A Monopolist in Public Transport: Undersupply or Oversupply?

A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on the degree of consumers’ heterogeneity as reflected in the distribution of consumers’ reservation prices. Oversupply is likely to occur when this distribution is peaked, and undersupply is likely to occur when this distribution is rather flat. In particular, monopoly production results in the oversupply of frequency when consumers’ reservation prices are concentrated around the entry costs of the private car, being the main alternative to public transport

Multi-store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets

Subsidisation of urban public transport and the Mohring effect

Mohring (1972) argues that urban public transport exhibits considerable economies of scale if users\u27 waiting time is included in the cost function. The implication is that without subsidisation, frequencies will be lower than socially optimal. This paper analyses this argument and shows that economies of scale do not constitute a justification for general subsidisation of urban public transport. If an operator is allowed to take the demand effect of their pricing and frequency decisions into account, then the profit-maximising frequency is shown to be at least as high as the welfare-maximising frequency

Subsidisation of Urban Public Transport and the Mohring Effect

Mohring (1972) argues that urban public transport exhibits considerable economies of scale if users' waiting time is included in the cost function. The implication is that without subsidisation, frequencies will be lower than socially optimal. This paper analyses this argument and shows that economies of scale do not constitute a justification for general subsidisation of urban public transport. If an operator is allowed to take the demand effect of their pricing and frequency decisions into account, then the profit-maximising frequency is shown to be at least as high as the welfare-maximising frequency. © 2008 LSE and the University of Bath

Park-and-ride: Good for the city, good for the region?

At the edge of cities, park-and-ride (P + R) facilities pop up with the aim to intercept motorists from traveling into the city. However, these facilities also appear attractive to public transport users who start using their cars for getting to the P + R location. This paper analyzes the overall impact of P + R on total car traffic and social welfare by means of a discrete modal choice model. The results show that the distribution of individuals' preferences for car over public transport is the main determinant of this impact. P + R has a larger traffic reducing effect if more individuals prefer their car. At the same time, the shift of traffic from city to periphery improves welfare. These effects get stronger when a P + R facility provides a superior access to the mainline public transportation network.Park and ride Traffic Transportation modes Discrete choice

Retail sprawl and multi-store firms: An analysis of location choice by retail chains

A growing number of cities and towns restrict the number of chain stores within their borders in order to prevent sprawl and increase in traffic problems. This paper verifies these concerns by analyzing endogenous location choices by multi-store firms, which sell heterogeneous products and can charge different prices at every store. It takes a generalized transportation cost approach to Salop [Salop, S.C., 1979. Monopolistic competition with outside goods. Bell Journal of Economics 10, 141-156], in which consumers' utility not only depends on real transportation costs but also on their preferences or tastes. The model confirms that firms' location strategies contribute to retail sprawl. However, the resulting locations actually minimize consumers' generalized transportation costs for given sizes of retail chains. One of the implications is that further concentration in the retail industry is welfare improving.Horizontal differentiation Multi-store competition Location choice Random utility

A Monopolist in Public Transport: Undersupply or Oversupply?

A monopolist in public transport may oversupply frequency relative to the social optimum, as van Reeven (2008) demonstrates with homogeneous consumers. This result generalizes for heterogeneous consumers who know the timetable. Whether a monopolist oversupplies or undersupplies frequency depends on the degree of consumers’ heterogeneity as reflected in the distribution of consumers’ reservation prices. Oversupply is likely to occur when this distribution is peaked, and undersupply is likely to occur when this distribution is rather flat. In particular, monopoly production results in the oversupply of frequency when consumers’ reservation prices are concentrated around the entry costs of the private car, being the main alternative to public transport.Frequency oversupply, Mohring effect, transportation monopolist