No. 30: Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immgration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa

The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens, migrants and refugees have been documented in several recent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as a major problem by the state and steps have been taken by government and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phenomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other countries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2 called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultaneously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a 1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to measure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and immigration and refugee policy preferences. The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of noncitizens in their countries. Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to target. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much more negative attitudes than other groups. One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant finding. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and policy-makers. Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy measures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skillsand investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin

No. 20: The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor

No. 14: The State of Food Insecurity in Windhoek, Namibia

AFSUN recently conducted a survey of poor urban households in eleven major cities in Southern Africa to better understand the seriousness of the urban food insecurity situation. This report looks in detail at the results for Windhoek and seeks to answer one central question, that is, why do the urban poor in Namibia’s capital generally appear to be better off than the urban poor in most of the other ten cities where the survey was conducted and why, at the same time, does Windhoek contain some of the most food insecure households in the region? As a city of migrants, Windhoek’s case also presents the opportunity to examine the relationship between migration and urban food security in more depth. Among the key findings is that access to food, which depends on incomes and food pricing, is critical in Windhoek, where food availability is not an issue. What is required is a systematic national and city strategy for reducing the high levels of food insecurity amongst the urban poor in general and in informal settlements in particular

No. 20: The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor

The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor

No. 47: The Haemorrhage of Health Professionals From South Africa: Medical Opinions

