Slow and Steady Improves Accuracy in Attention Tasks: Implications for Evaluating Attention Training

There have been increased efforts to develop methods for improving attention across a range of tasks including those assessing sustained attention. Using a variety of techniques, researchers have reported modest reductions in errors on sustained attention tasks. However, published reports often have not documented changes in response times (RTs) that might accompany error reductions, which is problematic given that the error reductions could be mediated by a slowing strategy (i.e., speed-accuracy trade-off). In three studies, I explored the effects of speed-accuracy trade-offs in a sustained attention task (The Sustained Attention to Response Task; SART). In Study 1, I examined the effects of changing SART instructions from the double-edged "be fast and accurate" to the more conceptually accurate goal of maintaining high accuracy by responding slowly and carefully, and found that instructions to respond slowly and accurately resulted in both significantly longer RTs and fewer SART errors. In Studies 2 and 3, I developed a modified version of the SART that allowed me to experimentally manipulate RTs and found that errors were a systematic function of manipulated differences in RT independent of individual differences in response strategies. The results of these experiments indicate that it is possible that any technique that alters RT might indirectly alter error rates independently of improvements in sustained attention. I therefore conclude that investigators need to carefully attend to, control for, and report any changes in RT that accompany improvements in accuracy of performance, or alternatively employ tasks controlling for RT

On the theoretical importance of distinguishing between intentional and unintentional types of Mind Wandering

When introduced to mainstream psychological research nearly a decade ago, mind wandering was defined as unintentional, internally-focused thought. The requirement of an absence of intention was critical in terms of the conceptualization of mind wandering because, for the better half of the past century, considerable research has examined intentional, internally-focused thought. Thus, without the stipulation of an absence of intention, mind wandering would simply refer to a construct that has long been studied by researchers, which would therefore negate the utility of introducing the neologism “mind wandering” to the scientific community. Notwithstanding the critical importance of conceptualizing mind wandering as reflecting unintentional, internally-focused thoughts, in most studies on the topic, the requisite steps have not been taken to ensure that the reported mind wandering did in fact occur without intention. The foregoing is particularly problematic as it suggests that, in many studies, absent-minded mind wandering might have been confounded with intentionally-generated thought. In the present series of studies, I examined this possibility at both the trait and state levels, and found that, (1) in studies of mind wandering, people do in fact experience and report intentional internally-focused thought as reflecting “mind wandering,” and (2) intentional and unintentional internally-focused thoughts are differentially related to certain critical measures of interest, which indicates that they are dissociable cognitive experiences. These results suggest a serious problem with the current state of the literature on mind wandering: Namely, that mind wandering, as initially conceptualized and introduced to psychological research as reflecting unintentional internally-focused thought, has likely been conflated with a very different mode of thinking (i.e., deliberately engaged thought)

Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes explicit but not implicit sequence learning

According to the attentional resources account, mind wandering (or “task-unrelated thought”) is thought to compete with a focal task for attentional resources. Here, we tested two key predictions of this account: First, that mind wandering should not interfere with performance on a task that does not require attentional resources; second, that as task requirements become automatized, performance should improve and depth of mind wandering should increase. Here, we used a serial reaction time task with implicit- and explicit-learning groups to test these predictions. Providing novel evidence for the attentional resource account’s first prediction, results indicated that depth of mind wandering was negatively associated with learning in the explicit, but not the implicit, group, indicating that mind wandering is associated with impaired explicit, but not implicit, learning. Corroborating the attention resource account’s second prediction, we also found that, overall, performance improved while at the same time depth of mind wandering increased. From an implicit learning perspective, these results are consistent with the claim that explicit learning is impaired under attentional load, but implicit learning is not

On the relation of mind wandering and ADHD symptomatology

Mind wandering seems to be a prototypical feature of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). However, an important emerging distinction of mind-wandering types hinges on whether a given episode of mind wandering reflects a failure of executive control (spontaneous mind wandering) or the engagement of controlled processes for internal processing (deliberate mind wandering). Here we distinguish between spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering and test the hypothesis that symptoms of ADHD are associated with the former but not the latter. We assessed ADHD symptomatology and everyday levels of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in two large non-clinical samples (Ns = 1,354). In addition, to provide converging evidence, we examined rates of deliberate and spontaneous mind wandering in a clinically diagnosed ADHD sample. Results provide clear evidence that spontaneous, but not deliberate, mind wandering is a central feature of ADHD symptomatology at both the clinical and non-clinical level. We discuss the implications of these results for understanding both ADHD and mind wandering

Humans Versus AI: Whether and Why We Prefer Human-Created Compared to AI-Created Artwork

