3 research outputs found
Understanding and Capturing People’s Privacy Policies in a People Finder Application
A number of mobile applications have
emerged that allow users to locate one another.
However, people have expressed concerns about the
privacy implications associated with this class of
software, suggesting that broad adoption may only
happen to the extent that these concerns are adequately
addressed. In this article, we report on our work on
PEOPLEFINDER, an application that enables cell phone
and laptop users to selectively share their locations
with others (e.g. friends, family, and colleagues). The
objective of our work has been to better understand
people’s attitudes and behaviors towards privacy as
they interact with such an application, and to explore
technologies that empower users to more effectively
and efficiently specify their privacy preferences (or
“policies”). These technologies include user interfaces
for specifying rules and auditing disclosures, as well as
machine learning techniques to see if the system can
help people manage their policies better. We present
evaluations of these technologies in the context of one
laboratory study and three field studies
Measuring Password Guessability for an Entire University (CMU-CyLab-13-013)
<p>Despite considerable research on passwords, empirical studies of password strength have been limited by lack of access to plaintext passwords, small data sets, and password sets specifically collected for a research study or from low-value accounts. Properties of passwords used for high-value accounts thus remain poorly understood. We fill this gap by studying the single-sign-on passwords used by over 25,000 faculty, staff, and students at a research university with a complex password policy. Key aspects of our contributions rest on our (indirect) access to plaintext passwords. We describe our data collection methodology, particularly the many precautions we took to minimize risks to users. We then analyze how guessable the collected passwords would be during an offline attack by subjecting them to a state-of-the-art password cracking algorithm. We discover significant correlations between a number of demographic and behavioral factors and password strength. For example, we find that users associated with the computer science school make passwords more than 1.8 times as strong as those of users associated with the business school. In addition, we find that stronger passwords are correlated with a higher rate of errors entering them. We also compare the guessability and other characteristics of the passwords we analyzed to sets previously collected in controlled experiments or leaked from low-value accounts. We find more consistent similarities between the university passwords and passwords collected for research studies under similar composition policies than we do between the university passwords and subsets of passwords leaked from low-value accounts that happen to comply with the same policies.</p
Guess again (and again and again): Measuring password strength by simulating password-cracking algorithms (CMU-CyLab-11-008)
Text-based passwords remain the dominant authentication method in computer systems, despite significant advancement in attackers’ capabilities to perform password cracking. In response to this threat, password composition policies have grown increasingly complex. However, there is insufficient research defining metrics to characterize password strength and evaluating password-composition policies using these metrics. In this paper, we describe an analysis of 12,000 passwords collected under seven composition policies via an online study. We develop an efficient distributed method for calculating how effectively several heuristic password-guessing algorithms guess passwords. Leveraging this method, we investigate (a) the resistance of passwords created under different conditions to password guessing; (b) the performance of guessing algorithms under different training sets; (c) the relationship between passwords explicitly created under a given composition policy and other passwords that happen to meet the same requirements; and (d) the relationship between guessability, as measured with password-cracking algorithms, and entropy estimates. We believe our findings advance understanding of both password-composition policies and metrics for quantifying password security.</p