Smart Traction Control Systems for Electric Vehicles Using Acoustic Road-type Estimation

The application of traction control systems (TCS) for electric vehicles (EV) has great potential due to easy implementation of torque control with direct-drive motors. However, the control system usually requires road-tire friction and slip-ratio values, which must be estimated. While it is not possible to obtain the first one directly, the estimation of latter value requires accurate measurements of chassis and wheel velocity. In addition, existing TCS structures are often designed without considering the robustness and energy efficiency of torque control. In this work, both problems are addressed with a smart TCS design having an integrated acoustic road-type estimation (ARTE) unit. This unit enables the road-type recognition and this information is used to retrieve the correct look-up table between friction coefficient and slip-ratio. The estimation of the friction coefficient helps the system to update the necessary input torque. The ARTE unit utilizes machine learning, mapping the acoustic feature inputs to road-type as output. In this study, three existing TCS for EVs are examined with and without the integrated ARTE unit. The results show significant performance improvement with ARTE, reducing the slip ratio by 75% while saving energy via reduction of applied torque and increasing the robustness of the TCS.Comment: Accepted to be published by IEEE Trans. on Intelligent Vehicles, 22 Jan 201

Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets

In this paper, we consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access, i.e., the network elements that are shared in the provision of competing broadband services, not only determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, but also the intensity of post-entry competition. We consider an access scheme that determines an access level and an associated two-part tariff. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher. We also show that the unregulated incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low).

Vertical Networks, Integration, and Connectivity

This paper studies competition in a network industry with a stylized two layered network structure, and examines: (i) price and connectivity incentives of the upstream networks, and (ii) incentives for vertical integration between an upstream network provider and a downstream firm. The main result of this paper is that vertical integration occurs only if the initial installed-base difference between the upstream networks is sufficiently small, and in that case, industry is configured with two vertically integrated networks, which yields highest incentives to invest in quality of interconnection. When the installed-base difference is sufficiently large, there is no integration in the industry, and neither of the firms have an incentive to invest in quality of interconnection. An industry configuration in which only the large network integrates and excludes (or raises cost of) its downstream rival does not appear as an equilibrium outcome: in the presence of a large asymmetry between the networks, when quality of interconnection is a strategic variable, the large network can exercise a substantial market power without vertical integration. Therefore, a vertically separated industry structure does not necessarily yield procompetitive outcomes

Weak and Strong Reinforcement Number For a Graph

Introducing the weak reinforcement number which is the minimum number of added edges to reduce the weak dominating number, and giving some boundary of this new parameter and trees

Glass half empty? politics and institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition

Half glass empty? politics & institutions in the liberalization of the fixed line telecommunications industry in Turkey

This chapter reviews Turkish experience with reform of the fixed line telecommunications industry. It provides an account of earlier incoherent attempts to privatize the incumbent operator in the absence of any regulatory framework or political consensus. It also describes the regulatory framework emerged in early 2000s and discusses the various political-economic and institutional factors behind its weak implementation, and hence its limited success in promoting competition

When good intentions are not enough: sequential entry and competition in the Turkish mobile industry

A decade into the liberalization of the Turkish mobile industry, the sector remains one of the most concentrated in Europe. In this paper we analyze the links between the regulatory environment and competitive outcomes in the Turkish context. We argue that seven years of duopoly incumbency resulted in a significant first-mover advantage. We then focus on the role of the regulatory tools that could potentially restrain the incumbent operators’ first-mover advantage and stimulate competition: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability

Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets

In this paper, we consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access, i.e., the network elements that are shared in the provision of competing broadband services, not only determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, but also the intensity of post-entry competition. We consider an access scheme that determines an access level and an associated two-part tariff. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher. We also show that the unregulated incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low)

Cooperation in Product Development and Process R&D Between Competitors

In this paper, we first provide a simple framework for cooperation in product development between competitors. We put forward the tradeoff between the benefits obtained through development cost sharing and the cost of intensified competition due to reduced product differentiation, which implies that no cooperation can be an equilibrium outcome. We allow for firms to cooperate partially, i.e., to develop some product components jointly, but not necessarily all components. This enables us to study the factors that may have an effect on the degree of cooperation in product development, both in the presence and in the absence of process R&D. We also analyze the interaction between cooperation decisions on product development and process R&D. By considering a direct link between the two, we show that the degree of cooperation in product development may adversely affect the intensity of cooperation in process R&D

Size of RJVs and Degree of Cooperation in Product Development

In this paper we provide a model of Research Joint Venture (RJV), and study the incentives of competing firms to cooperate in product development. Firms that participate in the RJV decide on the product components for joint development, i.e., they decide on how much to cooperate. We consider three cases: (i) an RJV with an exogenous size and an endogenous scope, (ii) an RJV with an endogenous size and an exogenous scope, and (iii) an RJV with an endogenous size and scope. Using numerical simulations we show that, on average, there is a negative relationship between the size and the scope of the RJV in both cases (i) and (ii). In case (iii), we find a positive relationship between the equilibrium size and the equilibrium scope of the RJV. Furthermore, both the equilibrium size and scope of the RJV are increasing with the industry size