Follow the foreign leader? Why following foreign incumbents is an effective electoral strategy

Previous research suggests that political parties respond to left–right policy positions of successful foreign political parties (“foreign leaders”). We evaluate whether this is an effective electoral strategy: specifically, do political parties gain votes in elections when they respond to successful foreign parties? We argue that parties that follow foreign leaders will arrive at policy positions closer to their own (domestic) median voter, which increases their electoral support. The analysis is based on a two-stage model specification of parties’ vote shares and suggests that following foreign leaders is a beneficial election strategy in national election because it allows them to better identify the position of their own median voter. These findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation, parties’ election strategies, and for policy diffusion

Presidential Popularity and Reputation

This paper reports on the results of an empirical study of relationships between the popularity of US presidents and economic variables. Traditionally, these relationships are based on the hypothesis that voters hold the incumbent President responsible for the economic situation. We derive an alternative specification of popularity, based on the hypothesis that political parties perform better on different issues. Empirical evidence turns out to be strongly in favour of our hypothesis. Our findings have important implications for studies on government behaviour in which it is assumed that one of the objectives of administrations is to maximise votes

A Farewell to Critical Junctures: Sorting Out Long-Run Causality of Income and Democracy

We consider the empirical relevance of two opposing hypotheses on the causality between income and democracy: The Democratic Transition claims that rising incomes cause a transition to democracy, whereas the Critical Junctures hypothesis denies this causal relation. Our empirical strategy is justified by Unified Growth Theory, which hypothesizes that the present international income differences have roots in the prehistoric past. Thus, we use prehistoric measures of biogeography as instruments for modern income levels, and find a large long-run causal effect of income on the degree of democracy. This result rejects the Critical Junctures hypothesis, which is an important part of the Primacy of Institutions view

The Democratic Transition: A Study of the Causality Between Income and the Gastil Democracy Index

The paper considers the transformation of the political system as countries pass through the Grand Transition from a poor developing country to a wealthy developed country. In the process most countries change from an authoritarian to a democratic political system. This is shown by using the Gastil democracy index from Freedom House. First, the basic pattern of correlations reveals that a good deal of the short- to medium-run causality appears to be from democracy to income. Then a set of extreme biogeographic instruments is used to demonstrate that the long-run causality is from income to democracy. The long-run result survives various robustness tests. We show how the Grand Transition view resolves the seeming contradiction between the long-run and the short- to medium-run effects

Assessing the association between all-cause mortality and multiple aspects of individual social capital among the older Japanese

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Few prospective cohort studies have assessed the association between social capital and mortality. The studies were conducted only in Western countries and did not use the same social capital indicators. The present prospective cohort study aimed to examine the relationships between various forms of individual social capital and all-cause mortality in Japan.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Self-administered questionnaires were mailed to subjects in the Aichi Gerontological Evaluation Study (AGES) Project in 2003. Mortality data from 2003 to 2008 were analyzed for 14,668 respondents. Both cognitive and structural components of individual social capital were collected: 8 for cognitive social capital (trust, 3; social support, 3; reciprocity, 2) and 9 for structural social capital (social network). Cox proportional hazard models stratified by sex with multiple imputation were used. Age, body mass index, self-rated health, current illness, smoking history, alcohol consumption, exercise, equivalent income and education were used as covariates.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>During 27,571 person-years of follow-up for men and 29,561 person-years of follow-up for women, 790 deaths in men and 424 in women were observed. In the univariate analyses for men, lower social capital was significantly related to higher mortality in one general trust variable, all generalised reciprocity variables and four social network variables. For women, lower social capital was significantly related to higher mortality in all generalised reciprocity and four social network variables. After adjusting for covariates, lower friendship network was significantly associated with higher all-cause mortality among men (meet friends rarely; HR = 1.30, 95%CI = 1.10-1.53) and women (having no friends; HR = 1.81, 95%CI = 1.02-3.23). Among women, lower general trust was significantly related to lower mortality (most people cannot be trusted; HR = 0.65, 95%CI = 0.45-0.96).</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Friendship network was a good predictor for all-cause mortality among older Japanese. In contrast, mistrust was associated with lower mortality among women. Studies with social capital indices considering different culture backgrounds are needed.</p