Market structure, screening activity and bank lending behaviour

In this paper we construct a theoretical model of spatial banking competition that considers the differential information among banks and potential borrowers in order to investigate how market structure affects the lending behavior of banks and their incentives to invest in screening technology. Consistent with the prevailing view in the relevant literature, our results reveal that competition reduces lending cost, which, in turn, encourages the entry of new customers in the loan market. Also, that the transportation cost that potential borrowers have to pay in order to reach the bank of their interest is decreased with the degree of competitiveness. Importantly, we demonstrate that market structure exerts a considerable positive effect on banks’ incentives to screen their loan applicants since banks are found to invest more in screening as competition in the market becomes higher. This is to say, banks resort to screening that serves as a buffer mechanism against bad credit which entails higher risk and which is more likely under competitive conditions. Overall, our findings provide support to a rather close link between the degree of competition, bank lending activity, and the investment of banks in screening technology

What lies behind the "Too-Small-To-Survive" banks

It is a common place that during financial crises, like the one started in 2007, authorities provide substantial financial support to some problem banks, whilst at the same time let several others to go bankrupt. Is this happening because some particular banks are considered important and big enough to save, whereas some others are perceived as being ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’? Is the size of banks the fundamental factor that makes authorities to treat them differently, or it is also that some banks perform poorly and are not capable of withstanding some considerable shocks whatsoever? Our study provides concrete answers to these questions thus filling part of the void in the existing literature. A short- and a long-run positive relationship between size and performance is documented regardless of the level of bank soundness (healthy vs. failed and assisted banks) under scrutiny. Importantly, we pose and lend support to the ‘Too-Small-To-Survive’ hypothesis according to which the impact of bank performance on failure probability strongly depends on size. Evidence shows that authorities tend not to save banks whose size is below some specific threshold

"Bank runs" und Staatliche Interventionen: Die Kolumne der "Luxembourg School of Finance“

No description supplie

A dual early warning model of bank distress

We contribute to the better understanding of the key factors related to the operation of the banking system that led to the global financial crisis through the development of a dual earning warning model that explores the joint determination of the probability of a distressed bank to face a licence withdrawal or to be bailed out. The underlying patterns of distress are analysed based upon a wide spectrum of bank specific and environmental factors. We obtain precise parameter estimates and superior in- and out-of-sample forecasts. Our results show that the determinants of failures and those of bailouts differ to a considerable extent, revealing that authorities treat a distressed bank differently in their decision to let it fail or to bail it out. Overall, we provide a reliable mechanism for preventing welfare losses due to bank distress