Reforming the Regulation of Political Advocacy by Charities: From Charity under Siege to Charity under Rescue?

A newly elected liberal federal government in Canada has pledged to reform the legal distinction between charity and politics. This paper provides context to this reform initiative, linking it to a controversial political activities audit program funded by the former conservative federal government. It identifies three distorting ideas about charity—that charity can be understood as a tax expenditure, economic or neutral concept—that should be eschewed in the reform process. It also identifies three characteristics of charity—the capacity of charities for thought leadership, the pervasiveness of messaging in charitable programming and the distinctiveness of charity and government—that should guide reformers

Reforming the Regulation of Political Advocacy by Charities: From Charity under Siege to Charity under Rescue?

A newly elected liberal federal government in Canada has pledged to reform the legal distinction between charity and politics. This paper provides context to this reform initiative, linking it to a controversial political activities audit program funded by the former conservative federal government. It identifies three distorting ideas about charity—that charity can be understood as a tax expenditure, economic or neutral concept—that should be eschewed in the reform process. It also identifies three characteristics of charity—the capacity of charities for thought leadership, the pervasiveness of messaging in charitable programming and the distinctiveness of charity and government—that should guide reformers

Funding Charities Through Tax Law: When Should a Donation Qualify for Donation Incentives?

Canadian income tax law provides incentives for taxpayers to make charitable donations. Since only those donations to charities qualifying as charitable “gifts” are eligible for donation incentives, the definition of gift bodes significant revenue implications for charities and government alike. The Income Tax Act does not, however, define the term gift. The tests applied by courts and regulators to identify gifts in the absence of a statutory definition are contradictory, unnecessarily restrictive, and inconsistent with the tax policy behind donation incentives. The recent attempt to improve the law through the proposed “split-receipting” rules has achieved little in the way of meaningful reform. The ideal solution is to adopt a statutory definition of “charitable donation” that will both broaden and clarify the range of eligible donations. / La loi canadienne de l’impôt sur le revenu prévoit des incitatifs visant à encourager les contribuables à faire des dons. Étant donné que seuls les dons faits aux oeuvres de bienfaisance qui se qualifient en tant que « dons » de bienfaisance peuvent donner droit à ces incitatifs, la définition du terme « don » est porteuse d’importantes répercussions fiscales, tant pour les organisations caritatives que pour le gouvernement. Toutefois, la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu ne définit pas le terme « don ». Les critères appliqués par les cours et les autorités de réglementation pour identifier ce qui constitue un don, en l’absence d’une définition établie par la loi, sont contradictoires, inutilement restrictives et incohérentes avec la politique fiscale concernant les incitatifs accordés au titre des dons de bienfaisance. La récente tentative d’améliorer la loi avec les règles proposées sur le fractionnement des reçus n’a eu que peu de résultats pour mener à une réforme significative. La solution idéale est d’adopter une définition législative du terme « don » qui permettrait d’élargir et de clarifier la portée des dons admissibles

Distinguishing Charity and Politics: The Judicial Thinking Behind the Doctrine of Political Purposes

This article identifies and critiques the rationales articulated by courts in support of the doctrine of political purposes in charity law. The author argues that courts have failed to cogently account for the doctrine. The author traces the doctrine back to a judicial misstatement of the law in an early twentieth century decision. The author then points out the flaws and limitations with the various justifications that have since been developed in the Canadian and English jurisprudence in support of the doctrine. The article concludes with the observation that the shortcomings with the doctrine are symptomatic of a larger theoretical failing in the law of charity.</jats:p