A Blueprint of a Calculator of Intensions

We are on Mars again – the favourite laboratory for philosophical experiments. Our host colleagues introduce us to some Martian stuff referred to as “T”, and ask us to help them to identify T on other possible worlds. Or, technically speaking, we are asked to determine the intension of “T”, i.e., what the term designates with respect to different possible worlds. Following a short series of experiments on the planet, we conclude that the intension of “T” depends upon three factors: (1) The semantic rule linked with the term, i.e., the way in which the term is designed to pick out its referent with respect to different possible worlds (e.g., as a definite description, or as a proper name, or as an actualised description etc.); (2) The properties of the referent of “T” in the actual world; and, (3) What we shall call ‘the metaphysical background of the universe’, i.e., what counts as a thing vs. what counts as a property of things (e.g., whether the universe is such that it contains material objects that merely happen to have their manifest properties, or whether the universe primarily contains manifest objects that merely happen to have their material constitution). As our experiments show, changing the values of any of these variables will result in a change in the reference of the term with respect to different possible worlds, viz., it will result in a change in the intension of the term. We then demonstrate how the three variables are interrelated, and specify how exactly they combine to produce a particular intension of a term. We conclude with a general “formula” that determines what will deserve to be called “T” relative to the different values of the above variables, i.e., we come up with a calculator of intensions. Finally, we also draw some morals about rigidity

Land Law Federalism

Land exhibits a unique duality. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems, natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect remote areas; networks of buildings, homes, offices, and factories create communities and provide the physical context in which most human interaction takes place. Despite this duality, the dominant descriptive and normative account of land-use law is premised upon local control

Minority Interests, Majority Politics: A Comment on Richard Collins Telluride\u27s Tale of Eminent Domain, Home Rule, and Retroactivity

In his article, Telluride\u27s Tale of Eminent Domain, Home Rule, and Retroactivity, Professor Richard Collins skillfully parses many of the unique legal issues that confronted the Colorado Supreme Court in Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp. In particular, Professor Collins explores the constitutional right to a change of venue based on jury bias in an eminent domain action, the scope of Telluride\u27s home rule power of eminent domain, and the extent to which a state statute purporting to limit such power could be retroactively applied

Land Law Federalism

Land exhibits a unique duality. Each parcel is at once absolutely fixed in location and inextricably linked to a complex array of interconnected systems, natural and man-made. Ecosystems spanning vast geographic areas sustain human life; interstate highways, railways, and airports physically connect remote areas; networks of buildings, homes, offices, and factories create communities and provide the physical context in which most human interaction takes place. Despite this duality, the dominant descriptive and normative account of land-use law is premised upon local control

One Person, One Weighted Vote

This Article argues that weighted voting should be used to comply with the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement while preserving representation for political units on the legislative body. First, this Article demonstrates that weighted voting satisfies the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement by equalizing the mathematic weight of each vote. Second, this Article demonstrates that weighted voting has the potential to remedy several negative consequences of equal- population districts. Specifically, this Article argues that by preserving local political boundaries, weighted voting eliminates the decennial redistricting process that gives rise to claims of partisan gerrymandering, enables local governments to function both as administrative arms of the state and as independent political communities and provides a format for regional governance. Third, this Article recognizes that while weighted- voting equalizes the mathematic weight of each vote, it does not equalize all aspects of legislative representation. In particular, this Article explains that weighted-voting generates inequality in the functional representation each voter receives, inflates the political power and voting power of legislators from more populous districts, and increases the risk of minority vote dilution. Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of weighted voting, this Article argues that weighted voting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, this Article maintains that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equal functional representation or legislator power, and that the Supreme Court permits the use of at-large voting systems that have a similar capacity to dilute minority voice. Thus, this Article concludes that while it is important to recognize the tradeoffs inherent in weighted-voting apportionment plans, these tradeoffs do not preclude their use

Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’

Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. Hence, in order to settle the dispute, we need to check which of the two – Kripke's use of ‘pain’ as rigid, or Lewis's use of ‘pain’ as nonrigid – better meets this intuition. I show that, despite crucial differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, surprisingly, both views meet this intuition equally well. Thus it appears that this question of rigidity cannot, in principle, be solved, and so, at least with respect to this particular dispute, the jury is still out on whether mental states are identical to physical state

Possible World Semantics Meets Metaphysics

Possible world semantics has been gradually fine-grained over the years. First, simple extensional semantics was fine-grained by relativizing it to worlds considered as counterfactual, thus generating standard possible-world semantics, which was later further fine-grained by relativizing it to worlds considered as actual, thus generating two-dimensional semantics. However, worlds considered as actual were only considered with respect to the empirical facts obtaining in such worlds. This paper shows that no less of an important role is played by another feature of actual worlds, namely, the criteria of identity that obtain in such worlds