The health sector has been especially hard hit by the brain drain from South Africa. Unless the push factors are successfully addressed, intense interest in emigration will continue to translate into departure for as long as demand exists abroad (and there is little sign of this letting up.) Health professional decision-making about leaving, staying or returning is poorly-understood and primarily anecdotal. To understand how push and pull factors interact in decision- making (and the mediating role of variables such as profession, race, class, age, gender income and experience), the opinions of health professionals themselves need to be sought. This paper reports the results of a survey of health professionals in South Africa conducted in 2005-6 by SAMP. Since there is no single reliable database for all practicing health professionals, SAMP used the 29,000 strong database of MEDpages. All those on the list were invited by email to complete an online survey. About 5% of the professionals went to the website and completed the questionnaire; some requested hard copies or electronic copies of the questionnaire which they completed and returned. Although the sample is biased towards professionals who have internet access and those who were willing to complete an online questionnaire, the sample represents a good cross-section (though not necessarily statistically representative sample) of South African health professionals and offers insights into their attitudes and opinions about emigration and other topics. In partnership with the Democratic Nursing Organisation of South Africa (DENOSA), SAMP also distributed the survey manually to a sample of nurses and received an additional 178 responses. Data on 1,702 health professionals was collected. The largest category of respondents was doctors (44%), followed by nurses (15%), dieticians/therapists (12%), psychologists (10%), pharmacists (7%) and dentists (5%). The sample was almost evenly split between males and females. About 70% of the respondents were white, followed by blacks (10%), Indians (6%) and Coloureds (3%). The pre-dominance of whites is primarily a historical legacy of the apartheid system which was racially biased in its selection of health trainees. About 57% of the sample came from the private sector, 23% from the public sector and 17% had employment in both sectors. Half the respondents were under 42 years of age. Just over 20% were in their first five years of service while 26% had twenty or more years of service. There was more variation within professions but, in general, the sample provided an extremely good mix of professionals at different stages of their career. The survey asked questions relating to (a) living in South Africa, (b) employment conditions and (c) attitudes about moving to another country. Each answer was evaluated against the set of basic demographic characteristics to see if there were important differences in response e.g. did health sector make a difference or did gender make a difference? The seven demographic characteristics analyzed were: sex, race, health sector, health profession, domicile, household income and years of service. The survey revealed the extreme dissatisfaction of many South African health professionals, a sentiment that cut across profession, race and gender. The profession is characterized not by a groundswell of discontent but a tidal wave of unhappiness and dissatisfaction with both economic and social conditions in the country. For example: With regard to general conditions in the country, there were very high levels of dissatisfaction with the HIV/AIDS situation (84% dissatisfied), the upkeep of public amenities (83%), family security (78%), personal safety (74%), prospects for their children’s future (73%) and the cost of living (45%). In only three categories were there fewer dissatisfied than satisfied professionals: availability of schooling (29% dissatisfied versus 46% satisfied), housing (30% versus 45%) and (perhaps unsurprisingly) medical facilities (19% versus 57%). In terms of working conditions, the most important source of dissatisfaction was taxation levels (58% dissatisfied, 14% satisfied) followed by fringe benefits (56% and 17%), then remuneration (53% and 22%), the availability of medical supplies (50% and 28%), workplace infrastructure (50% and 31%). prospects for professional advancement (41% and 30%) and work load (44% and 31%). Consistent with widespread concerns about safety, as many as a third were dissatisfied with the level of personal security in the workplace. Around a third of the respondents were dissatisfied with the level of risk of contracting a life-threatening disease in their work (35% versus 28% for HIV/AIDS; 32% versus 30% for TB and 37% versus 26% for Hepatitis B), an extraordinarily high percentage which is indicative of the conditions under which many work. On only two measures was there general satisfaction among the health professionals: collegial relations (76% satisfied, 5% dissatisfied) and the appropriateness of their training for the job (71% versus 14%). Variables with the greatest impact on satisfaction levels included profession and sector (public or private). Other variables (e.g. age, gender, race and years of experience) were not significant. The highest dissatisfaction levels expressed were as follows: for Workload: public sector employees, nurses and pharmacists; for Workplace Security: public sector, nurses, dentists and pharmacists; for Relationship with Management: public sector and nurses; for Infrastructure: public sector, nurses and black professionals; for Medical Supplies: public sector and public/private employees; for Morale in the Workplace: public and public/private sectors and nurses; for Risk of contracting TB: public sector; for Risk of contracting HIV/AIDS: nurses, doctors and dentists; for Risk of contracting HEP B: nurses and dentists; for Personal Safety: black professionals. Overall, public sector employees and nurses tend to have the highest levels of dissatisfaction. Income levels do significantly influence satisfaction levels on some broad issues including schooling for children, finding a house, cost of living and availability of products. In general, the higher the income the greater the percentage that are satisfied. Black