Interaction of Chandipura Virus N and P Proteins: Identification of Two Mutually Exclusive Domains of N Involved in Interaction with P

The nucleocapsid protein (N) and the phosphoprotein (P) of nonsegmented negative-strand (NNS) RNA viruses interact with each other to accomplish two crucial events necessary for the viral replication cycle. First, the P protein binds to the aggregation prone nascent N molecules maintaining them in a soluble monomeric (N0) form (N0-P complex). It is this form that is competent for specific encapsidation of the viral genome. Second, the P protein binds to oligomeric N in the nucleoprotein complex (N-RNA-P complex), and thereby facilitates the recruitment of the viral polymerase (L) onto its template. All previous attempts to study these complexes relied on co-expression of the two proteins in diverse systems. In this study, we have characterised these different modes of N-P interaction in detail and for the first time have been able to reconstitute these complexes individually in vitro in the chandipura virus (CHPV), a human pathogenic NNS RNA virus. Using a battery of truncated mutants of the N protein, we have been able to identify two mutually exclusive domains of N involved in differential interaction with the P protein. An unique N-terminal binding site, comprising of amino acids (aa) 1–180 form the N0-P interacting region, whereas, C-terminal residues spanning aa 320–390 is instrumental in N-RNA-P interactions. Significantly, the ex-vivo data also supports these observations. Based on these results, we suggest that the P protein acts as N-specific chaperone and thereby partially masking the N-N self-association region, which leads to the specific recognition of viral genome RNA by N0

Developing "personality" taxonomies: Metatheoretical and methodological rationales underlying selection approaches, methods of data generation and reduction principles

Taxonomic "personality" models are widely used in research and applied fields. This article applies the Transdisciplinary Philosophy-of-Science Paradigm for Research on Individuals (TPS-Paradigm) to scrutinise the three methodological steps that are required for developing comprehensive “personality” taxonomies: 1) the approaches used to select the phenomena and events to be studied, 2) the methods used to generate data about the selected phenomena and events and 3) the reduction principles used to extract the “most important” individual-specific variations for constructing “personality” taxonomies. Analyses of some currently popular taxonomies reveal frequent mismatches between the researchers’ explicit and implicit metatheories about “personality” and the abilities of previous methodologies to capture the particular kinds of phenomena toward which they are targeted. Serious deficiencies that preclude scientific quantifications are identified in standardised questionnaires, psychology’s established standard method of investigation. These mismatches and deficiencies derive from the lack of an explicit formulation and critical reflection on the philosophical and metatheoretical assumptions being made by scientists and from the established practice of radically matching the methodological tools to researchers’ preconceived ideas and to pre-existing statistical theories rather than to the particular phenomena and individuals under study. These findings raise serious doubts about the ability of previous taxonomies to appropriately and comprehensively reflect the phenomena towards which they are targeted and the structures of individual-specificity occurring in them. The article elaborates and illustrates with empirical examples methodological principles that allow researchers to appropriately meet the metatheoretical requirements and that are suitable for comprehensively exploring individuals’ “personality”

Personality psychology: Lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts reveal only half of the story—Why it is time for a paradigm shift

This article develops a comprehensive philosophy-of-science for personality psychology that goes far beyond the scope of the lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts that currently prevail. One of the field’s most important guiding scientific assumptions, the lexical hypothesis, is analysed from meta-theoretical viewpoints to reveal that it explicitly describes two sets of phenomena that must be clearly differentiated: 1) lexical repertoires and the representations that they encode and 2) the kinds of phenomena that are represented. Thus far, personality psychologists largely explored only the former, but have seriously neglected studying the latter. Meta-theoretical analyses of these different kinds of phenomena and their distinct natures, commonalities, differences, and interrelations reveal that personality psychology’s focus on lexical approaches, assessment methods, and trait concepts entails a) erroneous meta-theoretical assumptions about what the phenomena being studied actually are, and thus how they can be analysed and interpreted, b) that contemporary personality psychology is largely based on everyday psychological knowledge, and c) a fundamental circularity in the scientific explanations used in trait psychology. These findings seriously challenge the widespread assumptions about the causal and universal status of the phenomena described by prominent personality models. The current state of knowledge about the lexical hypothesis is reviewed, and implications for personality psychology are discussed. Ten desiderata for future research are outlined to overcome the current paradigmatic fixations that are substantially hampering intellectual innovation and progress in the field