26 research outputs found

    Computer, Data Processing, and Communication Services

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    Sterile Debates and Dubious Generalisations: An Empirical Critique of European Integration Theory Based on the Integration Processes in Telecommunications and Electricity

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    Making Democratic-Governance Work: The Consequences for Prosperity

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    Population, resources, and environment: Implications of human behavioral ecology for conservation

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    Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/43481/1/11111_2005_Article_BF02207996.pd

    The $4 Trillion Gamble: The Political Economy of the Emerging Global Information and Communication Infrastructure

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    Presented at 1:30 pm on October 22, 2008 in the Neely Room of the Georgia Tech Library.Peter F. Cowhey is Dean of the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and Qualcomm Endowed Chair in Communications and Technology Policy at the University of California, San Diego. His current research includes the political determinants of foreign policy, the reorganization of the global communications and information industries, internationalization of the world’s research universities and the future of foreign trade and investment rules in the Pacific Rim. Jonathan D. Aronson is Professor at the Annenberg School for Communication and the School of International Relations at the University of Southern California. His current research focuses on trade negotiations, trade in services, comparative regulation, international strategic alliances, and international telecommunications. Together with John Richards, Professors Cowhey and Aronson have written, Transforming Global Information and Communication Markets: The Political Economy of Innovation (MIT Press), available in January 2009.Runtime: 78:06 minute

    Deregulating and Liberalizing the North-American Telecommunications Market: Explaining the US-Approach

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    This paper examines the substantial regulatory changes in North American telecommunications markets over the past decade. We argue that a combination of U.S. domestic politics and the logic of international strategic positioning produced substantial and far-reaching reform driven primarily by multilateral actions at the WTO and a set of unilateral U.S. initiatives (primarily benchmarks). Internationally, although NAFTA played an important role as a "building block" for the WTO agreement, we argue the lack of market coverage and more far-reaching WTO agreement ultimately limited NAFTA's role in driving reform. The logic of U.S. domestic politics also played a central role by putting certain constraints on what the U.S. would accept in a telecommunications trade deal. Specifically, there was broad political support for a deal, but the particular problems facing U.S. carriers in competitive international markets meant any deal had to cover all major telecommunications markets and had to address the very real anti-competitive opportunities open to foreign monopolists. Our argument suggests continued reform is likely to be driven primarily by the framework established at the WTO, although the U.S. will continue to use unilateral initiatives to drive reform acceptable to key U.S. political actors. Dieses Papier untersucht die erheblichen Regulierungsänderungen auf dem nordamerikanischen Telekommunikationsmarkt während der letzten Dekade. Wir argumentieren, dass die Kombination von amerikanischer Innenpolitik und internationalen strategischen Interessen bedeutende und weit reichende Reformen erzeugte, ausgelöst vor allem von multilateralen Aktivitäten in der WTO und einseitigen Initiativen der USA (insbesondere Benchmarks). Die NAFTA war zwar ein wichtiger "Baustein" für das WTO-Abkommen, ihr begrenzter Wirkungsbereich und die weiter gehenden WTO-Vereinbarungen beeinträchtigten aber letztlich ihre Rolle als Triebkraft für Reformen. Die amerikanische Innenpolitik spielte einen zentralen Part, da sich hieraus Grenzen bezüglich der Inhalte eines Telekommunikationsabkommens ableiteten, das die USA zu akzeptieren bereit waren. Zwar gab es eine breite politische Unterstützung für ein Abkommen. Angesichts der spezifischen Probleme der amerikanischen Anbieter im internationalen Wettbewerb musste aber jede Vereinbarung alle großen Telekommunikationsmärkte umfassen, und sie musste den sehr konkreten Möglichkeiten ausländischer Monopolanbieter zur Beschränkung des Wettbewerbs Rechnung tragen. Unsere Überlegungen führen zu dem Ergebnis, dass weitere Reformen im Wesentlichen im Rahmen der WTO vorangetrieben werden dürften. Allerdings werden die USA auch in Zukunft einseitig Initiativen ergreifen, um Reformen durchzusetzen, die für ihre politischen Hauptakteure akzeptabel sind
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