

Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier

Southern African Migration Programme

Reports and Papers

2004

No. 30: Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa

Jonathan Crush

Balsillie School of International Affairs/WLU, jcrush@wlu.ca

Wade Pendleton

University of Cape Town

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholars.wlu.ca/samp>



Part of the [African Studies Commons](#), [Economics Commons](#), and the [Migration Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Crush, J., & Pendleton, W. (2004). Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa (rep., pp. i-49). Waterloo, ON: Southern African Migration Programme. SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 30.

This Migration Policy Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Reports and Papers at Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Southern African Migration Programme by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

REGIONALIZING XENOPHOBIA?
CITIZEN ATTITUDES TO
IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA

JONATHAN CRUSH AND
WADE PENDLETON

SERIES EDITOR:
PROF. JONATHAN CRUSH

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT
2004

Published by Idasa, 6 Spin Street, Church Square, Cape Town, 8001, and Queen's University, Canada.

Copyright Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) 2004
ISBN 1-919798-53-6

First published 2004
Design by Bronwen Dachs Müller
Typeset in Goudy

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission from the publishers.
Bound and printed by Creda Communications, Cape Town

CONTENTS	PAGE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
INTRODUCTION	4
THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY SURVEYS (NIPS)	6
MEASURES OF XENOPHOBIA	9
PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION DYNAMICS	12
ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS	17
EXPLAINING INTOLERANCE	24
CONTACT	24
ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES	26
“OTHERING” FOREIGNERS	29
ATTITUDES TO POLICY	33
REFUGEE POLICY ATTITUDES	40
RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS	41
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	43
ENDNOTES	46
MIGRATION POLICY SERIES	48

TABLES	PAGE
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SAMPLE	7
TABLE 2: ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLE	8
TABLE 3: REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION	10
TABLE 4: INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION	11
TABLE 5: PERCEPTIONS ABOUT FOREIGN INFLUX	12
TABLE 6: PERCEIVED NUMBERS OF MIGRANTS	12
TABLE 7: PERCEIVED LEGAL STATUS OF MIGRANTS	13
TABLE 8: PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION ORIGINS	14
TABLE 9: PERCEPTIONS OF WHY MIGRANTS COME	14
TABLE 10: PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRANT MOTIVATIONS	15
TABLE 11: PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRANT PERMANENCE	16
TABLE 12: PROPORTION OF REFUGEES THOUGHT TO BE GENUINE	16
TABLE 13: SOURCES OF INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGNERS	17
TABLE 14: IMPRESSIONS OF PEOPLE FROM DIFFERENT AREAS, BY COUNTRY	18
TABLE 15: ACCEPTABILITY OF FOREIGN CITIZENS BY REGION	19
TABLE 16: REASONS FOR EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN CITIZENS FROM CITIZENSHIP	20
TABLE 17: COMPETITION WITH FOREIGN CITIZENS ON THE JOB MARKET	20
TABLE 18: WORK ETHIC SCALE	21
TABLE 19: DIFFERENCE SCALE	22
TABLE 20: TRUSTWORTHINESS SCALE	23
TABLE 21: STEREOTYPING SCALE	24
TABLE 22: FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH FOREIGN CITIZENS	25
TABLE 23: TYPES OF PERSONAL CONTACT WITH FOREIGN PERSONS	26
TABLE 24: QUALITY OF INTERACTIONS WITH FOREIGN CITIZENS	26

TABLE 25:	LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH PERSONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	27
TABLE 26:	PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS	27
TABLE 27:	LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	28
TABLE 28:	PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS	28
TABLE 29:	SELF-IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP	29
TABLE 30:	CHILDREN'S IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP	30
TABLE 31:	NATIONAL PRIDE	30
TABLE 32:	STRENGTH OF TIES WITH FELLOW CITIZENS	31
TABLE 33:	CITIZENSHIP AND THE CONSTITUTION	31
TABLE 34:	CITIZENSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR NON-RACIALISM	31
TABLE 35:	LOCAL BIRTH AS A REQUIREMENT FOR CITIZENSHIP	32
TABLE 36:	BIRTH OF PARENTS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR CITIZENSHIP	32
TABLE 37:	BIRTH OF GRANDPARENTS AS A REQUIREMENT FOR CITIZENSHIP	32
TABLE 38:	RACE AND CITIZENSHIP	32
TABLE 39:	ATTITUDES TOWARDS VOLUME OF IN-MIGRATION	33
TABLE 40:	REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION CONTROL MEASURES	34
TABLE 41:	LIKELIHOOD OF TAKING ACTION AGAINST OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN NATIONALS	35
TABLE 42:	PERSONAL ACTIONS AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS	36
TABLE 43:	REGIONAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS DEPORTATION OF MIGRANTS	37
TABLE 44:	MIGRANT PREFERENCES	37
TABLE 45:	ATTITUDES TOWARDS TREATMENT OF MIGRANTS	38
TABLE 46:	ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE BRAIN DRAIN	39
TABLE 47:	ATTITUDES ABOUT REFUGEES	40
TABLE 48:	GOVERNMENT POLICY PREFERENCES ON REFUGEES	41
TABLE 49:	ATTITUDES TOWARDS RIGHTS FOR CITIZENS AND NON-CITIZENS	42

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors wish to express their sincere thanks to everyone involved in SAMP'S National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) and the creation of the data base on which this paper is based. They include the following individuals and their country research teams: Eugene Campbell and John Oucho (University of Botswana), Fernando Dava (Arpac, Mozambique), Hamilton Simelane (University of Swaziland), and Dan Tevera (University of Zimbabwe). Wade Pendleton coordinated the research in Namibia and the field implementation as a whole. The South African data used in this study is drawn from an earlier survey coordinated by David McDonald (Queen's), Donald Taylor (McGill) and Robert Mattes (Idasa and University of Cape Town). Christa Schier and her team at the MRCC at the University of Namibia created the data base for analysis. Christina Decarie provided invaluable editorial support.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The negative attitudes of South Africans towards non-citizens, migrants and refugees have been documented in several recent studies. Xenophobia has been officially recognized as a major problem by the state and steps have been taken by government and the South African Human Rights Commission to “roll back xenophobia.” Since anti-immigrant intolerance is a global phenomenon, should South Africans be singled out in this regard? This paper seeks to contextualize the South African situation by comparing the attitudes of South Africans with citizens from several other countries in the SADC; namely, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

In practical policy terms, xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present.

The paper is based on a SAMP Project implemented in 2001-2 called the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS). The survey, of a representative sample of urban residents, was implemented simultaneously in 5 SADC states. A comparable data set was extracted from a 1999 SAMP survey in South Africa. The survey was designed to measure citizen knowledge of migration, attitudes towards non-citizens, and immigration and refugee policy preferences.

The survey found that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity, and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries.

Negative attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa,

Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened by outsiders) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where to begin but deciding who to target. Within countries where there is greater tolerance, a more classic pattern pertains. That is, those with the most to lose from the presence of non-citizens – the unskilled and the unemployed – exhibit much more negative attitudes than other groups.

One of the more interesting results is the apparent absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant finding. The absence of any real sense of “regional consciousness” (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of these SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive, uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related initiatives such as the Migration Dialogue in Southern Africa (MIDSA) is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and policy-makers.

Most citizens would prefer national governments to “get tough” with migrants and refugees. There is widespread suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. Although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner.

When migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer harsh policy measures. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education confronting government if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skills- and investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin.

INTRODUCTION

The democratization of South Africa in 1994 brought major transformation to one of the most racially divided and inequitable countries in the world. Representative government, a rights-based Constitution and the deracialization of public life and the institutions of governance all testify to the extent and depth of this transformation.

The ANC government – in its attempts to overcome the divides of the past and build new forms of social cohesion at the local, regional and national level – embarked on an aggressive and inclusive nation-building project. One unanticipated by-product of this project has been a growth in intolerance towards outsiders. South Africa's redefinition of the boundaries of citizenship and belonging is based on the creation of a "new other"; the "non-citizen", the "foreigner", the "alien".¹ Intolerance, bordering on xenophobia, has intensified dramatically since 1994.² Violence against foreign citizens and African refugees has become increasingly common and communities are divided by hostility and suspicion.³ In 1997, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) set out to document the character and extent of xenophobic sentiment in South Africa. Two national surveys confirmed that South Africans were indeed highly xenophobic. The findings were reported in a joint publication with the South African Human Rights Commission in 2002.⁴

The primary sources of migrants to South Africa are the neighbouring countries in SADC and various countries elsewhere in Africa. Inevitably, therefore much South African xenophobic sentiment is directed at people from countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi. Francophone Africans also face a particularly difficult challenge since they are generally more visible.⁵ The home countries of migrants are often stereotyped as being in utter chaos and South Africa, by contrast, is portrayed as a haven of peace, calm and opportunity. In the course of our research, the question has been raised as to whether SAMP is "singling out" South Africa. In other words, perhaps the attitudes of South Africans are not only justifiable in the circumstances but very unlikely to be unique?

The general purpose of this paper, then, is to compare citizen attitudes to migrants, immigrants, refugees and immigration policy across the Southern African region. The more specific objective is to see whether the well-documented xenophobic attitudes of South Africans are echoed across the region. Are Southern Africans as intolerant of outsiders as South Africans? Or do they display a more tolerant and less paranoid set of attitudes? Many of these states have been through a similar

post-independence nation-building process and although South Africa is the “new kid on the block,” it is possible that decolonization and nationalism have produced similar outcomes throughout the region.

A second objective of the paper is to see whether attitudes vary from country to country across the region. All states have their own unique political and economic history and configuration but all have been bound for decades into a single system of cross-border labour migration.⁶ It is therefore important to try and understand if the experience of migration to other countries (which has been denied to most South Africans) makes people less insular and more accepting of outsiders in their own country.

Third, if attitudes do vary from country to country, then it is possible to hypothesize that the migration history of the country may be a factor. In other words, citizens of countries with little history of in-migration (Lesotho, Mozambique), may have different attitudes from those which have been destinations for migrants (South Africa, Botswana). Or again, the citizens of countries with a long humanitarian tradition of refugee protection may be far more accepting of refugees than a country like South Africa with a long history of persecuting refugees.⁷

Fourth, multi-lateral cooperation in migration management has been a consistently stated aim of SADC and many of its constituent governments.⁸ However, a regional approach would be considerably facilitated by the existence of a “regional consciousness”; in other words, a strong sense that there are regional migration interests that transcend narrow national interests. A survey of this nature therefore provides the opportunity to assess the degree of regional consciousness amongst citizens of a number of SADC states vis-à-vis a range of migration issues. At the heart of this issue is whether and what kind of distinction citizens make between migrants from inside and outside the region.

