The Structure of Payments in Technology Transfer Contracts: Evidence from Spain

I analyze a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms, where I observe firm and technology characteristics, as well as the type of scheduled payments, whether fixed and/or variable. I find first that technology type influences the chances of the parties reaching an agreement, and second, that the explanations for observed payments based on moral hazard or risk aversion alone are not satisfactory. I argue that all these theories fail to take into account the fact that the contractual relationship is extended along time and that the parties will choose the kind of payments that better estimate the value of the relationship.

Contractual Implications of International Trade in Tacit Knowledge

This paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. There is empirical evidence, drawn from a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991, that contracts scheduled to last shorter are less likely to include the transfer of know-how. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, so as to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the seller’s side.

Free entry and welfare with price discrimination

We show that if firms in an industry engage in third-degree price discrimination, the number of firms in the free-entry equilibrium may be inefficiently low. This result is obtained even with set up costs and a price above marginal cost. We discuss the relevant implications that our result has for policy design.Free entry, Social welfare, Third-degree price discrimination, Oligopoly, Business stealing.

Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

In this note, we suggest a link between tariff protection and firms' incentives to engage in a horizontal merger. We consider a Cournot oligopoly with equal, constant marginal costs where firms have to decide on lobbying efforts prior to choosing output. These lobbying efforts will determine whether a prohibitive tariff is introduced. We find that the possibility of lobbying may enlarge the set of mergers that are profitable, even without cost reductions.

Contractual Implications of International Trade in Tacit Knowledge

This paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. A sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991 is analyzed to find a positive relationship between contract duration and the likelihood of transferring know-how in unaffiliated transfers. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, suggesting that the parties try to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the licensor’s side

Demand Fluctuations and Innovation Investments: Evidence from the Great Recession in Spain

Fluctuations in aggregate demand can influence the decision to invest in innovation. This paper focuses on this choice when fluctuations are heterogeneous across productive strata of the economy. To guide the empirical analysis, we model firms’ decision to invest in innovation. In our framework, firms are heterogeneous and demand shocks are exogenous. We show that drops in aggregate expenditure reduce the proportion of firms investing in innovation. We then study investment behaviour in a panel of Spanish innovative manufacturing firms. These firms are all investing in internal R&D in 2004 and are yearly surveyed until 2013. During the Great Recession, firms experienced large contractions in aggregate consumption. The reduction reached 10% of its pre-crisis trend. We proxy heterogeneous fluctuations in demand with entry and exit rates in the productive stratum of each firm. Rates incorporate all firms, including non-innovative firms. Higher exit rates are associated with reductions of 2 to 3% in the share of firms investing in innovation. The drop is larger for smaller firms, which also experience larger decreases in sales. These results are in line with our theoretical predictions. Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of indicators of time-varying credit constraints. For these constraints, we observe a marginal role among innovative firms

Demand Fluctuations and Innovation Investments: Evidence from the Great Recession in Spain

Fluctuations in aggregate demand can influence the decision to invest in innovation. This paper focuses on this choice when fluctuations are heterogeneous across productive strata of the economy. To guide the empirical analysis, we model firms’ decision to invest in innovation. In our framework, firms are heterogeneous and demand shocks are exogenous. We show that drops in aggregate expenditure reduce the proportion of firms investing in innovation. We then study investment behaviour in a panel of Spanish innovative manufacturing firms. These firms are all investing in internal R&D in 2004 and are yearly surveyed until 2013. During the Great Recession, firms experienced large contractions in aggregate consumption. The reduction reached 10% of its pre-crisis trend. We proxy heterogeneous fluctuations in demand with entry and exit rates in the productive stratum of each firm. Rates incorporate all firms, including non-innovative firms. Higher exit rates are associated with reductions of 2 to 3% in the share of firms investing in innovation. The drop is larger for smaller firms, which also experience larger decreases in sales. These results are in line with our theoretical predictions. Our estimates are robust to the inclusion of indicators of time-varying credit constraints. For these constraints, we observe a marginal role among innovative firms

Quality differences, third-degree price discrimination, and welfare

We propose a theoretical model to analyze the welfare implications of price discrimination in the presence of differences in quality. The model considers two markets where in each market competition takes place between a local firm that operates in that market only and a global firm that operates in both markets. All firms are assumed to be producing with zero marginal costs. Local firms produce a good that is perceived by consumers to have superior quality than that produced by the global firm. We find that there are parameter values such that welfare increases while total output decreases if the global firm engages in price discrimination. This is due to a positive allocation effect brought about precisely by the global firm engaging in price discrimination

Contractual Implications of International Trade in Tacit Knowledge.

International audienceThis paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. A sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991 is analyzed to find a positive relationship between contract duration and the likelihood of transferring know-how in unaffiliated transfers. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, suggesting that the parties try to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the licensor's side