professionals are more dissatisfied than others regarding finding a house (61%), schooling for children (52%) and accessing medical services for family/children (39%). Younger professionals are the most dissatisfied when it comes to finding a house (51%) and nurses have the highest percentage dissatisfied with the cost of living (62%). Comparing life in South Africa today with the situation before 1994, respondents were divided almost equally with 35% feeling it had improved, 31% that it was the same and 35% that it had deteriorated. Not surprisingly, race had a significant impact with over 50% of black, Coloured and Indian respondents feeling that life was better now than before. In sum, it is alarming that South Africa’s health professionals find satisfaction in little except their interaction with colleagues. While their views of living and working in South Africa are very negative, they hold very positive opinions about other places: When asked whether life would be better in a number of potential destination countries overseas, responses were overwhelmingly positive. Topping the list of where life would be better were Australia and New Zealand (77% better, 6% worse), followed by North America (77% better, 7% worse) and Europe (72% better, 10% worse). The Middle East was also rated highly, particularly by dentists and nurses. As many as a half the sample felt that their lives would be better there. There was little evident enthusiasm for the Southern African region with 69% of respondents thinking it would be worse to live there, and only 9% thinking it would be better. However, as many as 30% of black respondents said they would do better in other Southern African countries than in South Africa. Asia was viewed in a more positive light than the rest of Southern Africa. When asked where they would likely go if they left South Africa (their personal MLD or Most Likely Destination), most selected developed countries or regions. The most popular choices were Australia/New Zealand (33%), the United Kingdom (25%), Europe (10%), the United States (10%) and Canada (9%). The results were generally consistent across the demographic variables although the UK is a more likely destination for dentists (38%) and Europe a more likely destination for psychologists (17%). Only black health professionals rated a move to a SADC country (14%) about as likely as a move to a developed country such as Canada (12%) or the United States (21%). Respondents were asked to compare employment conditions in South Africa with those in their MLD. Five features were identified by over 60% of respondents as better in the MLD: workplace security (69%), remuneration (65%), fringe benefits (63%), infrastructure (63%) and medical supplies (61%). Other issues rated by about half as better in the MLD included workload and career and professional advancement. Only training preparation was rated as better in South Africa. Hence, there is a very general perception that most aspects of the work environment are better in the MLD than in South Africa. Many also listed existing push factors that would prompt them to seek employment overseas. Some 72% cited inadequate remuneration as a reason to emigrate. Next came workplace infrastructure (cited by 27%), educational opportunity (25%), professional advancement (23%), job security (22%) and workload (19%). How serious are South African health professionals about actually leaving the country? Almost half of the respondents have given it a great deal of consideration and only 14% have given it no consideration at all. Male health professionals have given emigration more serious consideration than females (53% v 41%); white professionals have given it marginally more serious consideration than black (45% v 41%), while both groups have given it less consideration than Indians and Coloured professionals. Professionals in the private sector have actually given it more consideration than those in the public sector (48% v 44%). And professionals under 30 have given it more consideration than their older counterparts (indeed, this measure of emigration potential declines with age). Type of profession is a clear differentiating variable: pharmacists (at 68%) have given emigration a great deal of consideration, followed by dentists (58%), physicians (48%) and nurses (46%). Place of residence and level of income make little difference. Indeed it would appear that rampant dissatisfaction is translating directly into a serious consideration of leaving for a large percentage of health professionals. Around half of the respondents (52%) said there was a high likelihood they would leave South Africa within the next five years. This includes 25% likely to move within two years and 8% within six months. About 14% of the respondents had already applied for work permits in other countries. Six percent had applied for permanent residence, 5% for citizenship and as many as 30% for professional registration overseas. Recruiters are often identified as the guilty party in the “poaching” of health professionals from developing countries and are clearly very active in South Africa. The survey showed that health professionals get most of their information about foreign job opportunities from recruiter advertisements in professional journals and newsletters. Health professional publications such as the South African Medical Journal and Nursing Update carry copious job advertisements, primarily from the UK, Australia and Canada. Many of these advertisements are placed by both local and international health recruitment agencies. Agencies also make direct contact with health professionals about employment opportunities in other countries. Nearly two in five (38%) had been personally approached, with greater than half of all doctors (53%) having been contacted. However, survey respondents minimized the role of recruitment agencies, saying their influence was marginal. Less than a quarter of respondents had actually attended recruitment meetings. Despite this, the role of such agencies should not be discounted as having an impact on emigration. The survey also provided insights into the phenomenon of return migration. A third of the sample had already worked in a foreign country and returned to South Africa. Are South African