169 research outputs found

    Role-Player Realism

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    In practice theoretical terms are open-ended in not being attached to anything completely specific. This raises a problem for scientific realism: If there is no one completely specific kind of thing that might be in the extension of “atom”, what is it to claim that atoms exist? A realist’s solution is to say that in theoretical contexts of mature atom-theories there are things that play the role of atoms as characterized in that theory-context. The paper closes with a laundry list of problems that this more careful statement of scientific realism still faces

    Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended

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    Conventional scientific realism is just the doctrine that our theoretical terms refer. Conventional antirealism denies, for various reasons, theoretical reference and takes theory to give us only information about the word of the perceptual where reference, it would appear, is secure. But reference fails for the perceptual every bit as much for the perceptual as for the theoretical, and for the same reason: the world is too complicated for us to succeed in attaching specific referents to our terms. That would appear to leave us with a kind of latter day, representational idealism: All we have are representations. I argue that our representations tell us about an independent world without securing reference by showing that the world is very like the way it is represented in a range of different, often complementary modeling schemes. Though never exact, these representations are of something extra-representational because they present the world modally as going beyond what is represented explicitly

    Review: Discussion: What Is a Stance?

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    Modeling Truth

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    Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative modeling tool summarized in the idea that inaccuracy of statements can be accommodated by their imprecision. This yields a pragmatist account of truth, but one not subject to the usual counterexamples. The account can also be viewed as an elaborated error theory. The paper addresses some prima facie objections and concludes with implications for how we address certain problems in philosophy

    Language and the complexity of the world

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    Nature is complex, exceedingly so. A repercussion of this “complex world constraint” is that it is, in practice, impossible to connect words to the world in a foolproof manner. In this paper I explore the ways in which the complex world constraint makes vagueness, or more generally imprecision, in language in practice unavoidable, illuminates what vagueness comes to, and guides us to a sensible way of thinking about truth. Along the way we see that the problem of ceteris paribus laws is exactly the problem of vagueness and susceptible to similar treatment

    Two models of truth

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    Pan-Perspectival Realism Explained and Defended

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    Language and the complexity of the world

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    Nature is complex, exceedingly so. A repercussion of this “complex world constraint” is that it is, in practice, impossible to connect words to the world in a foolproof manner. In this paper I explore the ways in which the complex world constraint makes vagueness, or more generally imprecision, in language in practice unavoidable, illuminates what vagueness comes to, and guides us to a sensible way of thinking about truth. Along the way we see that the problem of ceteris paribus laws is exactly the problem of vagueness and susceptible to similar treatment

    The Ithaca Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

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    I list several strong requirements for what I would consider a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics and I discuss two simple theorems. One, as far as I know, is new; the other was only noted a few years ago. Both have important implications for such a sensible interpretation. My talk will not clear everything up; indeed, you may conclude that it has not cleared anything up. But I hope it will provide a different perspective from which to view some old and vexing puzzles (or, if you believe nothing needs to be cleared up, some ancient verities.)Comment: 21 pages, plain TEX. Notes for a lecture given at the Golden Jubilee Workshop on Foundations of Quantum Theory, Tata Institute, Bombay, September 9-12, 199

    Cytokinins and Differentiation Processes in Mercurialis annua

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