With the recent proliferation of advanced artifcial intelligence (AI) models capable of mimicking human artworks, AI creations might soon replace products of human creativity, although skeptics argue that this outcome is unlikely. One possible reason this may be unlikely is that, independent of the physical properties of art, we place great value on the imbuement of the human experience in art. An interesting question, then, is whether and why people might prefer human-compared to AI-created artworks. To explore these questions, we manipulated the purported creator of pieces of art by randomly assigning a “Human-created” or “AI-created” label to paintings actually created by AI, and then assessed participants’ judgements of the artworks across four rating criteria (Liking, Beauty, Profundity, and Worth). Study 1 found increased positive judgements for human- compared to AI-labelled art across all criteria. Study 2 aimed to replicate and extend Study 1 with additional ratings (Emotion, Story, Meaningful, Efort, and Time to create) intended to elucidate why people more-positively appraise Human-labelled artworks. The main fndings from Study 1 were replicated, with narrativity (Story) and perceived efort behind artworks (Efort) moderating the label efects (“Human-created” vs. “AI-created”), but only for the sensory-level judgements (Liking, Beauty). Positive personal attitudes toward AI moderated label efects for more-communicative judgements (Profundity, Worth). These studies demonstrate that people tend to be negatively biased against AI-created artworks relative to purportedly humancreated artwork, and suggest that knowledge of human engagement in the artistic process contributes positively to appraisals of art

What are the benefits of mind wandering to creativity?

A primary aim of mind-wandering research has been to understand its influence on task performance. While this research has typically highlighted the costs of mind wandering, a handful of studies have suggested that mind wandering may be beneficial in certain situations. Perhaps the most-touted benefit is that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval facilitates creative thinking. This finding has played a critical role in the development of accounts of the adaptive value of mind wandering and its functional role, as well as potential mechanisms of mind wandering. Thus, a demonstration of the replicability of this important finding is warranted. Here, we attempted to conceptually replicate results of a highly cited laboratory-based experiment supporting this finding. However, across two studies (N = 443), we found no evidence for the claim that mind wandering during a creative-incubation interval facilitates a form of creativity associated with divergent thinking. We suggest that our failed conceptual replication stems from an inadequate characterization of mind wandering (task-unrelated thought), and that there are good reasons to think that task-unrelated thought is unlikely to be causally related to creativity. Our results cast doubt on the claim that task-unrelated thought during an incubation interval enhances divergent creativity while also offering some prescriptions for how future research might further elucidate the cognitive benefits of mind wandering

Boredom proneness, political orientation and adherence to social- distancing in the pandemic.

Research recently showed that boredom proneness was associated with increased social distancing rule-breaking in a sample collected early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we explore data collected early in the pandemic to examine what factors might drive this relation. We focus on political affiliation. Given the functional account of boredom as a call to action, we hypothesized that this urge to act may drive individuals towards outlets replete with symbolic value (e.g., ideology, identity). In addition, given the politicization of some social distancing rules (e.g., mask wearing), we explored whether those who adhere to strong political ideologies—particularly conservative ideologies—would be more likely to rule-break. Moderation analyses indicated that boredom proneness and social (but not fiscal) conservatism were indeed predictive of rule-breaking. These results highlight the need for both clear messaging emphasizing the strength of communal identity and action (i.e., that “We are all in this together”) and for interventions that emphasize shared collective values in contexts that appeal directly to social conservatives

Missing the forest because of the trees : Slower alternations during binocular rivalry are associated with lower levels of visual detail during ongoing thought

Conscious awareness of the world fluctuates, either through variation in how vividly we perceive the environment, or when our attentional focus shifts away from information in the external environment towards information that we generate via imagination. Our study combined individual differences in experience sampling, psychophysical reports of perception, and neuroimaging descriptions of structural connectivity to better understand these changes in conscious awareness. In particular, we examined (1) whether aspects of ongoing thought—indexed via multi-dimensional experience sampling during a sustained-attention task—are associated with the white-matter fibre organization of the cortex as reflected by their relative degree of anisotropic diffusion, and (2) whether these neuro-cognitive descriptions of ongoing experience are related to a more constrained measure of visual consciousness through analysis of bi-stable perception during binocular rivalry. Individuals with greater fractional anisotropy in right hemisphere white-matter regions involving the inferior fronto-occipital fasciculus, the superior longitudinal fasciculus, and the cortico-spinal tract, described their ongoing thoughts as lacking external details. Subsequent analysis indicated that the combination of low fractional anisotropy in these right hemisphere regions, with reports of thoughts with high-levels of external details, was associated with the shortest periods of dominance during binocular rivalry. Since variation in binocular rivalry reflects differences between bottom-up and top-down influences on vision, our study suggests that reports of ongoing thoughts with vivid external details may occur when conscious precedence is given to bottom-up representation of perceptual information

Mind-Wandering as a Natural Kind : A Family-Resemblances View

As empirical research on mind-wandering accelerates, we draw attention to an emerging trend in how mind-wandering is conceptualized. Previously articulated definitions of mind-wandering differ from each other in important ways, yet they also maintain overlapping characteristics. This conceptual structure suggests that mind-wandering is best considered from a family-resemblances perspective, which entails treating it as a graded, heterogeneous construct and clearly measuring and describing the specific aspect(s) of mind-wandering that researchers are investigating. We believe that adopting this family-resemblances approach will increase conceptual and methodological connections among related phenomena in the mind-wandering family and encourage a more nuanced and precise understanding of the many varieties of mind-wandering