Reasoning, Argumentation and Rationality

Recent “argumentative approaches” in the study of reasoning are deemed by many to offer the most promising avenue in this field. Such approaches provide good theoretical grounds for the idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature and a large body of evidence supporting it. My aim here is to examine to what extent the idea that reasoning is argumentative in nature, and its implications, have been developed by the main argumentative approaches to reasoning. I will then consider whether and how more could be done to elaborate upon these claims. As I will try to argue, in reducing the connection between reasoning and argumentation to the fact that reasoning produces convincing arguments, these approaches mainly highlight reasoning’s persuasive and therefore instrumental function. I then conclude by proposing an alternative argumentative conception of rationality, outlined by Paul Grice and recently discussed by Marina Sbisà, which highlights reasoning’s reason-giving function

Brandom's deontic scorekeeping model and the assertive family

This paper deals with what, from a speech-act theoretical point of view, can be considered to be the \u201cillocutionary\u201d side of Robert Brandom\u2019s pragmatist framework, which regards the pragmatic significance of linguistic performances (specifically, assertional performances) characterized in terms of their effects on the normative statuses of the participants in a discursive practice. In Brandom\u2019s deontic scorekeeping model of discursive practice (which consists of ascribing, undertaking and acknowledging commitments and entitlements), all speech acts are alleged to have pragmatic significance because of their relationship with the act of asserting: here, I investigate whether the same model can be used to account for the pragmatic significance of other assertive speech acts which differ from assertion in terms of their varying degrees and modes of commitment, and I argue that it simply lacks the resources to do so. I conclude by making some general suggestions (with examples) of how an Austin-inspired conception of illocutionary force (to some extent compatible with Brandom\u2019s analysis) could be used as a basis to account for the varying degrees and modes of commitment of assertive speech acts in terms of variations in their force

Questioning Stephen Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism: What is Wrong With Its Consequentialist Approach to Reasoning Strategy Assessment?

In this paper, I examine and then criticize the two main assumptions underlying Stephen Stich’s Epistemic Pragmatism and its resulting consequentialist approach to reasoning strategy assessment, that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main epistemic goal and (2) the relativity of any assessment of reasoning strategies. According to Epistemic Pragmatism, indeed, any evaluation of reasoning strategies is to be made in terms of their conduciveness to achieving what their users intrinsically value. However, since, as I will try to show, neither Stich’s argument supporting the dismissal of truth as our main epistemic goal nor his relativistic view on reasoning strategies’ assessments are well supported, I will conclude that Epistemic Pragmatism cannot provide by itself an adequate consequentialist framework for comparatively assessing people’s reasoning strategies and their epistemic merits

Tra natura e cultura: la razionalità

In this paper, I first identify the four paradigms of rationality which have dominated studies on the relation between and culture in the definition of what characterizes human rationality. I then show how none of them can account for variability and, at the same time, complexity of people’s ways of reasoning from both a descriptive and a normative standpoint. Finally, I conclude by arguing for an interpretation of the hypothesis of “dual nature of human cognition” proposed by David Moshman, which seems to achieve a good compromise between universalistic and relativistic viewpoints in relation to studies on human rationality

L’inferenzialismo semantico di Robert Brandom: tra prospettivismo e oggettività

In this paper, after having outlined the theoretical framework of Brandom’s philosophy, I examine his attempt to reconcile semantic perspectivism, which is at the core of his inferentialist semantics, with the idea that objectivity transcends the practical normative attitudes of the participants in the so-called game of giving and asking for reasons

Questioning Stephen Stich\u2019s Epistemic Pragmatism: What is Wrong With Its Consequentialist Approach to Reasoning Strategy Assessment?

In this paper, I examine and then criticize the two main assumptions underlying Stephen Stich\u2019s Epistemic Pragmatism and its resulting consequentialist approach to reasoning strategy assessment, that is, (1) the rejection of truth as our main epistemic goal and (2) the relativity of any assessment of reasoning strategies. According to Epistemic Pragmatism, indeed, any evaluation of reasoning strategies is to be made in terms of their conduciveness to achieving what their users intrinsically value. However, since, as I will try to show, neither Stich\u2019s argument supporting the dismissal of truth as our main epistemic goal nor his relativistic view on reasoning strategies\u2019 assessments are well supported, I will conclude that Epistemic Pragmatism cannot provide by itself an adequate consequentialist framework for comparatively assessing people\u2019s reasoning strategies and their epistemic merits

Assertion and the Varieties of Norms

This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there are some norms that can be seen to apply to assertion in a more intimate way than others, and these norms can be shown to be constitutive of it, since it is by means of them that we can account for specific defects pertaining to the making of an assertion, which the reliance on contextually variable norms (such as the conversational maxims of Grice to which he refers) does not seem able to do

Introduzione

In this Introduction, we provide an overview of the papers included in the special issue of the e-journal Esercizi Filosofici, entitled “La dimensione pragmatica in filosofia, linguistica e semiotica” (The pragmatic dimension in philosophy, linguistics, and semiotics). The paper is divided into three parts, which are concerned with the application of pragmatics to philosophy, linguistics and semiotics respectively

Assertion and the Varieties of Norms

This paper challenges Cappelen’s claim that the speech act category of assertion is to be discarded since there is no principled way to distinguish between utterances that are assertions and those that are not. Using an Austin-inspired framework, I will argue that, in opposition to his claim, there are some norms that can be seen to apply to assertion in a more intimate way than others, and these norms can be shown to be constitutive of it, since it is by means of them that we can account for specific defects pertaining to the making of an assertion, which the reliance on contextually variable norms (such as the conversational maxims of Grice to which he refers) does not seem able to do

Identit\ue0 e linguaggio discriminatorio nei social network

Social networks pose new problems in the study of communication, while also amplifying old ones. In this paper we assess the role that the identity of users plays in guiding their readers towards the correct interpretation of their apparently discriminatory uses of language on social network such as Facebook and Twitter: in particular, we focus on non-derogatory uses of slurs on the one hand, and apparently discriminatory irony and humor on the other hand. In these cases, the user\u2019s identity plays a crucial role in the interpretation of the content conveyed by her utterance: to lose track of it may dramatically change the intended meaning, as well as, in some cases, question the legitimacy of her ironic and humoristic uses of language in relation to issues such as racial and gender discrimination. Moreover, the fact that the identity of the writer is hard to pin down poses serious challenges to the issue of censorship: to develop specific policies \u2013 which is of the highest importance in managing social networks \u2013 requires addressing many theoretical as well as practical issues that we tried to illustrate in this paper