Comment letters to the National Commission on Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 1987 (Treadway Commission) Vol. 1

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Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple markets

Traditional market power analyses of the U.S. cigarette manufacturing industry consider monopoly power exertion by manufacturers in selling cigarettes to consumers. Market characteristics combined with government policy make it plausible that manufacturers exert monopsony market power in procuring tobacco. We investigate this possibility in the U.S. and international tobacco markets by extending nonparametric tests to include simultaneously potential monopoly market power with potential monopsony market power in multiple input markets, allowing both Hicks-neutral and biased technical change. We use annual data from the cigarette manufacturing industry from 1977 to 1993. Results indicate substantial departures from competitive pricing in the procurement of domestic tobacco, supporting the postulate that cigarette manufacturers appropriate monopsony rents despite, and perhaps at times through, U.S. tobacco farm policy. Results are less clear with respect to monopsony market power exertion in imported leaf tobacco procurement by cigarette manufacturers. Finally, results indicate that monopoly market power exertion is relatively small and that, when the possibility of monopsony market power exertion is admitted, monopoly market power exertion is no longer problematic.[EconLit citations: L100, L660]. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 35-55, 2007.

Mix-Up: Models of Governance and Framing Opportunities in U.S. and EU Consumer Policy

Students of comparative politics have highlighted different styles of regulation in the U.S. and Europe. These differences also apply to consumer policy and its different models of governance. The paper holds that governance is a key variable but adds aspects of issue framing. Two examples of consumer policy are analysed: regulation of genetically modified organisms and tobacco control. The case studies show that features of governance such as adversarial legalism or the precautionary principle are not necessarily linked to distinctive styles of regulation. Instead they vary across policy fields. Only a mix of governance elements and framing opportunities for interest groups can explain output and new directions of consumer policy. Dilemmas of collective action appear to be shrinking for consumers because framing trumps mobilization of members. Copyright Springer 2005