Democracy and (dis)-integration : the conditions for a legitimate and effective economic and political organization

Our aim in this paper is to address the big questions of today’s European Union, more specifically, the Union’s deep legitimacy deficit that touches upon all aspects of input, throughout and output. We make three main points. (1) That the current crisis of European integration is to be understood as a manifestation of a broader question that concerns the conditions under which liberal democracy and a market economy may be made compatible. (2) That the long-term dynamics of European integration is driven by the inherent tension in democratic systems between representative and effective governance. (3) That the most urgent task facing European integration research is the normative imperative to rethink effective and legitimate democratic practices – who is involved, at what level, in what capacity, together with whom – and to redesign the boundaries of democratic governance between the EU and the member states

Handbook on Cohesion Policy in the EU

This Handbook covers all major aspects of EU Cohesion policy, one of the most significant areas of intervention of the European Union. Over five parts, It discusses this policy’s history and governing principles; the theoretical approaches from which it can be assessed; the inter-institutional and multi-level dynamics that it tends to elicit; its practical implementation and impact on EU member states; its interactions with other EU policies and strategies; and the cognitive maps and narratives with which it can be associated

Transforming Local Culture: Territorial Governance in the Italian South

http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/02_45.pd

Ma la politica italiana può ancora definirsi clientelare?

Italian politics is often accused of catering to the restricted interests of small-scale clienteles, which makes it particularly chaotic and prone to suboptimal decision-making. The literature has conventionally insufficiently distinguished between clientelism, corruption and patronage and often equated particularism with the pursuit of the personal vote. We know from the comparative literature, however, that there are completely legitimate forms of particularism which bank on the personal and policy record of the candidate and that attract to parties large shares of votes. Balancing the quest for the personal vote with alignment with party lines is a puzzle that all party leaders need to solve. Instrumental in striking this balance is the electoral system, which in varying degrees can favor the pursuit of the personal vote and, more specifically, a programmatic or rather a particularistic strategy for obtaining it. By referring to the theorization of particularism by Carey and Shugart (1995) and Seddon-Wallack et al (2003), the article offers conjectures on the relative space afforded to particularism by the various electoral systems that have characterized the “First Republic” – a proportional system with multiple preferences (1948-1993) – the “Second Republic” – a mainly majoritarian mixed system (Mattarellum, 1993-2005) and a proportional system with various coalition-forming incentives (Porcellum, 2005-2013) – and the “Third Republic” – a mainly proportional system with fewer coalition-forming incentives (Rosatellum bis, 2017-). It suggests that the space for clientelism-prone particularism has shrunk in time, that for the more conventional personal vote has known a brief season but has never been given a chance to get institutionalized, and that lately the space for particularism has shrunk again perhaps giving rise to populistic clientelism

Local political classes and economic development : the cases of Abruzzo and Puglia in the 1970s and 1980s

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, 1996.Includes bibliographical references (p. 325-343).by Simona C. Piattoni.Ph.D

Beyond Italian Exceptionalism? The ‘Critical’ Eighteenth Legislature

Italy’s eighteenth legislative term stands out as particularly idiosyncratic throughout Italian history. Over the course of this term, three governments with varying political orientations came into power, relying on parliamentary votes that shifted between the right, left, and center. In this article, we aim to highlight these peculiarities and explore whether they indicate a further complexification of Italy’s already intricate governmental history, or if they instead reflect issues that are prevalent in most Western democracies. In addition to briefly presenting the articles included in the Special issue, in the last section the article will attempt to take stock of the eighteenth legislature, analyzing its legacy for the Italian political system and trying to identify those factors that are bound to characterize Italian politics in the future as well

Does changing electoral systems affect (Corrupt) particularistic exchanges? Evidence from the italian case

The literature on forms of particularism explores the impact of institutional variables on what is denoted, alternatively, as constituency service, pork-barrel politics, or corruption. Attention has mostly been given to electoral systems, but other institutional provisions and political factors, such as party strength, are also relevant. The present contribution investigates the likely effects of electoral reforms on corruption control and seeks confirmation of the hypothesis that single member plurality (even within mixed member) systems are conducive to a type of particularism that might help fight corruption, taking Italy as a case. We test the impact of two electoral reforms and three electoral systems enacted in Italy between 1996 and 2016, whose primary aim was bolstering enfeebled party leaderships and facilitating the formation of durable governments, and we compare the effort at corruption control of the Italian governments born under these different electoral systems with those of other European democracies

Beyond Italian Exceptionalism? The ‘Critical’ Eighteenth Legislature

Italy’s eighteenth legislative term stands out as particularly idiosyncratic throughout Italian history. Over the course of this term, three governments with varying political orientations came into power, relying on parliamentary votes that shifted between the right, left, and center. In this article, we aim to highlight these peculiarities and explore whether they indicate a further complexification of Italy’s already intricate governmental history, or if they instead reflect issues that are prevalent in most Western democracies. In addition to briefly presenting the articles included in the Special issue, in the last section the article will attempt to take stock of the eighteenth legislature, analyzing its legacy for the Italian political system and trying to identify those factors that are bound to characterize Italian politics in the future as well

The European Semester: democratic weaknesses as limits to learning

In this contribution to the symposium “What’s the problem? Multilevel governance and problem-solving” we discuss possible reasons that make difficult for the European Semester to achieve the goals of developing mutual learning and the acquisition of “ownership” over fiscal restraint, budgetary coordination and structural reforms. We underscore the uneasy coupling of a “soft” multilevel governance mode with “hard” forms of governance associated with power politics and domination. We claim that four major problems undermine the Semester’s credibility and effectiveness: a) a democratic deficit resulting from executive dominance, the relative sidelining of parliaments and the marginalization of the public, which confine learning to governmental and administrative circles; b) the constitutionalization of budgetary policy choices, which constrains the available policy options and preempts reflection and discussion; c) the “disciplinary logic” imposed through asymmetric intergovernmentalism, which invites non-compliance or bargaining, and d) the “tough” treatment of debtor Eurozone members outside the Semester

Does Changing Electoral Systems Affect (Corrupt) Particularistic Exchanges? Evidence from the Italian Case

The literature on forms of particularism explores the impact of institutional variables on what is denoted, alternatively, as constituency service, pork-barrel politics, or corruption. Attention has mostly been given to electoral systems, but other institutional provisions and political factors, such as party strength, are also relevant. The present contribution investigates the likely effects of electoral reforms on corruption control and seeks confirmation of the hypothesis that single member plurality (even within mixed member) systems are conducive to a type of particularism that might help fight corruption, taking Italy as a case. We test the impact of two electoral reforms and three electoral systems enacted in Italy between 1996 and 2016, whose primary aim was bolstering enfeebled party leaderships and facilitating the formation of durable governments, and we compare the effort at corruption control of the Italian governments born under these different electoral systems with those of other European democracies