Happiness, Economic Well-being, Social Capital and the Quality of Institutions

Since Jeremy Bentham, utilitarians have argued that happiness, not just income or wealth, is the maximand of individual and social welfare. By contrast, Rawls and followers argue that to share a common perception of living in a just society is the “ultimate good” and that individuals have a moral ability to evaluate just institutions. In this paper we argue that just institutions, apart from their intrinsic value, also have an instrumental value, both in economic performance and in happiness. Thus happiness -- or subjective well being -- is analyzed as being a function of economic well-being, the quality of public institutions and social ties. Cross section individual data from citizens in OECD countries show that income, education and the perceived quality of institutions have the highest impact on life satisfaction, followed by social capital. Country analysis shows a non linear but positive influence of per capita GDP on life satisfaction, but also that unemployment and inflation reduce average happiness, the former effect being stronger. Finally, better quality public institutions and having more social capital also bring more happiness. We conclude with some policy implications.Happiness; Democracy; Social Capital; Quality of Institutions

Intergovernmental grant rules, the "golden rule" of public finance and local expenditures

The Stability and Growth Pact and the process of fiscal consolidation in several European countries have enhanced the role of fiscal rules at sub-national level. This paper analyzes the combined effect of a rule to allocate capital and current block grants to local governments and the “golden rule” of public finance (surplus of current balance). We argue that the two fiscal rules introduce significant rigidities and distortions in local governments’ expenditures structure since these mimic the structure of revenues. This effect is particularly relevant in municipalities that are more dependent of intergovernmental grants, mainly rural. On the other hand, urban municipalities with greater tax revenues (current revenues) are constrained in their ability to make capital investments because they receive per capita capital grants below what economies of scale would suggest. An empirical analysis of Portuguese local governments shows that it is no longer the median voter, but fiscal rules, that command the broad pattern of expenditure (current versus capital) at a local level. This paper is a contribution to the literature on the perverse effects of fiscal rules.Intergovernmental block grants; Fiscal Rules; Local Government Expenditure; “Golden Rule”

A politico-economic approach to intergovernmental : lump-sum grants

This paper develops a positive approach to grant design when the central government and a lobby of local governments are the main agents. It develops the hypothesis that the regressivity or progressivity of per capita grants regarding community size is, ceteris paribus, related to the structure of the lobbying activities of local governments and is independent of hypothetical economies or diseconomies of scale in the production of local public goods. An encompassing lobby organisation using a "one mayor one vote" system of representation supports the regressivity of per capita grants while under "proportional" representation the lobby will support a design of per capita grants which is progressive towards community size. An empirical analysis of lump-sum grants in Portugal supports the politico-economic hypothesis and rejects the hypothesis that economies of scale is the main explanatory cause for the observed regressivity of per capita grants.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

From Schumpeterian democracy to constitutional democracy

A critical issue of a constitutional democracy is to determine an optimal limitation of citizens’ political liberties. This problem is analysed here within the framework of a parliamentary system of government, and in the context of Rawls’ principle of equal political participation. It is argued that optimal barriers to entry into political competition are a function of the legislative decision rules, the domain of collective choices, and the rules for selecting (and dismissing) the executive. Contrary to Schumpeter and Riker who rejected ‘populism’ (the approach that public policy should be a result of citizens’ preferences), we argue that it is possible to reconcile greater citizen participation and liberal democracy with an appropriate institutional design.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Citizens’ Freedom to Choose Representatives: Ballot Structure, Proportionality and “Fragmented” Parliaments

The analysis of the political consequences of electoral laws has emphasized how individual characteristics of the electoral system (electoral formulas, district magnitude, ballot structure) affect the degree of parliament “fragmentation” and proportionality. This paper argues that the personal attributes of representatives are also an important consequence of electoral laws, and that they are in part determined by citizens’ freedom to choose representatives. We clarify this concept and develop an index of citizens’ freedom to choose members of parliament as a function of the ballot structure, district size and electoral formulae. Using data from twenty nine countries, we find that neither proportionality nor the effective number of parties is significantly affected by voters’ freedom of choice. This result has important normative implications for electoral reform.Ballot structure; Electoral index; Freedom to choose; Personal vote.

