Bank Management and Market Discipline

In recent years market discipline attracted interest as a mechanism to augment or to partially replace government oversight (discipline) of the financial sector, specifically depository institutions. Despite the abundance of research, mostly empirical studies, in the area no formal model has been presented to analyze the different aspects of the issue. This paper attempts to fill this gap. In our model we incorporate the characteristics of the regulatory structure and market discipline and examine the effects of several parameters on the optimal decisions of the bank. For example we consider the effects of changes in risk, deposit insurance coverage, and degree of market discipline. In most cases our results are compatible with recent empirical findings

BANK MANAGEMENT AND MARKET DISCIPLINE

In recent years market discipline attracted interest as a mechanism to augment or to partially replace government oversight (discipline) of the financial sector, specifically depository institutions. Despite the abundance of research, mostly empirical studies, in the area no formal model has been presented to analyze the different aspects of the issue. This paper attempts to fill this gap. In our model we incorporate the characteristics of the regulatory structure and market discipline and examine the effects of several parameters on the optimal decisions of the bank. For example we consider the effects of changes in risk, deposit insurance coverage, and degree of market discipline. In most cases our results are compatible with recent empirical findings

Liquidity Risk and Competition in Banking

Liquidity risk is one of the major risks faced by banks in addition to credit risk, market risk and operating risk. In this paper we construct a stylized model of bank management where the asset and liabilities liquidity structure are a key element in determining the bank's exposure to liquidity risk. The main results of our model are that liquidity risk increases when competition in the credit market increases while increasing competition in the deposit market will decrease the liquidity shortage. Our results are of particular importance as banks face increased liquidity risk due to the recent developments in the financial markets

Bank Management and Market Discipline

In recent years market discipline attracted interest as a mechanism to augment or to partially replace government oversight (discipline) of the financial sector, specifically depository institutions. Despite the abundance of research, mostly empirical studies, in the area no formal model has been presented to analyze the different aspects of the issue. This paper attempts to fill this gap. In our model we incorporate the characteristics of the regulatory structure and market discipline and examine the effects of several parameters on the optimal decisions of the bank. For example we consider the effects of changes in risk, deposit insurance coverage, and degree of market discipline. In most cases our results are compatible with recent empirical findings

The effect of merger and acquisition activity on the safety and soundness of a banking system

Banking system, credit risk, merger and acquisition,