Finally, in practical policy terms, SAMP makes the assumption that xenophobia undermines social cohesion, peaceful co-existence, good governance and human rights observance. In addition, SADC is a region composed of 14 states committed to greater integration and cooperation. To encourage or allow citizens of one member state to think and act in xenophobic ways about citizens of another, is ultimately extremely destructive of regional cooperation and harmony. This study therefore aims to show (for the 6 states studied) which are the “rogue states” in which citizens have not yet come to terms with a basic requirement of regional cooperation: tolerance and acceptance of people from neighbouring SADC countries. This, in turn, should help identify those governments who have an actual or potential problem on their hands and which therefore need to take the task of “rolling back xenophobia” far more seriously than they do at present.

THE NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY SURVEYS (NIPS)

SAMP's National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) was conducted in 2001-2 in five SADC countries: Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe.⁹ A comparable data set for South Africa was extracted from an earlier SAMP survey of South African citizens. The survey was based on an extended, common questionnaire administered by teams of researchers in each country. In total, 4 763 interviews were conducted in 6 countries.¹⁰ This is an extremely large data set for a survey of this kind. In addition, the sample size in each individual country is sufficient to allow reliable conclusions to be drawn for each one. The one proviso that applies to all countries is that this was an urban sample which means that the attitudes are nationally representative of the urban population only. In the case of South Africa, the survey was originally conducted amongst a national sample. In order to make the results comparable with the other countries, however, the urban sub-sample of 1 035 was extracted from the larger data set and is used in this analysis.¹¹

A fieldwork training programme was conducted by each SAMP country project leader to ensure that the fieldworkers asked questions in a similar manner. Respondents spoke many different languages and fieldwork teams were trained to translate questions into languages understood by the respondents. The Mozambique questionnaire was translated into Portuguese prior to implementation. The country surveys were conducted using a similar sampling methodology.

Tables 1 and 2 below provide basic demographics on the entire dataset by country. Inspection of the tables will show that the people interviewed reflect a diversity of age, education, socio-economic class, and work status. Almost equal numbers of men and women were interviewed. The collection of basic demographic variables of this depth and variety allows for an analysis which goes beyond the general description of national attitudes to identify attitudinal differences within the population.

Table 1: Demographic Profile of Sample												
	South Africa		Namibia		Botswana		Zimbabwe		Mozambique		Swaziland	
Age:	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
16-24	221	21.5	215	29.3	282	36.1	271	36.8	230	30.7	123	18.9
25-34	246	23.9	194	26.5	277	35.5	204	27.7	193	25.8	220	33.8
35-49	299	29.1	186	25.4	157	20.1	169	23.0	213	28.5	215	33.0
50-98	263	25.6	138	18.8	65	8.3	92	12.5	112	15.0	93	14.3
Total	1 029	100.0	733	100.0	781	100.0	736	100.0	748	100.0	651	100.0
Formal Education:												
None	22	2.1	43	5.7	44	5.7	17	2.3	43	5.8	14	2.0
Grades 1-7	136	13.1	101	13.5	155	19.9	76	10.4	235	31.5	50	7.2
Grades 8-12	697	67.3	455	60.7	408	52.4	502	68.4	367	49.1	304	43.6
Post grad & diploma	180	17.4	150	20.0	171	22.0	139	18.9	102	13.7	330	47.3
Total	1 035	100.0	749	100.0	778	100.0	734	100.0	747	100.0	698	100.0
Race of Respondent:												
White	365	35.3	90	12.0	5	0.6	14	1.9	24	3.2	6	0.8
Black	390	37.7	562	74.9	767	98.2	692	94.0	633	84.3	672	94.6
Coloured	140	13.5	97	12.9	9	1.2	28	3.8	89	11.9	30	4.2
Indian	140	13.5	1	0.1	0	0.0	1	0.1	5	0.7	1	0.1
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	0	0.0	1	0.1
Total	1 035	100.0	750	100.0	781	100.0	736	100.0	751	100.0	710	100.0
Gender:												
Male	517	50.0	367	51.0	347	44.4	383	53.6	425	58.6	354	49.9
Female	518	50.0	353	49.0	434	55.6	332	46.4	300	41.4	356	50.1
Total	1 035	100.0	720	100.0	781	100.0	715	100.0	725	100.0	710	100.0

Table 2: Economic Characteristics of Sample												
	South Africa		Namibia		Botswana		Zimbabwe		Mozambique		Swaziland	
Class:	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Poor	253	24.4	280	37.5	291	38.7	334	45.8	241	32.2	125	17.5
Working class	266	25.7	269	36.1	203	27.0	134	18.4	202	27.0	348	48.6
Middle class	425	41.1	151	20.2	243	32.4	207	28.4	250	33.4	206	28.8
Upper middle class	76	7.3	35	4.7	10	1.3	26	3.6	43	5.7	15	2.1
Upper class	10	1.0	6	0.8	4	0.5	12	1.6	8	1.1	5	0.7
Don't know	5	0.5	5	0.7	0	0.0	17	2.3	5	0.7	17	2.4
Total	1035	100.0	746	100.0	751	100.0	730	100.0	749	100.0	716	100.0
Travel												
Never left country	0	0.0	436	58.1	331	42.4	412	55.8	345	45.9	75	10.4
Travelled outside	0	0.0	179	23.9	333	42.6	208	28.2	242	32.2	457	63.2
Lived outside	0	0.0	135	18.0	117	15.0	118	16.0	164	21.8	191	26.4
Total	0	0.0	750	100.0	781	100.0	738	100.0	751	100.0	723	100.0
Work Status												
Formal employment	406	39.2	299	39.9	352	45.1	282	38.3	227	30.6	448	62.7
Informal employment	56	5.4	69	9.2	56	7.2	136	18.5	125	16.9	64	9.0
Unemployed looking	190	18.4	202	27.0	185	23.7	114	15.5	131	17.7	89	12.4
Unemployed not looking	383	37.0	179	23.9	188	24.1	204	27.7	258	34.8	114	15.9
Total	1035	100.0	749	100.0	781	100.0	736	100.0	741	100.0	715	100.0

MEASURES OF XENOPHOBIA

Xenophobia is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary as a “morbid dislike of foreigners.” Attempts to measure the incidence and prevalence of xenophobic attitudes on a national scale demand the use of national, quantitative surveys. Such statistical measures of xenophobia are obviously open to interpretation and debate. However, SAMP has endeavoured to develop a range of indices which cover various different facets of xenophobic attitudes and behaviours. These indices were developed in a series of planning workshops with all SAMP partners, independent experts and reviews of the international comparative literature. Thus, while any one index certainly does not “measure” xenophobia in and of itself, a general picture does emerge from the various measures presented and discussed here.

The first, and most general, index measures attitudes towards the presence of foreigners on national soil and what citizens expect governments to be doing about it. The World Values Survey regularly asks respondents what government should do about people from other countries. SAMP’s previous research has already shown that South Africans take an extremely restrictive view by international standards. This is confirmed once again in the latest survey with 21% of South African respondents wanting a complete ban on the entry of foreigners and another 64% wanting strict limits on the number allowed entry.

A comparison with the other SADC countries surveyed is instructive. In all of the other countries, the proportion of respondents wanting a total ban is significantly lower than South Africa: ranging from a maximum of 10% (Namibia, Botswana) to 3.5% (Swaziland) (Table 3). On the other hand, there is still little support for the “open borders” concept when it comes to allowing freedom of movement within SADC. Namibia, South Africa and Botswana are most opposed to the idea. But even the others cannot muster much support with Zimbabweans (at only 12.3%) the most accepting of the idea. The majority of citizens in all countries across the region want strict limits placed on entry, with Namibians (at 82.5%) the most enthusiastic for a highly restrictive immigration policy. There is some support for an immigration policy tied to job availability but this is hardly overwhelming. Namibians are least likely to favour such a policy (4.5%) while Mozambicans (at 31.5%) are the most positive.

Southern Africans are therefore generally not in favour of open borders and prefer restrictive immigration policies. However, within this grouping of SADC countries, South Africans are clearly most in favour of heavy restrictions, with one in four favouring a total ban on foreigners coming to the country. In some respects, Namibian and Botswana

Table 3: Regional Attitudes Towards Immigration							
What should government do about people from other countries?(%)							
	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Let anyone in who wants to enter	2.2	2.9	3.3	12.3	7.0	10.9	6.1
Let people in as long as jobs are available	13.1	4.5	18.0	14.6	31.5	20.6	16.8
Strictly limit numbers of foreigners who enter	63.7	82.5	68.3	68.9	57.8	64.9	67.5
Prohibit all from entering	21.0	10.2	10.4	4.2	3.7	3.5	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 547							

citizens favour a similarly restrictive approach. Mozambicans, Swazis and Zimbabweans are somewhat more relaxed in their attitudes. By international standards, South Africans and Namibians stand out as being particularly opposed to greater openness in the immigration area (Table 4).

In policy terms, what this means is that states that pursue narrowly nationalist immigration policies are unlikely to meet with much opposition from their citizenry. Clearly, those pushing for a more regionalist approach to migration have a great deal to do to convince citizens. Similarly, countries like South Africa that has developed a new jobs-based immigration policy will need to engage in considerable public education to convince South Africans of the wisdom of a more open approach.

Table 4: International Attitudes Towards Immigration					
	Prohibit people coming here from other countries (%)	Let anyone in who wants to enter (%)	Let people come as long as there are jobs (%)	Place strict limits on number of foreigners who can come here (%)	Don't know (%)
South Africa (1997)	25	6	17	45	7
South Africa (1999)	21	2	13	64	0
South Africa (1995)	16	6	29	49	0
Russia (1995)	18	6	48	28	2
Philippines (1995)	12	9	16	63	0
Peru (1995)	12	8	39	40	4
Namibia (2001)	10	3	4	83	0
Botswana (2001)	10	3	18	69	0
China (1995)	11	7	33	40	9
Argentina (1995)	9	8	49	31	3
USA (1995)	8	5	32	53	0
Finland (1995)	8	8	30	51	3
Chile (1995)	7	10	50	31	1
Japan (1995)	6	4	41	40	8
Nigeria (1995)	6	18	37	40	3
Spain (1995)	4	14	55	23	3
Zimbabwe (2001)	4	12	15	69	0
Zimbabwe (1997)	4	16	30	48	0
Mozambique (2001)	4	7	32	57	0
Swaziland (2001)	3	11	21	65	0
Australia (1995)	3	5	52	39	2
Lesotho (1997)	3	61	23	12	1
S. Mozam. (1997)	2	12	61	23	0
Sweden (1995)	1	8	32	55	3

Source: 1995 World Values Study; 1997, 1999, 2001 SAMP Surveys

PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION DYNAMICS

Citizen perceptions of migration and immigration are a mixture of half-truths and misleading stereotyping. A common cross-regional perception is that inter-state migration is on the increase. In all countries surveyed, with the exception of Zimbabwe, the vast majority of respondents strongly believe that the foreign population has greatly increased in recent times (Table 5). Certainly in the case of South Africa and Botswana, this perception is rooted in post-1990 realities; the evidence in other countries is more ambiguous.

