Bid-Ask Spreads and Volume:The Role of Trade Timing

I formulate a stylized Glosten-Milgrom model of financial market trading in which people are allowed to time their trading decision. The focus of the analysis is to understand people’s timing behavior and how it affects bid- and offer-prices and volume. Assuming heterogeneous quality of information, not all informed traders choose to trade immediately but some chose to delay, although they expect public expectations to move against them. Compared to a myopic, no-timing setting, first movers with timing have better quality information. Contrary to casual intuition this behavior lowers bid-ask spreads early on and increases them in later periods. Price-variability and total volume in both periods combined decrease. A numerical analysis shows that with timing the spreads are very stable (though decreasing), and that volume is increasing over time. Moreover, with timing the probability of informed trading (PIN) increases between periods.Microstructure, Sequential Trade, Trade timing.

When herding and contrarianism foster market efficiency: a financial trading experiment

While herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts, theoretical analyses have struggled to identify conclusive causes for the effect. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible in a market with efficient asset prices if information is bi-polar, and contrarianism is possible with single-polar information. We present an experimental test for the validity of this theory, contrasting with all existing experiments where rational herding was theoretically impossible and subsequently not observed. Overall we observe that subjects generally behave according to theoretical predictions, yet the fit is lower for types who have the theoretical potential to herd. While herding is often not observed when predicted by theory, herding (sometimes irrational) does occur. Irrational contrarianism in particular leads observed prices to substantially differ from the efficient benchmark. Alternative models of behavior, such as risk aversion, loss aversion or error correction, either perform quite poorly or add little to our understanding

Caller Number Five and Related Timing Games

There are two varieties of timing games in economics: Having more predecessors helps in a war of attrition and hurts in a pre-emption game. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs} that subsumes both as special cases. We assume a continuous time setting with unobserved actions and complete information, and explore how equilibria of these games capture many economic and social timing phenomena --- shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive probability) stopping. Inspired by auction theory, we first show how the symmetric Nash equilibria are each equivalent to a different "potential function". This device straightforwardly yields existence and characterization results. The Descartes Rule of Signs, e.g., bounds the number phase transitions. We describe how adjacent timing game phases interact: War of attrition phases are not played out as long as they would be in isolation, but instead are cut short by pre-emptive atoms. We bound the number of equilibria, and compute the payoff and duration of each equilibrium.Games of Timing, War of Attrition, Preemption Game.

When Herding and Contrarianism Foster Market Efficiency: A Financial Trading Experiment

While herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts, theoretical analyses have struggled to identify conclusive causes for the effect. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible in a market with efficient asset prices if information is bi-polar, and contrarianism is possible with single-polar information. We present an experimental test for the validity of this theory, contrasting with all existing experiments where rational herding was theoretically impossible and subsequently not observed. Overall we observe that subjects generally behave according to theoretical predictions, yet the fit is lower for types who have the theoretical potential to herd. While herding is often not observed when predicted by theory, herding (sometimes irrational) does occur. Irrational contrarianism in particular leads observed prices to substantially differ from the efficient benchmark. Alternative models of behavior, such as risk aversion, loss aversion or error correction, either perform quite poorly or add little to our understanding.Herding,Informational Efficiency, Experiments.

Trading Volume in Dealer Markets

We develop a financial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading volume and to the absolute value of the net order flow, i.e. the order imbalance. Moreover, higher volume leads to higher order imbalances. These findings are consistent with well-established empirical findings. Our model further predicts that higher trader participation and systematic improvements in the quality of traders' information lead to higher volume, larger order imbalances, lower market depth, shorter duration, and higher price volatility.Market Microstructure, Trading Volume, Liquidity

When Herding and Contrarianism Foster Market Efficiency : A Financial Trading Experiment

While herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts, theoretical analyses have struggled to identify conclusive causes for the effect. Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding is possible in a market with efficient asset prices if information is bi-polar, and contrarianism is possible with single-polar information. We present an experimental test for the validity of this theory, contrasting with all existing experiments where rational herding was theoretically impossible and subsequently not observed. Overall we observe that subjects generally behave according to theoretical predictions, yet the fit is lower for types who have the theoretical potential to herd. While herding is often not observed when predicted by theory, herding (sometimes irrational) does occur. Irrational contrarianism in particular leads observed prices to substantially differ from the efficient benchmark. Alternative models of behavior, such as risk aversion, loss aversion or error correction, either perform quite poorly or add little to our understanding.Herding ; Informational Efficiency ; Experiments

Liquidity, Volume, and Price Behavior: The Impact of Order vs. Quote Based Trading

We provide a three way theoretical comparison of dealer, limit order, and hybrid markets and analyze the impact that the organization of trading has on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency. We find, in particular, that trading volume is highest in the limit order market and lowest in the dealer market. Small order price impacts are lowest and large order price impacts are highest in limit order markets. Prices are most efficient in the hybrid market and least efficient in the dealer market, except when the level of informed trading is very high. Post-trade market transparency in a hybrid market hampers price efficiency for thinly traded securities. We further identify that traders behave as contrarians.liquidity, quote and order driven markets, price efficiency, hybrid markets, trading volume

Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing

We undertook the first market trading experiments that allowed heterogeneously informed subjects to trade in endogenous time, collecting over 2000 observed trades. Subjects’ decisions were generally in line with the predictions of exogenous-time financial herding theory when that theory is adjusted to allow rational informational herding and contrarianism. While herding and contrarianism did not arise as frequently as predicted by theory, such behavior occurs in a significantly more pronounced manner than in comparable studies with exogenous timing. Types with extreme information traded earliest. Of those with more moderate information, those with signals conducive to contrarianism traded earlier than those with information conducive to herding.Herding, Contrarianism, Endogenous-time, Informational Efficiency, Experiments

Caller Number Five and related timing games

There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special cases. We assume time is continuous, actions are unobserved, and information is complete, and explore how equilibria of the games, in which there is shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive probability) stopping, capture many economic and social timing phenomena. Inspired by auction theory, we first show how each symmetric Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a different "potential function.'' By using this function, we straightforwardly obtain existence and characterization results. Descartes' Rule of Signs bounds the number of phase transitions. We describe how adjacent timing game phases interact: war of attrition phases are not played out as long as they would be in isolation, but instead are cut short by pre-emptive atoms. We bound the number of equilibria, and compute the payoff and duration of each equilibrium.Games of timing, war of attrition, preemption game

Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing

We undertook the first market trading experiments that allowed heterogeneously informed subjects to trade in endogenous time, collecting over 2000 observed trades. Subjects’ decisions were generally in line with the predictions of exogenous-time financial herding theory when that theory is adjusted to allow rational informational herding and contrarianism. While herding and contrarianism did not arise as frequently as predicted by theory, such behavior occurs in a significantly more pronounced manner than in comparable studies with exogenous timing. Types with extreme information traded earliest. Of those with more moderate information, those with signals conducive to contrarianism traded earlier than those with information conducive to herding.Herding ; Contrarianism ; Endogenous-time ; Informational Efficiency, Experiments