Are Objective, Official Measures of Disability Reliable?

The issue considered in this study is whether objective, official reports on disability status are reliable. While there is a rather large literature on the reliability of self-reported disability, evidence regarding objective data is scant. It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since individuals out of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies. But we argue that such administrative data should be regarded with some suspicion, since the administrators also may have incentives to misreport. The empirical evidence, based on a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, suggests systematic misreporting by the Public Employment Service of objective, official disability measures due to incentives to exaggerate disability.Work Disability; Classification Error; Public Employment Service

Are objective, official measures of disability reliable?

The issue considered in this study is whether objective, official reports on disability status are reliable. While there is a rather large literature on the reliability of self-reported disability, evidence regarding objective data is scant. It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since individuals out of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies. But we argue that such administrative data should be regarded with some suspicion, since the administrators also may have incentives to misreport. The empirical evidence, based on a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, suggests systematic misreporting by the Public Employment Service of objective, official disability measures due to incentives to exaggerate disability.Work disability; classification error; public employment service

On the Definition and Age-Dependency of the Value of a Statistical Life. A Review and Extension

The value of preventing a fatality or (saving) a statistical life is an important question in health economics as well as environmental economics. This paper reviews and adds new insights to several of the issues discussed in the literature. For example, how do we define the value of a (statistical) life? Are there really strong theoretical reasons for believing that the value of a life declines with age? The paper derives definitions of the value of a statistical life in both single-period models and life-cycle models. Models with and without actuarially fair annuities are examined, as well as the age-profile of the value of a statistical life.Value of a statistical life; value of preventing a fatality; age-specific values; willingness to pay;

Employment, mobility, and active labor market programs

Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding a job substantially. Moreover, both programs are associated with a locking-in effect: the probability of finding a job outside the home region decreases after program participation. However, this effect appears to stem exclusively from the decrease in the overall job finding rate.Subsidized employment; labor market training; program evaluation; employment; contracted mobility

Estimating Compensating Wage Differentials from Worker Mobility

We estimate the effects of the implementation of a compulsory work injury insurance in Sweden in 1978 on compensating wage differentials. This involves two steps. First, we investigate if there are compensating wage differentials on the Swedish labor market and second, we assess if these were altered by the reform. We use panel data for the period 1970 to 1990 with annual information for a sample of blue collar workers. The econometric model departs from the worker's job mobility decision. Endogeneity, selection and measurement errors of risk exposure are considered in the estimation. The estimates show significant compensating wage differentials for work-related diseases in the female sub-sample. No significant effect of the reform was found.Work injury insurance; Panel data

Moral hazard and sickness insurance: Empirical evidence from a sickness insurance reform in Sweden

We use a reform of Sweden’s sickness insurance system as a source of exogenous variation to analyse the presence of moral hazard. As a result of the reform, the replacement level was reduced from 90 percent of forgone earnings to 65 percent for the first three days; to 80 percent between day 4 and 90; and remained at 90 percent after 90 days. We find that the incidence of work absence decreased due to the decrease in compensation level and that effect on duration is in accordance with moral hazard in the sickness insurance. We estimate the elasticities of the incidence with respect to forgone earning to -1 for males and -0.70 for females.Worker absenteeism; Cox proportional hazard models; regression-discontinuity

Employment, Mobility, and Active Labor Market Programs

Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding a job substantially. Moreover, both programs are associated with a locking-in e.ect: the probability of finding a job outside the home region decreases after program participation. However, this e.ect appears to stem exclusively from the decrease in the overall job finding rate.Subsidized employment; labor market training; program evaluation; employment; contracted mobility

Turnover and Price in the Housing Market: Causation, Association or Independence?

We give general conditions for the data generating process to facilitate the testing of structural dependence of turnover on the average (or median) price in the homogenous housing market. Furthermore, the implications of aggregation over sub-markets is studied. A plausible explanation of the disparate empirical findings in this literature may be aggregation over heterogenous sub-markets. This conclusion is supported by empirical findings using longitudinal quarterly data for 289 Swedish municipalities during 1981:1-2000:2.Aggregation bias; House price; Volume of trade; Search

The effect of increased employer contacts within a labour market training program

Using both register and survey data, two types of labour market training programs are compared. One program is part of the regular Swedish labour market training and the other, Swit, was initiated as an experiment during a two-year period, in an attempt to solve a bottleneck problem with people working with information technology. Enrolling in Swit increases the chances of finding employment by 20 percent, as compared to entering the conventional program, directed towards IT. The difference is due to the positive effect of more practical experience within Swit, which is especially large for individuals with a weak position on the labour market.Evaluation; Information technology; Employment rate; Propensity score matching

Program Evaluation and Random Program Starts

This paper discusses the evaluation problem using observational data when the timing of treatment is an outcome of a stochastic process. We show that, without additional assumptions, it is not possible to estimate the average treatment effect and treatment on the treated. It is, however, possible to estimate the effect of treatment on the treated up to a certain time point. We propose an estimator to estimate this effect and show that it is possible to test for an average treatment effect.treatment effects, dynamic treatment assignment, program evaluation, method of matching