health professionals who have international experience more or less satisfied with their life and job than those who have no overseas experience? This is an important issue given the growing attention being paid internationally to encouraging “return migration.” Those who have lived and worked in foreign countries might have found that conditions are not as attractive as once imagined. Certainly, there is anecdotal evidence that some émigrés return to South Africa because their expectations are not met. On the other hand, returnees may be influenced to return by nostalgic images of South Africa that fail to reflect current realities. In such a case, those who return to the country may be even more dissatisfied with conditions and choose to emigrate once again. The main conclusions are as follows: The vast majority of return migrants were doctors (63% of the total and 50% of doctors in the sample). Very few nurses had worked outside the country (only 5% of the total and 11% of nurse respondents). While living and working conditions are a major driving force in emigration; they do not attract people back. People return for a variety of less tangible reasons including family, a desire to return “home”, missing the South African lifestyle, patriotism, wanting to make a difference, and the fact that the ‘grass is not as green’ as anticipated on the other side. Returnees are generally more satisfied with living and working conditions than those who have never worked in a foreign country. With regard to employment and working conditions, return migrants are less dissatisfied on virtually every measure. The difference is particularly marked with regard to prospects for professional advancement (35% of return migrants dissatisfied versus 58% of non-migrants), income levels (34% versus 59%) and taxation (32% versus 60%). When it comes to living conditions in South Africa, return migrants are more positive about some issues, especially the cost of living, finding suitable accommodation and schools, and medical services. But they are equally as negative about certain others, especially the HIV/AIDS situation in the country, personal and family safety, public amenities and their children’s future prospects. In other words, while experience overseas has softened some attitudes about many determinants of emigration, it has done little to affect opinions related to safety or perceived health risks, especially as it relates to HIV/AIDS. Return migrants are primed for re-emigration. Those who have returned to South Africa are just as likely to leave again as those who have never left. For example, 1 2% of return migrants said they would probably leave within 6 months (compared to 6% of non-migrants). About a quarter of each (27% and 25%) said they would probably leave within two years. And around half (53% and 51%) said they would probably leave within five years. Finally, the survey provided insights into the attitudes of health professionals towards government policy. The South African government has moved recently towards more proactive retention policies for the health sector. Despite this, there is considerable scepticism among health professionals that conditions will improve. The overwhelming majority (94%) disapproved of the way the government has performed its job in the health sector over the last year. The survey results reported in this paper demonstrate the intense dissatisfaction of health professionals with working and living conditions in the sector and the country. Emigration is set to continue and even accelerate. The possibility that the health professional shortfall will be met by health professionals currently being trained in South Africa is disproved by a recent SAMP survey which showed that the emigration potential of health sector students is greater than students in the non-health sector; 65% indicated they would emigrate within five years. The level of dissatisfaction in the sector is such that it may seem difficult for government to know where to begin. Certainly it could begin with itself. There can be few professions where practitioners are as unhappy with their government department. The reasons for this need to be addressed and confidence built or restored. The health department, in concert with its provincial counterparts, also needs to address workplace conditions identified by respondents as needing change. When it comes to other factors, family and personal safety and security are rated as reasons to leave. Unless and until the level of personal security improves, health professionals will continue to be attracted by countries that are perceived to be safer. The other policy option facing South Africa would be for the country to become a recruiter and net importer of health professionals itself. Here there is a very real dilemma. To date, the Department of Health has adopted a policy of not recruiting health professionals from developing, particularly other African, countries. The problem, as some critics have pointed out, is that if South Africa does not recruit them, someone else will. At least this way, it is argued, health professionals are not lost to the region or continent. The only way this would benefit other countries is if they had greater access to South African health care facilities in return. There are compelling reasons for South Africa to adopt a more open immigration policy towards the immigration of health professionals from parts of the world that are being actively recruited by developed countries. In May 2007, under its new quota system for immigrants, the government announced the availability of 34,825 work permits in 53 occupations experiencing labour shortages. Significantly, not a single health professional category is on the designated list. This is clearly not in the country’s best interests. There is a decided and growing shortage of health professionals. Morality may suggest that a no-immigration policy is the best one to pursue but no country uses morality as a basis for making immigration decisions and South Africa certainly is not applying such criteria to other sectors. A twin-pronged strategy is urgently needed: address the conditions at home that are prompting people to leave and adopt a more open immigration policy to those who would like to come

