The Shadow of Death: Analysing the Pre-Exit Productivity of Portuguese Manufacturing Firms

In this study, we examine the pre-exiting productivity profile of mature firms relatively to survivors. We also evaluate how productivity affects the probability of exit along various dimensions. Our approach is an empirical one, and it is based on an unbalanced panel of Portuguese manufacturing firms covering a period of one decade. Our findings confirm that market selection forces low-productivity firms to exit, but there is also evidence that a sizeable portion of low-productivity firms do not shut down. Conversely, there is a non-negligible fraction of high-productivity firms that do actually close. In line, too, with some key theoretical predictions, exiting firms reveal a falling productivity level over a number of years prior to exit. Finally, our results from the survival model show that both low-productivity and small firms are much more likely to exit the market. Industry and macro environment were also found to have a non-negligible role on the exit of mature firms.Pre-exit performance; Exit pattern; Productivity; Firm survival; Portugal

Productivity, wages, and the returns to firm-provided training: fair shared capitalism?

In this study, we develop an alternative modelling that examines a) the determinants of firm productivity and wages and b) the internal rate of return (IRR) to firm training for both firms and workers. Using a six-year linked employer-employee dataset, our estimates indicate that an additional hour of training per worker results in an increase of 0.12% in productivity and 0.04% in wages, or an increase of 0.16% and 0.08%, respectively, if one uses firm training as a stock variable. We then find that 82% of the gains in productivity are captured by firms and 18% by workers. Given the training costs, we finally obtain an IRR of 13% for firms and 33% for workers at sample means. Firms are heterogeneous, and we do find that dispersion in the rates of return across firms is high.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Does Schumpeterian Creative Destruction Lead to Higher Productivity? The effects of firms’ entry

This paper discusses the impact of newly created firms on industry productivity growth. Our central hypothesis is that there are two potential effects of new firms on productivity growth: a direct effect, as entrants may be relatively more productive than established firms; and an indirect effect, through increased competitive pressure that stimulates incumbents to elevate their productivity in order to survive. The results of the decomposition exercise of aggregate productivity growth suggest that the direct contribution of entry is small. In turn, the regression analysis on the effect of entry on productivity growth of incumbents indicates that the higher is the former, the higher is the latter, which is equivalent to say that the greater is the competitive pressure generated by new entrants, the higher is the expected aggregate productivity level.Entry, Firm dynamics, Productivity growth, Competition effect

Are Good Industrial Relations Good for the Economy?

Using international data, we investigate whether the quality of industrial relations matters for the macro economy. We measure industrial relations inversely by strikes Ð which proxy we cross-check with an industrial relations reputation indicator Ð and our macro performance indicator is the unemployment rate. Independent of the role of other institutions, good industrial relations do seem to matter: greater strike volume is associated with higher unemployment. But these results apply in cross section. Holding country effects constant, the sign of the strikes coefficient is abruptly reversed. Although it does not seem to be the case that the line of causation runs from unemployment to strikes once we control for the endogeneity of strikes, it is also the case that support for the strikes proxy for industrial relations quality is much eroded.strikes, industrial relations quality, unemployment, labor market institutions, cross-country data

What Have We Learned About The Employment Effects of Severance Pay? Further Iterations of Lazear et al.

In this study we examine the contribution of severance pay to employment and unemployment development using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear’s (1990) dictum that severance payment requirements adversely impact the labor market. We extend his sample period and add to his parsimonious specification a variety of fixed and time-varying labor market institutions. While the positive effect of severance pay on unemployment garners some support, there is no real indication of adverse effects for (the three) other employment outcomes identified here. Moreover, with the possible exception of collective bargaining coordination, the role of institutions is also more muted than suggested in the literature.