Has the number of foreigners coming to this country increased, decreased or stayed the same? (%)							
	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Greatly increased	46.3	58.4	69.2	10.3	46.3	54.3	48.2
Increased	44.1	36.7	29.2	15.9	43.0	37.6	35.4
Decreased	5.6	2.0	0.8	37.0	7.8	4.2	8.8
Greatly decreased	0.7	0.1	0.1	30.9	0.4	1.5	4.8
Remained the same	3.3	2.7	0.6	5.8	2.5	2.4	2.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 312							

There is not only a generalized perception that in-migration has increased but that the numbers involved are massive and out of control. Respondents in all countries surveyed consistently exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their country. Most people believe that between 1 in 3 and 1 in 4 people in their country are foreigners (Table 6). Even taking into account undocumented migration, these figures bear absolutely no relationship to the real situation.

	Nationals		Foreigners	
	No.	%	No.	%
South Africa	969	71.3	1 035	26.9
Namibia	648	71.7	648	28.3
Botswana	558	66.7	558	33.3
Zimbabwe	645	73.2	645	26.8
Mozambique	662	78.0	662	22.0
Swaziland	587	68.2	587	31.8

Respondents in most countries also think that between 40 and 50 percent of non-citizens in their country are there illegally (Table 7). Again this is almost certainly an exaggeration, consistent with the confusion in many minds between illegality and immigration.

	Here legally		Here illegally	
	No.	%	No.	%
South Africa	922	46.3	1 035	47.9
Namibia	624	56.9	624	43.1
Botswana	503	57.4	503	42.6
Zimbabwe	603	62.7	603	37.3
Mozambique	601	56.9	601	43.1
Swaziland	565	50.6	565	49.4

The point to emphasize here is that the ground in Southern Africa is fertile for the development of anti-foreign intolerance. There is a generalized perception amongst citizens in Southern Africa that their countries are under siege from outside. This perception, correct or not, is at the heart of any xenophobic discourse. Rapid in-migration often does precipitate negative responses from citizens; but so too does the mere *perception* of increased in-migration.

And yet, most citizens do not “externalize” the immigration issue. In other words, they do not see their countries as being “swamped” from outside the region but from within. Respondents correctly think that other Southern African countries are the major source of in-migrants (Table 8). Southern Africa accounts for about half of all foreigners believed to be in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Swaziland; for the other countries the percentage is about 30%. Respondents in all six countries think the percentage of foreigners from the rest of Africa is only slightly greater than the percentage from Europe/North America (15% -20%). These findings cannot, unfortunately, be compared with actual immigration statistics, which tend only to capture legal movements. What they do indicate, however, is a strong conviction, embedded in reality, that migration is primarily a regional phenomenon. If there were evidence of a regional consciousness amongst citizens, one might reasonably infer that attitudes towards migrants would be more tolerant and moderate.

Respondents were then asked why they thought people from other countries came to their country. A multiplicity of factors were cited, some related to the relative attractiveness of their own country (pull factors), others related to the unattractiveness of home (push factors) (Table 9). First, it is clear that economic motivations for in-migration

Table 8: Perceptions of Migrant Origins

	Southern Africa		Rest of Africa		Europe/ North America		Asia/Pacific	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
South Africa	1 034	55.0	1 034	19.2	1 034	13.7	1 034	13.8
Namibia 538	33.3	538	21.5	538	19.8	538	25.4	
Botswana	464	38.4	464	19.6	464	16.1	464	25.9
Zimbabwe	581	49.9	581	18.1	581	18.1	581	14.0
Mozambique	570	36.3	570	18.2	570	18.5	570	27.0
Swaziland	547	45.9	547	21.6	547	15.8	547	16.7

are seen as paramount by people in all of the countries surveyed. In South Africa and Botswana, a significant number of people see the healthiness of their own economy as a major pull factor (37% in South Africa, 27% in Botswana). Zimbabweans (unsurprisingly) and Swazis (more surprisingly) do not see their economies as a major draw. Second, at least in the case of South Africa, the country's public services are seen as a draw card. Third, political conditions in the country of origin versus country of destination were cited relatively consistently across the region. Given what we know about migrant motivations from other surveys, it is clear that citizen perceptions do reflect migrant realities.

Table 9: Perceptions of Why Migrants Come

Reasons cited	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland
Worse/bad economy at home	8.0	7.6	11.9	7.3	5.0	9.9
Better economy here	37.0	19.0	27.2	10.3	22.5	10.0
Political conditions at home	7.8	8.5	9.7	10.6	6.8	14.2
Political conditions here	5.5	7.1	9.5	3.4	10.0	8.1
To commit crimes/cause trouble	4.8	7.8	5.2	3.1	5.2	4.3
Hunger/famine at home	2.9	3.7	11.6	8.2	3.4	10.9
Better health care, education, etc here	17.6	7.1	4.8	9.3	4.1	5.6
Help development here	0.9	8.1	1.7	5.5	13.5	6.1
Visit, holiday, meet people	4.7	18.8	8.9	23.0	17.0	14.0
Move permanently/immigrate here	0.8	2.8	2.0	5.0	3.4	3.7
Worse/bad environmental/population conditions at home	0.1	3.4	2.2	6.5	2.2	6.3
Better environmental/population conditions here	9.2	5.8	3.0	7.4	7.0	6.7
Other	0.7	0.2	2.6	0.2	0.0	0.3
N	1 923	2 039	1 841	2 310	2 325	3 025

Another area in which perceptions bear some resemblance to reality is that very few of the respondents (5% or less in each country) believe that immigration per se (intent to stay) is a particularly important reason motivating people to come. Again, this is consistent with the findings of surveys of migrants themselves.¹² This is confirmed by the data presented in Table 10. In each country, the vast majority responded positively to the assertion that the foreigner “just wants to come and make money and then return home.”

Most people come to this country because (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
They want to be a citizen	9.9	13.3	5.4	6.1	5.2	4.3	7.6
They want to stay and make money, but don't want to become a citizen	30.9	21.3	24.2	26.3	28.9	27.9	26.8
They just want to make money and then go home	58.8	63.2	68.1	57.5	61.2	63.2	61.9
None	0.4	2.2	2.2	10.1	4.6	4.6	3.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N = 4 616							

Table 11 addresses this question from a different angle. Here respondents were asked what proportion of migrants they thought intended to remain permanently. The range of country scores was 30-40% with Botswana (37%) and South Africa (41%) the highest. Temporary residents were divided up between those who intend to remain temporarily and refugees. The point about refugees is worth highlighting. Most citizens across the region believe that a quarter to a third of migrants in their countries are actually refugees (with a high of 38% in Namibia and a low of 23% in Zimbabwe). These are almost certainly exaggerations. But they do set up the interesting question of whether citizens distinguish between refugees and other migrants when it comes to attitude formation.

Respondents were then asked what percentage of refugees they believed was genuine (Table 12). A very large percentage of respondents in all countries surveyed, between 63% and 79%, say that 40% or less of refugees are actually genuine. This indicates a generalized skepticism about refugees and refugee claimants.

	Foreigners who intend to remain permanently		Foreigners who intend to remain temporarily		Foreigners who are refugees	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
South Africa	832	40.6	1 035	24.5	1 035	23.2
Namibia	549	32.0	549	30.1	549	37.9
Botswana	423	37.0	423	38.6	423	24.4
Zimbabwe	537	34.4	537	42.7	537	22.9
Mozambique	566	33.4	566	41.4	566	25.2
Swaziland	524	32.4	524	32.7	524	34.9

What percentage of foreigners (refugees) are genuine refugees?						
	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
10-20%	39.2	40.3	47.4	55.8	41.0	44.8
30-40%	26.7	22.2	19.7	22.8	29.0	24.1
50-60%	18.2	16.3	13.5	12.3	18.1	15.7
70-80%	13.5	14.5	12.7	6.8	10.4	11.6
90-100%	2.4	6.7	6.7	2.3	1.6	3.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

While Southern Africans have a reasonably realistic view about the motives for in-migration and the impermanence of such movements, they are certainly less well-informed about other aspects of the migration experience. Citizens of South Africa, Namibia and Botswana are consistently most sceptical of migrants and refugees. The next section of the paper therefore examines how perceptions about migration translate into attitudes towards migrants themselves.

ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS

At the outset of a discussion on attitudes towards non-citizens, it is worth asking where people get their information and misinformation about migrants? Across the six countries surveyed there was uniformity in the ranking of information sources: television first (a reflection perhaps of the urban-based sampling method), radio second, personal interaction third, and newspapers fourth. The media therefore plays a critical role in creating and propagating images about foreigners. Studies of media coverage of immigration issues in South Africa indicate a persistent negative bias.¹³ The same might well be true of regional media outlets. The NIPS survey research would therefore seem to imply that the negative stereotyping in the media is having a definite impact on citizen attitudes. Equally, of course, the media could be used to promote a more accurate and balanced account of migration and migrants.

Source	Frequency	Total
Television	2 384	18.9
Radio	2 233	17.7
Meeting and talking to them personally	1 996	15.9
Newspapers	1 899	15.1
Through friends	1 409	11.2
Magazines	1 231	9.8
At work	1 144	9.1
Internet	89	0.7
Family	48	0.4
Other	157	1.2
Total	12 590	100.0
Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.		

What, then, do SADC country citizens really think about people from neighbouring and other states? First, respondents were asked to rate their impression of people from different areas on a 10-point scale (where 1 was completely unfavourable, 5 was neutral and 10 was completely favourable). Table 14 presents the results and also allows a comparison between countries. Residents of sampled SADC countries have a generally favourable impression (above 5.0) of people from Southern Africa and other African countries. By contrast, South Africans, both black and white, have a more negative opinion of people from other

African countries (4.0). Unsurprising is the low opinion of “illegal immigrants” across the region (1.9), with Botswana, Namibia and South Africa again to the fore. People from Asia are generally rated negatively (4.7) in comparison with those from North America and Europe (6.0) and the rest of Africa. Europeans rate more favourably than Africans from other African countries (6.0 versus 5.6) but not quite as highly as those from Southern Africa (6.1). Perhaps the most striking finding is that in no country are other SADC citizens regarded significantly more favourably than Africans from elsewhere on the continent. Only in Botswana, however, do the latter rate more favourably than fellow SADC citizens. This is an important finding for those who argue that that there is, or ought to be, greater consciousness of SADC as a region.