(Virtual) Agents for running electricity markets

This paper describes a multi-agent based simulation (MABS) framework to construct an artificial electric power market populated with learning agents. The artificial market, named TEMMAS (The Electricity Market Multi-Agent Simulator), explores the integration of two design constructs: (i) the specification of the environmental physical market properties and (ii) the specification of the decision-making (deliberative) and reactive agents. TEMMAS is materialized in an experimental setup involving distinct power generator companies that operate in the market and search for the trading strategies that best exploit their generating units' resources. The experimental results show a coherent market behavior that emerges from the overall simulated environment

A hybrid approach to multi-agent decision-making

In the aftermath of a large-scale disaster, agents' decisions derive from self-interested (e.g. survival), common-good (e.g. victims' rescue) and teamwork (e.g. fire extinction) motivations. However, current decision-theoretic models are either purely individual or purely collective and find it difficult to deal with motivational attitudes; on the other hand, mental-state based models find it difficult to deal with uncertainty. We propose a hybrid, CvI-JI, approach that combines: i) collective 'versus' individual (CvI) decisions, founded on the Markov decision process (MDP) quantitative evaluation of joint-actions, and ii)joint-intentions (JI) formulation of teamwork, founded on the belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture of general mental-state based reasoning. The CvI-JI evaluation explores the performance's improvemen

Decisions with multiple simultaneous goals and uncertain causal effects

A key aspect of decision-making in a disaster response scenario is the capability to evaluate multiple and simultaneously perceived goals. Current competing approaches to build decision-making agents are either mental-state based as BDI, or founded on decision-theoretic models as MDP. The BDI chooses heuristically among several goals and the MDP searches for a policy to achieve a specific goal. In this paper we develop a preferences model to decide among multiple simultaneous goals. We propose a pattern, which follows a decision-theoretic approach, to evaluate the expected causal effects of the observable and non-observable aspects that inform each decision. We focus on yes-or-no (i.e., pursue or ignore a goal) decisions and illustrate the proposal using the RoboCupRescue simulation environment

The voter who wasn’t there : Referenda, representation and abstention

We analyze single binary-choice voting rules and identify the presence of the No-Show paradox in this simple setting, as a consequence of specific turnout or quorum conditions that are included in actual rules. Since these conditions are meant to ensure a representative outcome, we formalize this concern and reach our main result: no voting rule can ensure representation if abstention is possible, unless restrictive assumptions are made on the preference domain of abstainers. We then focus on the main referendum systems and show that appropriate restrictions do make them compatible with representation. The main purpose of our paper is, however, to provide a tool for referendum design: rather than imposing arbitrary restrictions on the preference domain of non-voters, we recommend instead that a conscious choice be made on how abstention is to be interpreted and that this choice be used to derive the corresponding referendum rule..info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Formação de equipa para combate a incêndio urbano

Neste artigo descreve-se uma abordagem para dimensionar uma equipa de bombeiros para combate a incêndio urbano em ambiente de simulação. A simulação foi realizada no ambiente RoboCupRescue que combina, num mesmo espaço geográfico (e.g. cidade), a evolução de uma catástrofe (e.g. incêndio urbano) e a actuação dos meios (humanos) que visam mitigar os efeitos dessa catástrofe. A abordagem seguida permite determinar o número mínimo de elementos a constituir numa equipa de bombeiros para extinguir um determinado incêndio. Utilizou-se um processo de exploração de conhecimento a partir de um conjunto de treino para construir uma árvore de decisão, recorrendo ao algoritmo de classificação ID3. O conjunto de treino foi obtido a partir da simulação de diferentes situações de incêndio usando o espaço geográfico (mapa) da cidade japonesa de Kobe. São analisados os resultados da avaliação das regras geradas e apresentam-se algumas conclusões sobre os factores que influenciam o critério de formação das equipas.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio