Fictional Content

It is usually taken for granted that a necessary condition for knowing that P is the truth of P. It may therefore be claimed that if we assume that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction (let us call it fictional knowledge) of P* , then P* should be true\u2014in at least a cer- tain sense. My hypothesis is that this assumption grounds the differ- ent ways adopted by philosophers for attributing truth-conditions to fictional sentences. My claim in this work is that fictional sentences do not have truth-values and truth-conditions, but I want to maintain that we gain some kind of knowledge through fiction: to this aim, I will characterize the objective content of fictional sentences not in terms of truth-conditions (which are usually described by appealing to rules of the language or rules of interpretation of language independent of the actual users), but in dispositional terms and I will define a necessary condition for fictional knowledge accordingly

McTaggart, Lewis and the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics

McTaggart\u2019s Paradox has been considered a special case of Lewis\u2019s Problem of Temporary Intrinsics (see Craig (1998), Rea (2003) and Rettler (2012)). I argue instead that the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics cannot simply be applied to the Problem of the passage of time and therefore that McTaggart\u2019s Paradox cannot be a special case of the Problem of Temporary Intrinsics. This observation is relevant in order to point out the difference between the change in objects or events over time (i.e. the subject of Lewis\u2019s Problem) and the change (or passage) of time (i.e. the subject of McTaggart\u2019s Paradox)

Model reduction for analysis of cascading failures in power systems

In this paper, we apply a principal-orthogonal decomposition based method to the model reduction of a hybrid, nonlinear model of a power network. The results demonstrate that the sequence of fault events can be evaluated and predicted without necessarily simulating the whole system

Resistenza immaginativa

La resistenza immaginativa emerge quando un soggetto \ue8 in difficolt\ue0 ad immaginare il contenuto (anche parziale) di un racconto (\ua71). Verranno innanzitutto presentate le diverse modalit\ue0 in cui il rompicapo filosofico connesso a questo fenomeno pu\uf2 essere caratterizzato (\ua72). Saranno poi prese in considerazione le due diverse strategie che si sono delineate nella letteratura per caratterizzare il fenomeno e per spiegarlo: la soluzione concettuale (\ua73) e la soluzione valutativa (\ua74). Per ciascuna delle due strategie verr\ue0 delineata l\u2019esigenza di fondo che la caratterizza e i diversi modi in cui \ue8 stata sviluppata. Alla fine (\ua75) \ue8 presentato un breve bilancio conclusivo e viene proposta una possibile linea di ricerca per il futuro