Table 14: Impressions of People from Different Areas, By Country

		South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Whites	No.	1017	731	754	720	713	689	4624
		6.7	8.3	7.3	8.6	7.8	7.6	4.6
Blacks	No.	1015	727	748	714	716	673	4609
		6.6	6.3	6.3	6.2	7.4	6.1	6.5
Coloureds	No.	1011	726	712	706	710	673	4538
		6.0	6.6	5.1	5.0	6.3	5.2	5.7
Asians/Indians	No.	992	592	731	679	707	616	4317
		5.5	5.3	3.9	5.1	5.8	4.0	5.0
People from Southern Africa	No.	0	677	747	690	704	675	3493
		-	5.7	5.6	6.4	7.2	5.7	6.1
People from other African countries	No.	868	690	728	696	705	675	4362
		4.0	5.5	5.7	6.3	7.0	5.6	5.6
People from North America/ Europe	No.	870	668	707	695	712	661	4313
		5.1	5.7	5.9	5.8	7.6	5.8	6.0
People from Asia	No.	902	711	763	695	718	684	4473
		2.1	1.7	1.1	2.6	2.2	2.0	1.9
Illegal immigrants	No.	881	707	743	698	705	683	4417
		3.5	5.2	4.8	5.5	6.3	5.9	5.1
Refugees	No.	0	678	746	673	717	651	3465
		-	4.8	3.8	5.3	5.6	4.1	4.7

10 = completely favourable, 1 = completely unfavourable.

The finding that Southern Africans make very little distinction between foreign citizens from within and outside the SADC region is confirmed, in the aggregate, by Table 15. Here the survey asked if the

region of origin makes a difference to their acceptability as potential citizens. Responses are generally uniform with about 60% or more of respondents in all countries of the opinion that foreigners from any region were acceptable in their country. Only Asia scored significantly lower.

	Yes		No		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Europe and North America	2 719	61.7	1 691	38.3	4 410	100.0
Other countries in Southern Africa	2 748	62.0	1 686	38.9	4 434	100.0
Other parts of Africa	2 150	61.2	1 365	38.8	3 515	100.0
Asia	1 870	53.0	1 655	47.0	3 525	100.0

However, the majority of respondents in each country felt that foreign citizens could not become part of the nation (Table 16). The reasons given are interesting. South Africans, more than anyone else, see economic harm as the major deterrent. The association of foreign citizens with illegality and crime is much stronger outside South Africa (compare Botswana at 26% with South Africa at 10%). On the other hand, significantly more South Africans (15%) simply think that foreigners should keep out because they are foreign (compared with less than 9% in all other countries). "Overpopulation" is cited as a major reason in Namibia, Swaziland, Botswana and Zimbabwe (all countries in which large tracts of land are tied up in unproductive private ownership).

The perception that immigrants harm a country economically is strongest in South Africa, but not altogether absent elsewhere. The survey asked a series of questions about the local job situation and the impact foreigners might be having (Table 17). Ironically, although the majority of people in all countries see immigrants as a threat to jobs, very few have personal knowledge or experience of such an occurrence. Over 60% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique have never heard of anyone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; in Swaziland and Botswana the percentage drops to 34% and 50%, respectively. Even fewer people know from their own experience of someone being denied a job because it went to a foreigner; the exception to the pattern is Swaziland where almost half of the respondents claim to know of such an occurrence. Almost 90% of respondents in all six countries have no personal experience of being denied a job because it went to a foreigner.

Reasons	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)
Harm the economy	35.8	21.4	20.9	17.7	22.0	14.1
Engage in illegal activities	10.1	18.8	25.9	16.1	25.3	20.5
Unable to adapt culturally/socially	8.4	4.1	7.0	17.8	15.1	16.3
It is our country – keep out	14.9	8.6	3.5	4.0	7.2	4.6
Cause shortages on housing, food and services	8.6	8.2	8.9	13.4	8.8	10.3
Cause health problems/disease	6.3	16.2	8.1	12.6	11.2	13.3
Cause over-population	15.3	22.6	20.4	17.9	10.3	20.9
Other	0.6	0.1	5.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	653	903	761	753	1 090	679

	No.	%
Heard of anyone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreigner		
More than once	1 261	28.5
Once	578	13.0
Never	2 592	58.5
Total	4 431	100.0
Personally know someone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreigner		
More than once	659	15.4
Once	588	13.7
Never	3 032	70.9
Total	4 279	100.0
Been denied a job because it went to a foreigner		
More than once	242	5.4
Once	244	5.4
Never	4 016	89.2
Total	4 502	100.0

In order to access national stereotypes, respondents were asked to rate nationals and foreigners from different regions of the world on various scales. The scale goes from “0” (most negative) to “10” (most positive). On each of the scales evaluated, national and foreigner ratings are inter-mixed; that is, foreigners are sometimes rated above nationals and other times below nationals. No consistent pattern of rating foreigners below nationals was observed nationally or across the region. What are more interesting are differential perceptions of non-citizens by region of origin.

The “work ethic” scale has the highest overall mean score (6.4) (Table 18). In terms of attitudes to the domestic population, black people are rated at or near the top in most countries except South Africa (where racist stereotyping amongst whites may have played a role). Coloured (mixed-race) people consistently rate at the bottom. Whites have the highest ranking in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia and Swaziland. Generally, people from outside are not seen as particularly more or less hard-working than citizens. Nor is much differentiation made between citizens from different parts of the world.

	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Whites	6.0	6.4	7.1	6.2	7.6	6.7	6.6
Blacks	5.9	7.8	6.9	8.5	8.1	7.1	7.3
Coloureds	5.3	6.1	5.5	4.0	5.4	5.3	5.3
Asians/Indians	6.2	6.6	6.4	5.4	5.7	6.5	6.1
People from Southern Africa	5.8	6.5	7.0	6.2	7.3	6.5	6.5
People from the rest of Africa	5.5	6.6	6.7	6.2	7.2	6.3	6.6
People from North America/ Europe	5.9	6.7	7.1	5.8	8.1	6.4	6.6
People from Asia	-	7.1	7.4	5.8	6.1	6.3	6.5

0 = most negative, 10 = most positive.

The “difference scale” asked respondents to assess the similarity of their group to other groups with 0 being fundamentally different and 10 being completely similar. Again, what emerges most strongly is that Southern Africans make no great distinction between Africans from inside and outside the SADC region. On the other hand, citizens of most countries see South Africans as most similar to themselves (7.1 versus 6.1 for Southern Africans in general).

The “trustworthiness” scale has the lowest mean score (5.0), indicating that trust in other groups is not well developed (Table 20). Domestically, coloureds and Asians are viewed with greatest suspicion. Indeed, in most countries these groups scored lower than black and white immigrants. Black immigrants and migrants are viewed with greater suspicion than white. However, the generally low scores attached to people from other African countries (compared to internal scores) are consistent with the general view that Africans are a liability and threat rather than an asset. Interestingly, again, no distinction is made between people from Southern Africa and the rest of Africa. The only obvious national exception is Mozambique whose citizens generally have a less suspicious attitude to Africans from outside the country.

	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Whites	6.3	5.1	3.8	4.3	5.3	3.4	4.8
Blacks	5.8	8.1	7.6	8.7	8.9	8.4	7.8
Coloureds	5.6	6.4	5.1	5.4	6.4	5.7	5.8
Asians/Indians	5.1	4.2	3.4	4.3	5.0	3.3	4.3
People from Southern Africa	4.5	5.5	6.3	6.7	7.8	6.6	6.1
People from the rest of Africa	4.4	5.4	6.0	6.6	7.8	6.1	5.9
People from N. America/Europe	5.0	4.4	4.0	4.3	5.4	3.2	4.5
People from Asia	-	4.0	2.9	4.2	4.8	2.9	3.8
People from South Africa	-	6.3	6.7	7.1	7.7	7.9	7.1

0 = most different, 10 = least different.

	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Whites	5.8	4.8	6.6	6.7	6.4	6.7	6.1
Blacks	5.0	5.7	5.8	5.8	6.9	5.4	5.7
Coloureds	4.8	4.7	4.7	2.9	4.3	4.0	4.3
Asians/Indians	4.5	4.7	3.0	4.4	4.2	3.4	4.0
People from Southern Africa	4.5	4.4	4.4	5.1	6.1	4.4	4.8
People from the rest of Africa	4.4	4.3	4.7	5.0	6.2	4.4	4.8
People from N. America/Europe	5.4	4.8	6.2	5.9	6.8	6.3	5.9
People from Asia	-	4.5	3.2	5.0	4.6	4.1	4.3

0 = least trustworthy, 10 = most trustworthy.

The final “stereotyping scale” asked respondents to consider a list of positive and negative activities and to indicate to what extent they thought people from Southern Africa are involved in each of the activities, with ‘0’ meaning none of them do it and ‘10’ all of them do it. Table 21 shows that all the “negative” activities (the first five activities listed in the table) have higher mean scores than the “positive” activities. Looking across the data for the six countries, there is not much consensus about the rank order of the “negative’ activities. However, it is clear that taking jobs from locals, sending earnings out of the country, using welfare services, and committing crimes all rank very high. With the exception of Zimbabwe and Mozambique, “job stealing” is highly associated with people from other Southern African countries (8.0 in South Africa, Namibia and Botswana). Remittance behaviour is consistently viewed as a defining characteristic of the Southern African migrant (a perception embedded in reality). Crime and bringing disease is also a major association in each country, with disease actually scoring higher than crime.

Table 21: Stereotyping Scale (mean scores)

	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland
Take jobs from locals	7.2	7.1	7.4	5.4	5.6	6.2
Commit crimes in this country	6.9	6.9	7.2	5.6	6.4	6.3
Send earnings out of this country	7.4	7.3	7.3	6.7	7.6	7.5
Use this country's welfare services	7.1	7.2	7.5	5.9	7.5	6.7
Bring diseases to this country	7.4	7.0	6.8	6.3	7.4	5.9
Create jobs	3.0	4.8	5.1	5.4	5.1	5.7
Bring skills needed by this country	3.8	5.4	6.0	5.8	5.1	6.0
0 = all of them, 10 = none of them						

EXPLAINING INTOLERANCE

Explanations for anti-foreign intolerance commonly focus on three sets of factors: (a) interactive (which would include the amount and character of personal exposure to people of different origin); (b) cultural (including issues of identity and national consciousness) and (c) material (including job and resources competition, relative deprivation and so on).¹⁴ Space does not allow for the kind of multivariate analysis which would allow us to relate the attitudinal profile presented in the previous section to these three sets of factors. A more detailed explanatory framework will be developed in subsequent papers.¹⁵ However, it is important to present the evidence on these three factors that emerged from the survey since they are part of the dynamic social environment in which attitudes are being formed on migration issues within the SADC.

