Innovations, Rents and Risk

This research was conducted within the Paul Woolley Research Initiative on Capital Market Dysfunctionalities at IDEI, Toulouse. Support from the Europlace Institute of Finance is gratefully aknowledged. Many thanks to participants in the first conference of the Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality at the London School of Economics, the Pompeu Fabra Conference on the Financial Crisis, the third Banco de Portugal conference on Financial Intermediation, the Europlace Institute of Finance 7th Annual Forum, as well as seminar participants at London Business School, Frankfurt University, the European Central Bank and Amsterdam University, especially Sudipto Bhattacharya, Arnoud Boot, John Boyd, Markus Brunnermeier, Catherine Casamatta, Zvi Eckstein, Guido Friebel, Alex Gümbel, Philipp Hartmann, Augustin Landier, Thomas Mariotti, John Moore, Liliana Pellizzon, Enrico Perotti, Ludovic Phalippou, Guillaume Plantin and Steve Schaefer.

Por qué los mercados financieros son tan ineficientes y explotadores, y una propuesta de solución

The essay offers a new understanding of how financial markets work. The key departure from conventional theory is to recognize that investors do not invest directly in securities but through agents such as fund managers. Agents have better information and different objectives than their customers (principals) and this asymmetry is shown as the source of inefficiency: mispricing, bubbles and crashes. A separate outcome is that agents are in a position to capture for themselves the bulk of the returns from financial innovations. Principal/agent problems do a good job of explaining how the global finance sector has become so bloated, profitable and prone to crisis. Remedial action involves the principals changing the way they contract with, and instruct agents. The essay ends with a manifesto of policies that pension funds and other large investors can adopt to mitigate the destructive features of delegation both for their individual benefit and to promote social welfare in the form of a leaner, more efficient and more stable finance sector.financial markets, principal-agent

Curse of the benchmarks

Obsession with short-term performance against market cap benchmarks preordains the dysfunctionality of asset markets. The problems start when trustees hire fund managers to outperform benchmark indexes subject to limits on annual divergence. For multi-asset portfolios the benchmark is generally the performance of peer group funds, also based on market cap. In the absence of formal instructions, asset managers, as well as off-the-peg mutual funds, are still keen to demonstrate their ability against the competition in the short run. If securities markets were efficiently priced in the sense of reflecting best estimates of fundamental value, there would be no problem in using market cap benchmarks. But the terms under which most professional investment is handled ensure that markets are not efficient. Benchmarking causes, first, the inversion of the relationship between risk and return so that high volatile securities and asset classes offer lower returns than low volatile ones. Second, it fosters the pursuit of momentum strategies which then earn profits at the expense of benchmarked funds. The paper explains how these problems arise using rational models of asset mispricing and proposes an incentive-based solution

Asset management as creator of market inefficiency

In this paper, we describe how agency frictions in asset management can generate prime violations of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, such as momentum, value and an inverted risk-return relationship. Momentum in our theory is associated with procyclical fund flows and price over-reaction, and is more pronounced for overvalued assets. The investors who generate the momentum and who are losing from it are those requiring their asset managers to keep their portfolios close to benchmark indices. Our theory suggests a rethinking of asset management contracts. Contracts should employ measures of long-run risk and return, and benchmark indices that emphasize asset fundamentals. There should also be greater transparency on managers’ choice of strategies

An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal

We propose a rational theory of momentum and reversal based on delegated portfolio management. An investor can hold assets through an index or an active fund. Investing in the active fund involves a time-varying cost, interpreted as managerial perk or ability. The investor responds to an increase in the cost by flowing out of the active and into the index fund. While prices of assets held by the active fund drop in anticipation of these outflows, the drop is expected to continue, leading to momentum. Because outflows push prices below fundamental values, expected returns eventually rise, leading to reversal. Besides momentum and reversal, fund flows generate comovement, lead-lag effects and amplification, with all effects being larger for assets with high idiosyncratic risk. The active-fund manager’s concern with commercial risk makes prices more volatile.

Asset management contracts and equilibrium prices

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes managers to greater risk of deviating from the index than trading against undervaluation, agency frictions bias the aggregate market upwards. They can also generate a negative relationship between risk and return because they raise the volatility of overvalued assets. Socially optimal contracts provide steeper performance incentives and cause larger pricing distortions than privately optimal contracts

The dynamics of innovation and risk

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about the likelihood of negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of shocks. If no shock occurs, confidence improves, attracting managers to the innovative sector. But, when condence becomes high, inefficient managers exerting low risk-prevention effort also enter. This stimulates growth, while reducing risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While these dynamics arise in the first-best, asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents, inflating the innovative sector and increasing its vulnerability

Dynamics of Innovation and Risk

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry in which agents learn about the likelihood of negative shocks. Managers can exert risk prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of shocks. If no shock occurs, confidence improves, attracting managers to the innovative sector. But, when confidence becomes high, inefficient managers exerting low risk-prevention effort also enter. This stimulates growth, while reducing risk prevention. The longer the boom, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. Although these dynamics arise in the first-best, asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents, inflating the innovative sector, and increasing its vulnerabilit

The dynamics of innovation and risk

We study the dynamics of an innovative industry when agents learn about the likelihood of negative shocks. Managers can exert risk-prevention effort to mitigate the consequences of shocks. If no shock occurs, confidence improves, attracting managers to the innovative sector. But, when condence becomes high, inefficient managers exerting low risk-prevention effort also enter. This stimulates growth, while reducing risk-prevention. The longer the boom, the larger the losses if a shock occurs. While these dynamics arise in the first-best, asymmetric information generates excessive entry of inefficient managers, earning informational rents, inflating the innovative sector and increasing its vulnerability

A case of chronic myelogenous leukemia in pregnancy characterized by a complex translocation t(9;22;11)(q34;q11.2;q13)

The management of chronic myelogenous leukemia during pregnancy requires balancing the well-being of the mother with that of the fetus. We report a case of a 26-year-old lady who was diagnosed with chronic myelogenous leukemia (CML) at 15 weeks gestation and who had an atypical chromosome t(9;22;11) (q34;q11.2;q13) translocation. She was observed through the remainder of the pregnancy and the disease remained stable; she delivered a normal boy. Treatment with imatinib mesylate was initiated shortly after delivery and she went into molecular complete remission. We discuss the course of the disease and suggest guidelines for managing pregnancy with respect to the currently available agents imatinib, dasatinib and nilotinib