Does the Quality of Industrial Relations Matter for the Macro Economy? A Cross-Country Analysis Using Strikes Data

Using international data, we investigate whether the quality of industrial relations matters for the macro economy. We measure industrial relations inversely by strikes – which proxy we cross-check with an industrial relations reputation indicator – and our macro performance outcome is the unemployment rate. Independent of the role of other institutions, good industrial relations do seem to matter: greater strike volume is associated with higher unemployment. Holding country effects constant, however, the sign of the variable is reversed. This fixed-effects result likely picks up a direct effect of strikes, namely, their tendency to rise when striking becomes more attractive to the union.strike rate/volume, quality of labor relations, labor market institutions, unemployment

The Effect of Works Councils on Employment Change

Despite recent changes in the relationship between unionism and various indicators of firm performance, there is one seeming constant in the Anglophone countries: unions at the workplace are associated with reduced employment growth of around -2.5% a year. Using German data, we examine the impact of the works council – that country’s form of workplace representation – on employment change, 1993-2001. The German institution appears to have much the same negative effect on employment growth. That said, survival bias seems to play a small role, and works councils do not seem to further slow the tortuous pace of employment adjustment in Germany.

Is Portugal really so arteriosclerotic? Results from a cross-country analysis of labor adjustment

Reputation indexes of employment protection have proven popular constructs in studies of the covariation of labor market institutions and macroeconomic outcomes. Portugal occupies an unenviable rank order in such measures of the stringency of employment protection. We critique this reputation in two ways: first, by offering a modicum of 'corrective' institutional detail on the nature of employment protection in Portugal; and, second, and more substantively, by offering a detailed analysis of the process of labor djustment in Portugal, benchmarked to other-country experience. The latter exercise – based on a two- and one-stage error correction model – reveals Portugal to have a very high speed of adjustment to deviations from the long-run employment-output equilibrium – a result that is clearly at odds with its allegedly sclerotic labor market. More in accord with received wisdom is the very smooth labor adjustment mechanism characterizing the United Kingdom. The most notable feature of the German results is the deterioration in that country's speed of adjustment in recent years. The Spanish case is distinguished by its erratic path of long-run adjustment. --

Rent Seeking at Plant Level: An Application of the Card-De la Rica Tenure Model to Workers in German Works Councils

Low-skilled workers enjoy a large wage advantage in German works council establishments. Since job tenure is also longer for these workers, one explanation might be rent-seeking. If the premium is a compensating wage differential (or a return to unmeasured ability), it should not lead to higher tenure; whereas if it is (partly) rent, lower quits should lead to longer tenure at plants with works councils. Our analysis uses the Card and de la Rica (2006) tenure model, and although the association between skill level and the works council tenure gap is positive it fails to achieve statistical significance in a single equation framework. However, running the tenure equation for separate skill quintiles, we find that those with the highest wage premium have the greatest tenure. As a result, although we cannot be certain that the works council wage mark-up of low-skilled workers is necessarily a non competitive rent, the observed pattern of job tenure across different skill subsamples is not after all inconsistent with rent-seeking behavior.

German Works Councils and the Anatomy of Wages

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the effect of German works councils on wages, using matched employer-employee data from the German LIAB for 2001. In general, we find that works councils are associated with higher earnings, even after accounting for worker and establishment heterogeneity. At this level, the works council premium exceeds the collective bargaining mark-up, and is modestly higher in the presence of collective bargaining once we account for worker selection into the two institutions. More specifically, works councils do seem to benefit women relatively and to build on collective bargaining in this regard. They also seem to favor foreign, east-German, and service-sector workers although the effects of collective bargaining are not always reinforcing. The evidence from quantile regressions suggests that only in conjunction with collective bargaining is the narrowing influence of works councils really clear-cut. The above findings pertain to workers in all plants. Once we consider smaller establishments with 21-100 employees, however, each of these results is further qualified, beginning with the effect on wage levels where premia are now only observed in conjunction with collective bargaining.works councils, collective bargaining coverage, matched employer-employee data, wages, wage distribution.