CONTACT

Internationally, contact with non-citizens has been shown to have both positive and negative effects on citizen attitudes.¹⁶ In other words, increased contact of a more personal character tends to lessen prejudice. Casual contact can, however, have the opposite effect. Given the levels of intolerance in some countries in Southern Africa, it is important to

understand the amount and types of interaction that Southern Africans have with people from outside the country and region.

Respondents were first asked about their overall level of contact with people from other countries (Table 22). What is striking for the region as a whole is the low overall levels of contact with groups from virtually everywhere. Nearly half of those interviewed had none or hardly any contact with foreigners. This is particularly ironic given that in most countries 25% of the population is believed to be foreign (see above). Only 15% said they had a great deal of contact with people from other Southern African countries and a mere 10% had a great deal of contact with Africans from elsewhere. This is all the more remarkable given that, as mentioned above, this was an urban sample. Inclusion of a rural sample would have reduced these figures ever further. Some differences emerged between countries but these do not contradict the overall pattern of responses.

	Great Deal		Some		Hardly any at all		None		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
People from other countries in North America and Europe	421	9.1	1413	30.4	628	13.5	2185	47.0	4647	100.0
People from Southern African countries	710	15.2	1785	38.1	476	10.2	1708	36.5	4679	100.0
People from other countries in Africa	465	9.8	1648	34.7	510	10.7	2029	42.7	99	100.0
People from Asia	77	10.7	216	30.1	107	14.9	318	44.3	718	100.0

What type of contact do nationals have with foreigners from other parts of the world? Table 23 shows that the most frequent type of contact is economic exchange, with second and third ranking activities being working for/with foreigners, and socializing with them. There is little difference in the ranking of these activities by country surveyed. Living next to foreigners is ranked third or fourth and contact with children at school is ranked about fifth. The lower ranking of these two types of contact with foreigners reflects the relative segregation of foreigners' private lives in comparison to their public presence.

Interactions with foreigners from the four world regions were evaluated on a scale going from very positive to very negative (see Table 24). Over 60% of respondents in the countries surveyed rate their interactions with foreigners from the world regions (except Asia) as very positive/positive with only moderate country differences. This would tend to confirm the hypothesis that interaction breeds tolerance and that

one of the primary problems in generating negative attitudes is unfamiliarity and lack of contact with foreign nationals in the country.

	North America/ Europe (%)	Southern Africa (%)	Other parts of Africa (%)	Asia (%)
Work for/with	26.2	19.1	23.5	15.9
Live next to them	11.2	14.5	12.7	7.4
Are friends with them	22.5	22.2	18.1	9.6
Children go to school with them	8.6	8.9	8.7	6.9
Buy things from, or sell things to them	25.1	29.2	30.9	57.7
Other	4.3	3.1	4.9	1.9
Relatives/family	2.1	3.0	1.1	0.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	3 038	4 096	3 892	2 729

	North America/ Europe (%)	Southern Africa (%)	Other Parts of Africa (%)	Asia (%)	South Africa (%)
Very positive	13.6	11.5	7.7	6.4	21.6
Positive	55.5	59.2	52.9	47.4	56.7
Neither positive nor negative	21.0	19.5	27.7	29.5	15.5
Negative	6.7	6.9	9.0	10.7	4.2
Very negative	3.3	2.9	2.7	6.0	2.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1 904	2 407	2 592	2 003	2 696

ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES

Perceptions of relative national and personal economic circumstances have been shown to have a strong correlation with attitudes towards outsiders. When perceptions are negative, scapegoats are required and often the visible and invisible foreigners “amongst us” take the blame. Respondents were therefore asked a series of questions about their satisfaction with personal economic conditions. For South Africa, Namibia, and Mozambique respondents were more or less divided between being very satisfied/satisfied and very dissatisfied/dissatisfied. However, for Botswana, Swaziland, and especially Zimbabwe, far more respondents were very dissatisfied/dissatisfied (Table 25). Do respondents think their

personal economic conditions will improve in the next year? Respondents in all countries are optimistic about the future, except Zimbabweans where nearly 70% of the respondents thought their personal economic conditions would get worse/much worse (Table 26). Country differences are strongly significant statistically.

Table 25: Level of Satisfaction with Personal Economic Conditions							
	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)	Total (%)
Very satisfied	4.6	6.2	2.5	1.4	2.8	2.8	3.4
Satisfied	32.2	40.6	26.8	9.5	31.9	16.8	26.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	15.5	20.2	11.4	6.8	26.2	19.0	16.4
Dissatisfied	34.1	27.6	48.4	35.0	30.6	46.1	36.8
Very dissatisfied	13.6	5.4	11.0	47.4	8.5	15.3	16.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 742							

Table 26: Perceptions of Personal Economic Prospects One Year Hence							
	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)	Total (%)
Much better	6.5	10.2	5.3	3.5	6.9	10.7	7.2
Better	34.6	47.3	44.7	17.2	49.8	32.4	37.2
Same	25.7	27.4	34.0	10.8	28.8	25.1	25.2
Worse	26.7	12.3	11.6	28.8	11.2	23.8	19.8
Much worse	6.5	2.8	4.3	39.7	3.3	8.0	10.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 400							

Respondents were also asked about the national economy and their expectations for the future (Tables 27, 28). For Namibia, Botswana and Mozambique answers are more or less divided between satisfied and dissatisfied. In comparison to the other countries, people in South Africa, Swaziland, and especially Zimbabwe (92%) are more strongly dissatisfied/very dissatisfied with their country's economy. Respondents in all countries are mildly optimistic about the situation a year from now with scores for economic improvements showing gains for all countries; the South Africans and the Zimbabweans are the least optimistic about economic improvement.

	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)	Total (%)
Very satisfied	2.3	2.1	3.7	0.8	3.0	0.4	2.1
Satisfied	13.3	38.6	35.1	2.7	29.1	14.1	21.6
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	15.7	25.7	18.0	4.5	31.0	16.8	18.4
Dissatisfied	49.1	27.5	35.7	33.8	25.5	53.1	38.1
Very dissatisfied	19.6	6.2	7.5	58.2	11.3	15.6	19.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 645							

	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)	Total (%)
Much better	6.4	12.1	9.4	1.8	9.7	9.1	7.8
Better	26.9	45.7	34.5	10.1	51.8	22.5	31.2
Same	18.5	22.0	31.4	9.9	20.5	25.0	20.7
Worse	35.3	15.2	18.7	28.3	12.5	32.0	24.7
Much worse	13.0	5.1	5.9	49.9	5.4	11.5	15.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 310							

The general pessimism about personal and national economic circumstances that prevails through much of Southern Africa does not provide a very positive environment within which to ply one's trade as a foreign citizen in another state. Levels of economic dissatisfaction are clearly at their most intense in Zimbabwe. Here, however, the response of citizens has not been to scapegoat but to leave. The country is experiencing an extremely serious brain drain at present, as other SAMP research has demonstrated.¹⁷ Of the other countries, levels of dissatisfaction are highest in South Africa and Botswana. At one level this is ironic, given the fact that these are two of the healthiest economies in the sub-continent. However, anti-foreign intolerance is strong in South Africa and growing apace in Botswana. Although no causal relationship can be proven, these findings are certainly consistent with the perception of gloomy and worsening economic circumstances.

“OTHERING” FOREIGNERS

A third common set of explanations advanced in the literature is that xenophobia is triggered by intense nationalism or nativism.¹⁸ In this regard, anti-foreign sentiment can be a direct tool to foster nationalist sentiment. Or it can be an incidental by-product of a heightened sense of their own national identity by citizens. The question is also relevant for the purposes of other questions addressed in this paper. In other words, how strong is nationalist sentiment in Southern Africa? Is there any evidence of a distinctive “regional consciousness”? What are the prospects for a more regionalized approach to migration management?

A series of questions were therefore asked about national identity (Tables 29-31). Respondents expressed a strong consensus across the six countries that national identity is important, they want their children to have the same national identity, and they are proud of their national identity. On these questions, about 90% of respondents in South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, and Mozambique strongly agreed/agreed; for Zimbabwe and Swaziland the agreement percentage is between 10 and 15 percentage points lower depending on the question being asked.

Another series of questions also explored the topic of national pride. The answers were similar with most respondents expressing very strong/strong agreement about the importance of national pride/identity: pride in nation, national and self-identity and wanting children to have the same national identity. Respondents in Zimbabwe and Mozambique rated the pride questions slightly lower than respondents in the other countries.

Being a ... is a very important part of how you see yourself (%)	South African	Namibian	Botswana	Zimbabwean	Mozambican	Swazi	Total
Strongly agree	56.3	57.1	67.1	46.3	31.4	42.1	50.6
Agree	39.1	37.8	26.9	34.1	58.7	34.6	38.5
Neither agree nor disagree	2.8	3.6	3.0	6.8	4.3	12.5	5.3
Disagree	1.5	1.3	2.2	10.1	5.1	7.9	4.4
Strongly disagree	0.4	0.1	0.9	2.7	0.5	2.9	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 752							

You want your children to think of themselves as ... (%)	South African	Namibian	Batswana	Zimbabwean	Mozambican	Swazi	Total
Strongly agree	52.8	56.7	66.9	46.9	37.1	37.1	50.0
Agree	39.1	37.3	26.7	34.6	54.6	39.6	38.6
Neither agree nor disagree	3.3	5.0	3.5	7.7	5.3	14.3	6.2
Disagree	3.9	0.9	2.1	9.2	2.8	7.1	4.3
Strongly disagree	1.0		0.8	1.6	0.3	2.0	0.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 720							

It makes you feel proud to be a ... (%)	South African	Namibian	Batswana	Zimbabwean	Mozambican	Swazi	Total
Strongly agree	58.3	62.4	75.7	48.6	45.2	43.1	56.0
Agree	34.8	32.2	20.1	26.4	45.0	32.8	32.0
Neither agree nor disagree	3.2	4.3	1.9	8.6	5.5	13.7	5.9
Disagree	2.5	0.9	1.5	11.3	3.7	8.1	4.5
Strongly disagree	1.2	0.1	0.8	5.1	0.5	2.3	1.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 738							

Respondents did not rate the other questions on national identity quite as highly (see Table 32). About 70% of respondents strongly agreed/agreed about feeling strong ties with people who have the same national identity with a high of 84% for Mozambique respondents and a low of 63% for Swaziland respondents.

Who is a 'true' national? Respondents were asked to rank various patriotic characteristics from essential to not at all important. The various characteristics fall into two categories. The first are those attitudes which people acquire and have some choice about. Tables 33 and 34 are typical of the answers to these questions. South Africans have the highest essential/important scores and Swazis the lowest.

