The Sequencing Problem in Sequential Investigation Processes

Many decision problems in various fields of application can be characterized as diagnostic problems trying to assess the true state (of the world) of given cases. The investigation of assessment criteria improves the initial information according to observed signal outcomes, which are related to the possible states. Such sequential investigation processes can be analyzed within the framework of statistical decision theory, in which prior probability distributions of classes of cases are updated, allowing for a sorting of particular cases into ever smaller subclasses. However, receiving such information causes investigation costs. Besides the question about the set of relevant criteria, this defines two additional problems of statistical decision problems: the optimal stopping of investigations and the optimal sequence of investigating a given set of criteria. Unfortunately, no solution exists with which the optimal sequence can generally be determined. Therefore, the paper characterizes the associated problems and analyzes existing heuristics trying to approximate an optimal solution.Decision-Making, Uncertainty, Information, Bayesian Analysis, Statistical Decision Theory

Optimal Structuring of Assessment Processes in Competition Law: A Survey of Theoretical Approaches

In competition law, the problem of the optimal design of institutional and procedural rules concerns assessment processes of the pro- and anticompetitiveness of business behaviors. This is well recognized in the discussion about the relative merits of different assessment principles such as the rule of reason and per se rules. Supported by modern industrial organization research, which applies a more differentiated analysis to the welfare effects of different business behaviors, a full-scale case-by-case assessment seems to be the prevailing idea. Even though the discussion mainly focuses on extreme solutions, different theoretical approaches do exist, which provide important determinants and allow for a sound analysis of appropriate legal directives and investigation procedures from a ‘Law and Economics’ perspective. Integrating and examining them in light of various constellations results in differentiated solutions of optimally structured assessment processes.Law Enforcement, Competition Law, Competition Policy, Antitrust Law, Antitrust Policy, Decision-Making

Multilingual dictionaries of film vocabulary : a bibliography

Die folgende Bibliographie erschien zunächst in der Film Theory: Bibliographic Information and Newsletter, nos. 10-11, 1986, pp. 63-80 (= G177-G194). Inhalt: Bibliography Index of Languages Index of Lexicographical Domain

Multi-View Picking: Next-best-view Reaching for Improved Grasping in Clutter

Camera viewpoint selection is an important aspect of visual grasp detection, especially in clutter where many occlusions are present. Where other approaches use a static camera position or fixed data collection routines, our Multi-View Picking (MVP) controller uses an active perception approach to choose informative viewpoints based directly on a distribution of grasp pose estimates in real time, reducing uncertainty in the grasp poses caused by clutter and occlusions. In trials of grasping 20 objects from clutter, our MVP controller achieves 80% grasp success, outperforming a single-viewpoint grasp detector by 12%. We also show that our approach is both more accurate and more efficient than approaches which consider multiple fixed viewpoints.Comment: ICRA 2019 Video: https://youtu.be/Vn3vSPKlaEk Code: https://github.com/dougsm/mvp_gras

Agent Based Traffic Signals Regulating Flow On a Basic Grid

A simulation study on traffic light optimisation with agent-based behaviour of the traffic signals

Implications of Unprofitable Horizontal Mergers: A Positive External Effect does not Suffice to Clear a Merger!

We demonstrate that the popular Farrell-Shapiro-framework (FSF) for the analysis of mergers in oligopolies relies regarding its policy conclusions sensitively on the assumption that rational agents will only propose privately profitable mergers. If this assumption held, a positive external effect of a proposed merger would represent a sufficient condition to allow the merger. However, the empirical picture on mergers and acquisitions reveals a significant share of unprofitable mergers and economic theory, moreover, demonstrates that privately unprofitable mergers can be the result of rational action. Therefore, we extend the FSF by explicitly allowing for unprofitable mergers to occur with some frequency. This exerts a considerable impact on merger policy conclusions: while several insights of the original FSF are corroborated (f.i. efficiency defence), a positive external effect does not represent a sufficient condition for the allowance of a merger anymore. Applying such a rule would cause a considerable amount of false positives. We thank all participants of the 29th HOS Conference (Marburg, November 2007), the 35th EARIE Conference (Toulouse, September 2008) and the Annual Meeting of the Verein für Socialpolitik (Graz, September 2008) for a valuable and helpful discussion of this paper. Furthermore, we thank Barbara Güldenring for editorial assistance.Oligopoly theory, horizontal merger policy, profitability of mergers, antitrust

Horizontal Mergers, Involuntary Unemployment, and Welfare

Standard welfare analysis of horizontal mergers usually refers to two effects: the anticompetitive market power effect reduces welfare by enabling firms to charge prices above marginal costs, whereas the procompetitive efficiency ef-fect increases welfare by reducing the costs of production (synergies). How-ever, demand-side effects of synergies are usually neglected. We introduce them into a standard oligopoly model of horizontal merger by assuming an (empirically supported) decrease in labour demand due to merger-specific synergies and derive welfare effects. We find that efficiency benefits from horizontal mergers are substantially decreased, if involuntary unemployment exists. However, in full employment economies, demand-side effects remain negligible. Eventually, policy conclusions for merger control are discussed.Horizontal mergers, involuntary unemployment, efficiency defense, oligopoly, competition