that despite the strong similarities, consensus to change the property classification does not seem imminent. It concludes by suggesting that the emphasis on the property label is misplaced. And using the evolution of the law of employment discrimination as an example, it shows that animal exploitation will likely continue even with the elimination of the property label.Part TV evaluates the claim that animal abuse and human abuse are linked. This Part looks at the sources of this claim and their many limitations and contradictions. Specifically, the predictive value of studies and anecdotal evidence linking animal cruelty to interpersonal violence is considered. Further, it considers the indictment that animal rights advocates are themselves cruelbecause of their indifference to human suffering, demonstrated for example, by their support for abortion rights. It also looks at other examples of insensitivity to human suffering by individuals who exhibit strong affection for animals and shows the obstacle this presents for animal activism.The last Part of this Article addresses animal exploitation as a universal cultural norm that academic theories are incapable of greatly influencing

The Illusion and Allure of Textualism

This article first studies Justice Scalia\u27s statutory interpretation decisions to determine whether a coherent theory of construction can be identified. His opinions reveal consistent advocacy of a textbased approach which logically could be called textualism. Critique of his approach is provided throughout. This section also provides an example of Justice Scalia\u27s deployment of the construction format he preaches

The Foreign Amici Dilemma

The primary goal of this article is to go beyond the rule of deference theory and explore how and why the Court routinely rejects or ignores the interpretations offered by foreigners when their views conflict with those of the executive. By exposing the imbalance and unfairness of the Court\u27s approach, perhaps this article will open the door for remedial measures. This article does not provide an exhaustive historical analysis of Supreme Court response to amici efforts, but rather sets out several historical spotlights which illuminate the futility of foreign amici. This illumination is accomplished by exploring three different types of amici picketing : (1) purely domestic, (2) domestic-foreign, and (3) purely foreign. The term amici picketing refers both to formal brief submission as well as extra-judicial activities intended to influence the Court

Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act to Equalize the Adjudication Rights of Powerful and Weak Parties

Providing an extensive historical overview of federal arbitration jurisprudence and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), this article argues that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted FAA provisions and goals, thereby drastically changing the law of labor arbitration to the detriment of American workers and consumers. Namely, original congressional policy goals (providing speedy, fair and informal alternatives to court adjudication) have been countermanded by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of arbitration law over the last 50 years. As a result, modern arbitration law sets up an imbalance of power between employers/merchants and workers/consumers who are forced into lengthy and expensive procedures before they can exercise their legal rights to sue. At the time the FAA was passed, arbitration relied on the concept of voluntary consent by both parties, but modern arbitration agreements are often not the result of voluntary consent but of a more powerful contracting party who controls the rules of the arbitration forum, thereby exerting pressure on a weaker party. Arguing against this interpretation, this article posits options available to reverse current arbitration rules, including lower court judicial defiance, legislative overrides, and the possibility of Supreme Court reversal. This article concludes by suggesting a proposal for a narrow legislative fix to the FAA that would include national standards for arbitration agreements and would define “arbitration” to avoid the current practices that conflict with fundamental arbitration attributes and goals

Reforming the Federal Arbitration Act to Equalize the Adjudication Rights of Powerful and Weak Parties

Providing an extensive historical overview of federal arbitration jurisprudence and the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), this article argues that the Supreme Court has misinterpreted FAA provisions and goals, thereby drastically changing the law of labor arbitration to the detriment of American workers and consumers. Namely, original congressional policy goals (providing speedy, fair and informal alternatives to court adjudication) have been countermanded by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of arbitration law over the last 50 years. As a result, modern arbitration law sets up an imbalance of power between employers/merchants and workers/consumers who are forced into lengthy and expensive procedures before they can exercise their legal rights to sue. At the time the FAA was passed, arbitration relied on the concept of voluntary consent by both parties, but modern arbitration agreements are often not the result of voluntary consent but of a more powerful contracting party who controls the rules of the arbitration forum, thereby exerting pressure on a weaker party. Arguing against this interpretation, this article posits options available to reverse current arbitration rules, including lower court judicial defiance, legislative overrides, and the possibility of Supreme Court reversal. This article concludes by suggesting a proposal for a narrow legislative fix to the FAA that would include national standards for arbitration agreements and would define “arbitration” to avoid the current practices that conflict with fundamental arbitration attributes and goals

Public Opinion and the Demise of Affirmative Action

Skewed perceptions about the black condition and a quiet avoidance of racial realities now dominate discussions about race. It is common to hear that discrimination is not a norm but an aberration, and that white disadvantage mirrors that of blacks. Part I of this article evaluates the link between increasingly widespread images of black success and declining realities of whiteness as privilege25 and its impact on the future of affirmative action. Part II shows that tying white disadvantage to black opportunity and achievement is not new and has always been strong currency in Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence. Part II also shows that, while available scholarship has focused on the interpretive aspects of the Court\u27s affirmative action jurisprudence, it has paid little or no attention to the role of public perception in redirecting the Court\u27s attention to the concerns of whites. Part III of this article argues that public mood and opinion are more powerful than the constitutional and statutory provisions implicated in the affirmative action debate because public opinion is a key force driving the interpretation given to those provisions. Part IV evaluates the effect of public opposition to racial competition and the theory of colorblindness on affirmative action programs in the areas of education, voting, and employment. This article contends that we must recognize racial discrimination and continue to work at eradicating such practices. Identifying how discrimination against blacks continues will serve as a counterweight to perceptions of black advantage and will minimize the public outcry against affirmative action

Privatizing Antidiscrimination Law with Arbitration: The Title VII Proof Problem

Privatizing Antidiscrimination La