The second set of features is ascribed (i.e. determined by birth). Non-nationals have little chance of "acquiring" these characteristics. Birth is massively important to most people in the determination of "national belonging", as is having parents and grandparents born in the

Table 32: Strength of Ties with Fellow Citizens							
Feel strong ties with people who call themselves ... (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Strongly agree	22.3	32.0	33.6	36.2	27.7	12.4	27.1
Agree	46.4	46.0	33.1	40.9	56.3	40.6	44.0
Neither agree nor disagree	21.5	12.9	13.4	11.9	7.6	25.4	15.8
Disagree	8.4	8.0	16.2	8.2	5.6	15.8	10.2
Strongly disagree	1.6	1.1	3.6	2.8	2.8	5.9	2.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 688							

Table 33: Citizenship and the Constitution							
Supporting the constitution of this country (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	31.2	39.2	44.6	31.1	42.6	16.6	34.8
Important	52.4	36.1	26.8	30.8	44.1	35.9	38.5
Not very important	9.9	12.0	10.8	18.0	6.9	23.7	12.9
Not at all important	6.6	12.7	17.8	20.1	6.5	23.7	13.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 519							

Table 34: Citizenship and Support for Non-Racialism							
Supporting non-racialism (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	29.0	23.2	30.5	33.3	25.8	21.1	27.3
Important	51.2	38.7	30.1	34.6	50.8	30.6	40.2
Not very important	13.3	20.6	20.4	16.8	13.4	23.2	17.6
Not at all important	6.5	17.5	19.0	15.4	10.0	25.1	14.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 543							

country (Tables 35-37). Far less important in this regard is race. With the exception of Mozambique, less than half the population in each country feels that it is essential to be “black” in order to be a citizen (Table 38).

Table 35: Local Birth as a Requirement for Citizenship							
Being born in this country (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	37.4	40.9	40.3	32.9	42.9	23.4	36.5
Important	48.0	41.2	26.0	33.7	45.7	29.4	38.0
Not very important	8.5	11.9	14.9	20.5	6.3	28.1	14.5
Not at all important	6.1	6.0	18.8	12.9	5.1	19.1	11.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 731							

Table 36: Birth of Parents as a Requirement for Citizenship							
Having parents who were born in this country (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	29.8	38.7	42.8	28.0	37.6	21.8	33.1
Important	44.8	40.6	25.3	32.6	45.9	33.1	37.5
Not very important	15.8	13.5	17.9	23.9	10.8	32.4	18.7
Not at all important	9.6	7.3	14.0	15.5	5.6	12.7	10.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 720							

Table 37: Birth of Grandparents as a Requirement for Citizenship							
Having grandparents who were born in this country (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	26.9	30.5	37.4	29.9	34.3	18.4	29.5
Important	41.1	41.2	25.4	26.2	41.5	32.1	35.0
Not very important	19.4	19.8	20.5	26.5	14.7	33.7	22.1
Not at all important	12.6	8.5	16.7	17.5	9.5	15.8	13.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 705							

Table 38: Race and Citizenship							
Being black (%)	South Africa	Namibia	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	Swaziland	Total
Essential	20.5	11.8	11.8	19.2	18.6	14.0	16.3
Important	25.9	22.9	18.0	19.9	36.4	13.7	23.0
Not very important	20.7	30.5	25.1	30.3	23.6	35.7	27.2
Not at all important	32.8	34.7	45.0	30.7	21.4	36.7	33.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 660							

ATTITUDES TO POLICY

In this section of the paper attention turns to the policy arena. Given the attitudinal profile described in previous sections, the obvious question is what kind of immigration policies citizens would like to see enacted and enforced by their governments.

Obviously citizen attitudes towards how government should respond depend very much on whether migration is perceived as a “problem” or not; as a “threat” to the interests of citizens or not; as out of control or not. In the first instance it is therefore useful to know what people think about the volume of in-migration to their countries. Respondents were therefore asked whether they thought too many, too few or about the right number were entering. With the exception of Zimbabwe, the survey results show that between 72% (Mozambique) and 89% (Botswana) think too many foreigners are entering their country. There is thus a generalized feeling that migration is out of control.

	South Africa (%)	Namibia (%)	Botswana (%)	Zimbabwe (%)	Mozambique (%)	Swaziland (%)	Total (%)
Too many	87.8	85.1	89.1	43.5	72.0	85.2	78.0
Too few	3.8	5.0	3.3	26.6	12.9	3.8	8.8
Right number	8.4	9.9	7.6	29.9	15.1	11.0	13.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N=4 693							

Populations with xenophobic attitudes tend to regard national boundaries as frontiers under siege. In this context, Table 40 provides a regional summary of answers to a set of questions about border and immigration control measures. There is majority support across the sub-continent for all but one of the proposed border control measures including deploying the army to control national borders (80.9% in favour); requiring that foreign citizens carry identity documents with them at all times (76.7% in favour); and allocating more resources to border protection (51.9%). Support for sanctions against employers who hire migrants illegally is also strong (81.6% in favour). More disconcerting is that over half (53.1%) actually favour border electrification. While there is widespread support for these control measures in principle, people do not want to pay for them themselves. More than half (56.1%) reject tax increases to cover the cost of more patrols (with only 28.6% in favour.)

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Electrification of borders	25.6	27.5	9.9	22.3	14.7
Allocating more money from the national budget to border protection	18.0	43.9	12.9	17.3	8.0
Using the army to patrol borders	32.9	48.0	8.1	7.2	3.7
Increasing taxes to cover the expense of increased patrols	7.9	20.7	15.2	28.3	27.8
Requiring foreigners to carry identification with them at all times	35.8	40.9	11.9	7.7	3.8
Giving the police the right to detain suspected illegal immigrants	39.9	42.4	9.0	6.1	2.6
Penalizing businesses or persons who employ immigrants illegally	44.5	37.1	9.5	5.7	3.3
N=4 705					

A regional sweep of this kind disguises important differences between countries. Most respondents in the six countries think that using the army to control borders is a good idea. Except in Swaziland, there is also widespread support for having non-citizens carry ID at all times. Increasing taxes to pay for border patrols is disliked by the majority in all countries (except Namibia where 50.5% are in favour). On two of the measures there is considerable inter-country variation. In the case of allocating more money to border protection, support varies from a high of 81% in Namibia to a low of 40% in Zimbabwe. On the border electrification issue, Namibia (80.7%), South Africa (63.3%), and Botswana (62.7%) all have a majority in favour of border electrification. In Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland, the majority oppose border electrification.

In general, these measures show that Southern Africans share certain perceptions. They want borders to be patrolled by armies and they want non-citizens in their countries to be easily identifiable. On the other hand, they are not willing to be personally out-of-pocket for the cost of increased border controls. The differences are sharpest on two issues: border electrification and diverting state resources to pay for border controls. Here there are two clusters. Citizens of South Africa, Namibia and to a lesser extent Botswana all favour draconian border controls. Those from Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique take a considerably more relaxed view. This grouping of countries tends to recur throughout the survey.

A fundamental feature of xenophobia is intolerance of non-citizens

already in the country. The fact that so many wish non-citizens to carry ID's suggest that they want there to be a clear and obvious differentiation between those who "belong" (us) and those who do not (them). What, then, do Southern Africans feel should be done about non-citizens already in their countries? The first question is whether they would do anything personally to stop people entering or to eject those already there.

Respondents were asked what they would do about citizens of other SADC countries who impacted on their lives. Table 41 shows that, in general, the vast majority of people would be unlikely or very unlikely to do anything if other SADC nationals moved into their neighbourhood (66.6%), operated a business in their area (55.7%), shared school facilities (72%) or became a co-worker (69.1%). The underlying assumption (which makes the answers consistent with other questions) is that the SADC nationals are living and working in the country legally. Hence, there is little sign of a gut-level and irrational response to the legal presence of other-country citizens. The question, though, is whether there are any inter-country variations. In other words, are citizens of some SADC countries more tolerant of their neighbours than others? South Africa, in fact, has the largest percentage of people likely to take action in all four areas (between 8.0% and 12.4 % *very likely* to act).

	Very Likely (%)	Likely (%)	Unlikely (%)	Very Unlikely (%)
Moving into your neighbourhood	12.4	20.9	32.6	34.0
Operating a business in your area	12.1	22.2	21.9	33.8
Sitting in the same classroom as your children	8.0	20.0	33.4	38.6
Becoming one of your co-workers	9.2	21.7	32.2	36.9

The question of turning attitudes into actions arises again in the area of unauthorized migration. Here there are significant differences between the countries (Table 42). The question is what someone would do if they suspected someone was in the country illegally. Very few people in any country would engage in vigilante action by either using violence or using force to make them leave. There is considerable inter-country variation on the issue of whether or not to report the suspected unauthorized migrant from a high of 79.9% in Namibia and 72% in Botswana to a low of only 26.8% in Zimbabwe. Contrariwise, 62% of

Zimbabweans said they would do “nothing” compared to a low of only 11.9% of Namibians who would do nothing. Interestingly and unexpectedly, South Africa is the second highest here with 44.3% saying they would do nothing. SAMP has suggested here that when it comes to acting on their negative feelings towards foreigners, many South Africans are relatively passive at this point in time. Not so the citizens of Namibia or Botswana who would identify “suspects” to the authorities (and expect them to act).

Table 42: Personal Actions Against Unauthorized Migrants

	Do nothing %	Report to police/ Home Affairs %	Report to employer %	Get people together to force them to leave %	Report to local community association %	Use violence %	Talk and advise %	Other %	Total %
South Africa	44.3	39.3	4.5	8.5	0.4	0.0	3.0	0.0	100.0
Namibia	11.9	79.9	1.0	4.5	1.3	0.5	0.0	0.8	100.0
Botswana	14.1	72.0	3.6	7.4	0.8	0.6	1.5	0.0	100.0
Zimbabwe	62.0	26.8	2.2	4.9	1.7	1.4	0.6	0.4	100.0
Mozambique	16.7	39.1	12.4	16.9	4.6	1.1	0.4	8.8	100.0
Swaziland	30.2	37.8	6.9	19.9	3.9	0.4	0.0	1.0	100.0
Total	30.2	48.1	5.3	10.7	2.1	0.6	1.0	1.9	100.0

Unsurprisingly, therefore, there is general support for deporting unauthorized immigrants (87.3% in favour), non-citizens who have committed crimes (92.3% in favour) or immigrants who do not contribute to the country economically (62.8% in favour) (Table 43). There is much less, but still some, support for deporting foreigners working legally in the country (19.4% in favour). In other words, as long as a non-citizen is in the country legally and is contributing economically, hostility falls off rapidly. Still, it is worth emphasizing that one in five people do not want any foreign workers at all in their country.

There is certainly massive support for deporting unauthorized migrants, yet a sizable minority (42.1%) also feel that amnesties should be offered to people in their country illegally (with only 37% opposed). At face value, there would seem to be something of a contradiction between these two views. It is therefore important to examine the country-by-country breakdown on this issue.

A series of questions were asked about what kinds of immigrants government should give preference to (Table 44). There was an almost equal split across the region in terms of those who supported and opposed legal immigration (43% versus 41%). Respondents in Namibia

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Deport all foreign workers even if they are here legally	7.5	11.9	10.0	44.2	26.5
Deport all foreigners who do not contribute to the economy	27.2	35.6	12.7	17.8	6.7
Deport all foreigners who have committed crimes	65.8	26.5	2.6	2.4	2.7
Deport all those who live here without permission	55.5	1.8	6.6	3.9	2.3
Offering amnesty to people who are here illegally	13.2	28.9	21.0	18.6	18.4
N=4 742					

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Foreigners who want to come here legally to work as permanent residents and possibly become citizens	8.3	34.9	16.1	27.2	13.4
Foreigners who want to come legally to work for a specific period and then return home	13.1	42.3	15.3	20.0	9.2
Foreigners from North America and Europe	7.0	35.2	27.3	21.0	9.5
Foreigners from Southern African countries	4.9	33.5	28.2	23.3	10.1
Foreigners from other African countries	5.0	32.1	28.2	24.1	10.7
People with skills not possessed by nationals	39.3	42.3	10.3	5.9	2.3
People who will invest money in the national economy and create jobs	54.3	35.1	5.9	3.2	1.6
N=4 636					

and Botswana have the largest percentage of people who strongly oppose/oppose (about 55%) while Mozambique has the largest percentage who strongly support/support (almost 60%). Temporary residence for immigrants was the clear preference of 55% of the overall sample. However, for both South Africa and Namibia, over 40% strongly oppose/oppose even temporary residence. No geographical area ranked

significantly higher than any other as a desirable source of immigrants (42% supported immigration from Europe/North America favour with only 29% opposed. The corresponding figures were 44% and 33% for SADC; and 37% and 35% for the rest of Africa).

Once again, economic factors were paramount. The vast majority of citizens in all countries said that they supported a legal immigration policy tied to economic benefit. For example, 83% supported/strongly supported government giving preference to migrants with skills not possessed locally. And 89% supported/strongly supported giving preference to investors who would create jobs locally.

Respondents were asked a series of questions about government policy regarding the treatment of foreigners already legally living and working in their country (Table 45). Regarding making it easier for families of contract workers to come and live in the host country, opinions were divided with Zimbabweans (57%) and Mozambicans (64%) backing the idea. On the idea of contract workers qualifying for permanent residence, over half of the respondents strongly oppose/oppose this idea except in Mozambique. Making it easier for Southern African hawkers and traders to sell and buy things in their country or to start small businesses also receives mixed support with the strongest opposition coming from South Africa (over 50%) and Botswana (over 55%).

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Making it easier for families of contract workers to come and live in this country	8.2	38.0	14.7	26.2	12.9
Making it easier for contract workers to qualify for permanent residency after the completion of their contracts	4.8	26.3	16.5	32.6	19.8
Making it easier for people from Southern African countries to sell and buy things in this country (ie hawkers and traders)	13.9	34.6	15.8	20.5	15.2
Making it easier for people from Southern African countries to start small businesses in this country	17.5	31.5	14.9	20.3	15.8
N=4 653					

All six countries surveyed face a “brain drain” problem of one degree or another.¹⁹ Respondents were asked how they thought government should respond (Table 46). Almost 60% of respondents in the different

countries strongly support/support the position of making it more difficult for people to send money out of the country; Zimbabweans have the lowest support for this idea (38%). A similar pattern is found for the question about limiting the amount of capital to be sent out of the country. Almost half of respondents strongly support/support making it more difficult for skilled people to leave the country; also supported less by Zimbabweans. Over 60% of respondents across the countries strongly support/support making community service mandatory after completion of degrees with Zimbabweans again expressing the least support for this idea (39%). Mandatory community service for state bursary holders is also strongly supported/supported (about 70% and above) and also less supported by Zimbabweans (about 50%). There is strong support/support across the six countries for offering tax incentives to those who remain in the country (76%).

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Making it more difficult to send money out of the country	19.3	38.8	13.4	20.7	7.9
Making it more difficult for skilled people to leave	15.7	33.0	14.7	25.8	10.8
Making community service mandatory for completion of degrees	19.8	43.3	14.2	14.6	8.1
Making community service mandatory for state bursaries	23.7	44.0	13.9	11.9	6.6
Limiting the amount of capital to be sent out of the country	21.6	42.9	14.0	15.4	6.1
Offering tax incentives to those who remain	30.1	45.5	12.9	7.4	4.0
N=4 655					

REFUGEE POLICY ATTITUDES

On the topic of refugees, respondents were asked if they thought people who are persecuted for religious, ethnic, racial or political reasons in their own countries deserve protection? (Table 47). Respondents in the six countries strongly agree/agree (72%) with this statement. However, over half of the respondents in the six countries say that it is impossible to determine whether or not a person is really a refugee.

Table 47: Attitudes about Refugees

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
People who are persecuted deserve protection	25.5	46.4	11.6	10.7	5.8
Impossible to determine whether a person is really a refugee	12.7	41.1	18.4	20.8	6.9
N=4 686					

Respondents were asked their opinion about various government policies towards refugees (Table 48). People generally supported giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution (strongly support/support, 72%) although South Africa and Namibia have the largest percentage of people who strongly oppose/oppose doing this (28% and 22% respectively). Increasing the number of refugees is strongly opposed/opposed across the six countries (77%). Granting permanent residence to refugees is also strongly opposed/opposed (61%) although less so in Mozambique (37%). There is strong support/support (86%) for sending refugees back to their own countries. Respondents have diverse opinions about requiring refugees to live in camps with about half strongly supporting/supporting this position; those in Swaziland had the least strong support/support (30%). There are also mixed opinions about using money from the country's budget to shelter refugees with about half of respondents in all six countries strongly opposed/opposed.

	Strongly Support (%)	Support (%)	Neither Support nor Oppose (%)	Oppose (%)	Strongly Oppose (%)
Giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution	21.2	50.3	11.6	11.1	5.7
Increasing the number of refugees who enter the country	1.8	8.3	13.5	41.2	35.3
Granting permanent residence to refugees (five years and above)	3.1	20.2	16.3	33.6	26.8
Sending refugees back to their own countries	39.2	46.5	6.9	4.3	3.2
Requiring all refugees to live in special camps	18.0	33.5	20.1	18.7	9.8
Using money from the national budget to shelter refugees	6.1	26.4	17.4	24.4	25.7
N=4 691					

RIGHTS OF FOREIGNERS

The final section of this paper addresses important policy and public education issues that arise from the foregoing analysis. In other words, anti-foreign sentiments of the kind revealed above are usually premised on the belief that migrants, immigrants and refugees should not enjoy the same rights as citizens (even if those rights are protected by constitutional fiat or international convention).

Respondents were therefore asked a series of questions about their attitudes towards the civil rights of citizens, temporary workers/visitors, refugees, and “illegal immigrants” (Table 49). The first question was essentially about freedom of speech. Across all the countries, a high percentage of respondents think this is a right that should always be granted to citizens (85%), but respondents feel almost as strongly that temporary workers, refugees and illegal immigrants do not have this right (between 50% and 88%). The right to vote is strongly supported by respondents in all countries for citizens (98%), and it is a widely shared opinion in the six countries that temporary workers (78%), refugees (87%) and “illegal immigrants” (88%) should not enjoy this right. The right to legal protection, such as not being detained without a trial and having legal representation, is strongly supported for citizens across the six countries (94%), but the percentage who think it should always be granted drops significantly for temporary workers (52%), refugees (42%)

and “illegal immigrants” (23%). The smallest percentages of people who would always grant these rights to non-citizens are in South Africa.

There is a similar pattern of responses across the six countries

Table 49: Attitudes Towards Rights for Citizens and Non-citizens				
		Should Always Be Granted (%)	Depends on Circumstances (%)	Never Be Granted (%)
The right to say what you want, for instance, criticize the government and society.	1. Citizens	85.2	11.7	3.1
	2. Temporary workers/visitors	13.8	36.2	50.0
	3. Refugees	7.5	25.3	67.2
	4. Illegal immigrants	3.1	9.3	87.6
The right to vote.	1. Citizens	98.2	1.4	0.4
	2. Temporary workers/visitors	6.2	16.1	77.7
	3. Refugees	2.5	10.6	86.8
	4. Illegal immigrants	1.4	4.3	94.3
The right to legal protection, such as not being detained without trial, or having a lawyer if you go to court.	1. Citizens	94.2	5.0	0.8
	2. Temporary workers/visitors	52.0	31.9	16.1
	3. Refugees	42.0	31.8	26.2
	4. Illegal immigrants	22.9	20.0	57.2
The right to be protected by the police, to be free from illegal searches, and to have your property protected.	1. Citizens	95.5	4.1	0.4
	2. Temporary workers/visitors	60.9	27.1	12.0
	3. Refugees	51.1	28.3	20.6
	4. Illegal immigrants	23.5	20.7	55.7
The right to social services such as education, housing, health care and water.	1. Citizens	98.6	1.6	0.1
	2. Temporary workers/visitors	62.9	24.3	12.8
	3. Refugees	55.2	24.1	20.7
	4. Illegal immigrants	27.1	19.5	53.45
N=4 700				

surveyed for the next question about the right to police protection, due process and protection of property. Citizens should always have the right (96%) but many respondents think non-citizens should not have this right. The last question in this series is about the right to social services, such as education, housing, health care and water; and the answers also follow the same pattern. Across the six countries surveyed, and especially in South Africa, temporary workers, refugees and “illegal immigrants,” are thought to be less entitled to such basic rights as legal, police and social services.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS²⁰

Is xenophobia a regional phenomenon in Southern Africa? The answer to that question is that it depends: it depends on which country one is talking about, it depends on who one is speaking about within a country, and it depends on the degree of knowledge people have about the migration process and of particular migrants.