No. 30: Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immgration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa

The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens, migrants and refugees have been documented in several recent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as a major problem by the state and steps have been taken by government and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phenomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other countries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present. The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2 called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultaneously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a 1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to measure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and immigration and refugee policy preferences. The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of noncitizens in their countries. Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to target. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much more negative attitudes than other groups. One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant finding. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and policy-makers. Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy measures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skillsand investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin

No. 26: Social Media, The Internet and Diasporas for Development

The recent focus on diasporas by policy-makers researchers has highlighted the rich potential of migrants as a force for shaping development activities in their countries of origin. The study of diasporas in development presents researchers a number of significant challenges. As Vertovec and Cohen suggest, ‘one of the major changes in migration patterns is the growth of populations anchored … neither at their places of origin nor at their places of destination’. The fluid, multi-sited and multi-generational nature of diaspora groupings poses considerable methodological challenges of definition, identification, location, sampling and interviewing. As the nature of African diasporas are constantly in flux so too should the methodologies we use to study them. In practice, traditional approaches lead to the same methodological roadblocks. Census and immigration data (particularly from destination countries) can provide an overall picture of diaspora stocks, flows and locations. However, privacy issues generally preclude these sources from providing disaggregated data at the level of the individual migrant or migrant household. Surveys of diaspora members have therefore become the standard means of collecting information on diaspora characteristics, identities, activities and linkages. This immediately raises a set of problems and challenges. Census data can tell us the size of the population to sample but not who the individuals are, where they live and how to contact them. Without a sampling frame, researchers tend to rely instead on ‘snowball’, ‘purposive’ or ‘convenience’ sampling. This has produced a disproportionate number of studies that rely on key informant and focus group interviews in order to create a profile of diasporas and their development-related activities. Diasporas are often geographically dispersed within a country and across different countries. Cost and time constraints and the bias of snowball and convenience sampling lead to a focus on sub-sets. Studies of diaspora members in particular cities or regions are especially common. While sample sizes vary considerably, there is a marked reliance on very small samples, which raises obvious questions about the representativeness and generalizability of the findings. The mail-out survey is still the preferred method of reaching members of a geographically dispersed diaspora, although response rates remain stubbornly low. To contact members of the diaspora, mailing lists are compiled from organizations that keep, and are willing to share, membership lists (such as diaspora organizations, embassies, alumni associations, immigrant service agencies and religious organizations). However, this means an inherent sampling bias since data collected from these individuals and groups has the potential to be skewed towards diaspora members actively engaged with their origin country. This method of ‘accessing the diaspora through the diaspora’ is also unlikely to provide much information on ‘hidden’ members of a diaspora whose immigration status may be undocumented or uncertain and who are wary of disclosing personal information directly to researchers. Researchers have also noted that members of vulnerable populations such as asylum seekers and refugees might be reluctant to provide personal information due to fear and trust issues. To identify and connect with larger numbers, different strategies need to be adopted. In this context, the potential of the internet has rarely been considered. Since the advent of the internet age, more than one billion people have become connected to the World Wide Web (WWW), creating seemingly limitless opportunities for communication. The past decade has also seen a major increase in the use of the internet by diaspora individuals and groupings. The internet has not only facilitated remittance transfers, but has increased communication among and between diasporas and influenced the formation of diasporic identities. In this context, the potential of web-based methodologies in diaspora research appears promising. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we argue for supplementing conventional approaches with new methodologies that embrace the connectivity of diasporas, the emergence of social media and the potential of online surveys. Second, we illustrate the potential of this approach through discussion of the methods adopted in our current research on the African diaspora in Canada

The State of Food Insecurity in Maputo, Mozambique

Food insecurity is a fact of life for the vast majority of households across Maputo’s poverty belt. The Maputo urban food security survey done by AFSUN as part of its baseline survey of 11 Southern African cities found that households exist in a constant state of food insecurity manifested in a lack of access to sufficient affordable food, poor dietary quality and undernutrition. Income is meagre and only those households with access to wage income have any chance of holding food insecurity at bay. With a vibrant informal food economy, Maputo’s poor are surrounded by fresh and processed food. Food availability is therefore not the primary determinant of food insecurity in Maputo. Certainly large-scale food import from South Africa and further afield makes the market price of food inherently volatile. But prices for the consumer are also driven down by the fact that there is intense competition among vendors on the streets and in the marketplaces. The real cause of food insecurity is high urban unemployment and a lack of regular and decent-paying work. Among its recommendations, AFSUN urges the city of Maputo to set up a food security strategy that is multisectoral and policy-oriented and based on a better understanding of food flows into and within the city, the operation of the city’s informal food economy and the likely impacts of formal retailing for the food security of the urban poor