20 research outputs found

    Lectin-like bacteriocins from pseudomonas spp. utilise D-rhamnose containing lipopolysaccharide as a cellular receptor

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    Lectin-like bacteriocins consist of tandem monocot mannose-binding domains and display a genus-specific killing activity. Here we show that pyocin L1, a novel member of this family from Pseudomonas aeruginosa, targets susceptible strains of this species through recognition of the common polysaccharide antigen (CPA) of P. aeruginosa lipopolysaccharide that is predominantly a homopolymer of d-rhamnose. Structural and biophysical analyses show that recognition of CPA occurs through the C-terminal carbohydrate-binding domain of pyocin L1 and that this interaction is a prerequisite for bactericidal activity. Further to this, we show that the previously described lectin-like bacteriocin putidacin L1 shows a similar carbohydrate-binding specificity, indicating that oligosaccharides containing d-rhamnose and not d-mannose, as was previously thought, are the physiologically relevant ligands for this group of bacteriocins. The widespread inclusion of d-rhamnose in the lipopolysaccharide of members of the genus Pseudomonas explains the unusual genus-specific activity of the lectin-like bacteriocins

    Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits

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    Serious cartel conduct, criminalisation and evidentiary standards: Lessons from the Coal Vend case of 1911 in Australia

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    The criminalisation of anti-competitive behaviour such as price fixing has long been a feature of US antitrust law. Some European countries have introduced criminal penalties for price fixing while in others the matter is under debate. Australia introduced such laws in 2009. Of critical importance when considering criminalisation is the evidentiary standard expected in criminal prosecutions. A century ago, in the Coal Vend case, the High Court of Australia broke new evidentiary ground in applying forensic accounting and economic methods to examine price fixing. Subsequently overturned, much could still be learnt by policy makers and competition agencies from this case.competition, cartels, price fixing, intent, public interest,
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