The first point to emerge from this inter-country study is that citizens across the region consistently tend to exaggerate the numbers of non-citizens in their countries, to view the migration of people within the region as a “problem” rather than an opportunity and to scapegoat non-citizens. The intensity of these feelings varies significantly from country to country. The harshest sentiments are expressed by the citizens of South Africa, Namibia and, to a lesser extent, Botswana. The citizens of Swaziland, Mozambique and Zimbabwe are considerably more relaxed about the presence of non-citizens in their countries. At the most basic level, there is therefore a marked difference between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. The citizens of recipient countries tend to be considerably more intolerant. That the situation is very fluid and dynamic is illustrated by the case of Botswana. As the numbers of primarily Zimbabwean migrants has increased over the last few years, so levels of tolerance of all outsiders have dropped.²¹

The second point of significance is that attitudes in the anti-foreign “troika” (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana) are so pervasive and widespread that it is actually impossible to identify any kind of typical “xenophobe profile.” In other words, the poor and the rich, the employed and the unemployed, the male and the female, the black and the white, the conservative and the radical, all express remarkably similar attitudes. This poses a significant problem of explanation because it runs counter to the more general belief that certain groups in a population (usually those who are or who perceive themselves to be threatened) are more prone to xenophobic attitudes than others. It also provides a massive public education challenge not only of knowing where

to begin but deciding who to target.

Third, it would be incorrect to suppose that in the remaining countries attitudes are uniformly tolerant. But these countries tend to fit the more typical international profile. In other words, where there is intolerance it tends to be confined to identifiable socio-economic groups within the population. As might be anticipated, the socio-economically disadvantaged in these countries (the poor, the working class, the unemployed) tend to have more negative views about migrant, immigrants and refugees than their better-off and more secure fellow citizens.

Fourth, in all countries surveyed it is remarkable how little personal contact, and therefore knowledge, citizens have of non-citizens. Most face-to-face exchanges tend to be of the economic type. In other words, it would be fair to say that negative attitudes are held because there is no evidence to the contrary. Those citizens who do number foreigners amongst their friends and personal acquaintances tend to be far more accepting and tolerant than those who do not. Interaction, in other words, is a powerful antidote to xenophobia. But how, in practical and policy terms, is this to be encouraged since people cannot be forced to choose their friends? Clearly, familiarity breeds acceptance rather than contempt. The primary challenge is therefore an educational one: to provide citizens with direct or vicarious knowledge of migrants, immigrants, refugees *as people* through the media, and to encourage a greater sense of continentalism and internationalism in the population through curriculum reform at schools, the media and the public pronouncements of opinion-makers.

Fifth, in this context, one of the more interesting results to emerge from this survey is the virtual absence of any sense of solidarity with other countries in the SADC. Given the longevity of the SADC as a formal institution, this is a significant indictment. The absence of any real sense of "regional consciousness" (of participation in a regional grouping whose interests are greater than the sum of its parts) has very direct implications for migration issues. Citizens of SADC countries make very little distinction between migrants from other SADC countries and those from elsewhere in Africa and even Europe and North America. Where attitudes are negative, they are uniformly negative; where positive; uniformly positive. An urgent challenge confronting the SADC and migration-related organizations such as MIDSAs is therefore to develop strategies to build a new regional consciousness amongst citizens and migration policy-makers.

Sixth, given the attitudinal profile revealed in the NIPS surveys, it is unsurprising that most citizens would prefer national governments to "get tough" with migrants and refugees. There is enormous suspicion that refugees are not genuine and there is significant fear that migrants

are an economic threat. Perhaps the most significant and consistent finding is the fear – certainly not confined to Southern Africa – that migrants steal rather than create jobs. And yet, when citizens are pressed on the issue, it is clear that this belief is generic rather than born of personal experience. Hardly anyone in our representative sample had ever lost a job to a foreign citizen, and very few had personal experience of this happening to their family and friends. Not many could cite instances of this actually happening.

Seventh, when migration is viewed as a “threat” (as it clearly is amongst significant portions of the population and amongst virtually everyone in some countries) it is not unusual for citizens to prefer draconian policy solutions. Rather shocking is the degree of support for border electrification. But citizens also want to see armies at the borders, tough internal enforcement and curtailment of basic rights. There is clearly a massive job of education in the offing if policy-makers are to turn around the obsession with control and exclusion and encourage a countervailing sense of the potential positive aspects of migration and immigration. Here, the NIPS survey is particularly relevant. It shows that across the region, citizens are prepared to accept and welcome non-citizens if their economic impact is demonstrably positive. Hence, skills- and investor-friendly immigration policies would not be a difficult sell to citizens. Since such policies are inevitable if countries are to be and remain globally competitive, it is important that policy and opinion-makers begin to build a broad public consensus on this issue. There is nothing more off-putting to a new immigrant who wants to put their skills to work in and for a new country to find that they are the object of scorn and vilification simply because of their accent or the colour of their skin.

ENDNOTES

- 1 S Croucher, "South Africa's Illegal Aliens: Constructing National Boundaries in a Postapartheid State" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 21 (1998), pp.639-60; M Reitzes, "Mindsets and Migrants: Conceptions of State, Sovereignty and Citizenship of Insiders and Outsiders in South Africa" In J Whitman, ed. *Migrants, Citizens and the State in Southern Africa* (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 62-81; S Peberdy, "Imagining Immigration: Inclusive Identities and Exclusive Policies in Post-1994 South Africa" *Africa Today* 48(2001), pp.15-34.
- 2 R Mattes, DM Taylor, DA McDonald, A Poore and W Richmond, "South African Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration" In David A. McDonald, ed. *On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa* (Cape Town and New York: Southern African Migration Project and St Martin's Press, 2000), pp. 196-218; J Crush, "The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia, and Human Rights in South Africa" *International Migration* 38(2000); pp.103-34.
- 3 J Crush and DA McDonald, eds. *Transnationalism and New African Immigration to South Africa* (Toronto: Southern African Migration Project and Canadian Association of African Studies, 2002).
- 4 Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), *Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa*, SAMP Migration Policy Series Paper No 22, Cape Town and Kingston, 2001.
- 5 A Morris and A Bouillon, eds. *African Immigration to South Africa: Francophone Migration of the 1990s* (Pretoria: Protea and IFAS, 2001).
- 6 J Crush, "Migrations Past: An Historical Overview of Cross-Border Movement in Southern Africa" In McDonald, ed. *On Borders*, pp. 12-24.
- 7 B Rutinwa, "Asylum and Refugee Policies in Southern Africa: A Historical Perspective" In Legal Resources Foundation, *A Reference Guide to Refugee Law and Issues in Southern Africa* (Lusaka, 2002), pp. 1-10.
- 8 J Oucho and J Crush, "Contra Free Movement: South Africa and the SADC Migration Protocols" *Africa Today* 48(2001), pp.139-58.
- 9 SAMP is publishing in-depth individual country studies separately; see, to date, D Tevera and L Zinyama, *Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe*, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 25, Kingston and Cape Town, 2002; B Frayne and W Pendleton, *Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes*, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 27, Cape Town and Kingston, 2002; E Campbell and J Oucho, *Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Botswana*, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 28, Cape Town and Kingston, 2003. Studies on Mozambique and Swaziland are in press.
- 10 Totals for individual questions vary by country and question due to missing

- data.
- 11 In a few tables the reader will find “0” for South African respondents which indicates that particular question was not included in the original South African questionnaire.
 - 12 See the chapters in McDonald, *On Borders*.
 - 13 R Danso and D McDonald, “Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Print Media in Post-Apartheid South Africa” *Africa Today* 48(3) (2001); pp. 115-38; F Nyamnjoh, “Local Attitudes Towards Citizenship and Foreigners in Botswana: An Appraisal of Recent Press Stories” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 28(4) (2002): 755-76; P Kabeya-Mwepu and S Jacobs, “‘Fugees’: African Immigrants, Media and the New South Africa” In H Wasserman and S Jacobs (eds.) *Shifting Selves* (Cape Town: Kwela Books, 2003): 221-34.
 - 14 J Fetzer, *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany* (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), pp. 1-24.
 - 15 M Dambrun, D Taylor, J Crush and D McDonald, “Intergroup Attitudes in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Foreigners as a Prime Target of Prejudice”; “Patterns of Prejudice in Urban Southern Africa”; “The Relative Deprivation-Gratification Continuum and Hostility Towards Immigrants in South Africa” Unpublished papers, Southern African Migration Project, 2002.
 - 16 Fetzer, *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany*.
 - 17 D Tevera and J Crush, *The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe*, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 29, Cape Town and Kingston, 2003.
 - 18 Fetzer, *Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France and Germany*.
 - 19 Crush and McDonald, *Transnationalism and New African Immigration to South Africa*.
 - 20 These conclusions are based on the findings reported here as well as the individual country studies.
 - 21 E Campbell, “Attitudes of Botswana Citizens Toward Immigrants: Signs of Xenophobia?” *International Migration* 41(4) (2003), pp. 71-112.

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES

1. *Covert Operations: Clandestine Migration, Temporary Work and Immigration Policy in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-51-9
2. *Riding the Tiger: Lesotho Miners and Permanent Residence in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-52-7
3. *International Migration, Immigrant Entrepreneurs and South Africa's Small Enterprise Economy* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-62-4
4. *Silenced by Nation Building: African Immigrants and Language Policy in the New South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-64-0
5. *Left Out in the Cold? Housing and Immigration in the New South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-68-3
6. *Trading Places: Cross-Border Traders and the South African Informal Sector* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-71-3
7. *Challenging Xenophobia: Myth and Realities about Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-70-5
8. *Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican Miners and Post-Apartheid South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-78-0
9. *Women on the Move: Gender and Cross-Border Migration to South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-82-9.
10. *Namibians on South Africa: Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Migration and Immigration Policy* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-84-5.
11. *Building Skills: Cross-Border Migrants and the South African Construction Industry* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-84-5
12. *Immigration & Education: International Students at South African Universities and Technikons* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-89-6
13. *The Lives and Times of African Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
14. *Still Waiting for the Barbarians: South African Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
15. *Undermining Labour: Migrancy and Sub-contracting in the South African Gold Mining Industry* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
16. *Borderline Farming: Foreign Migrants in South African Commercial Agriculture* (2000) ISBN 1-874864-97-7
17. *Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Press in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-01-3
18. *Losing Our Minds: Skills Migration and the South African Brain Drain* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-03-x
19. *Botswana: Migration Perspectives and Prospects* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-04-8
20. *The Brain Gain: Skilled Migrants and Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-14-5
21. *Cross-Border Raiding and Community Conflict in the Lesotho-South African Border Zone* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-16-1

22. *Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-30-7
23. *Gender and the Brain Drain from South Africa* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-35-8
24. *Spaces of Vulnerability: Migration and HIV/AIDS in South Africa* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-38-2
25. *Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-40-4
26. *The Border Within: The Future of the Lesotho-South African International Boundary* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-41-2
27. *Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-44-7
28. *Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Botswana* (2003) ISBN 1-919798-47-1
29. *The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe* (2003) ISBN 1-919798-48-X