The Viability of Trade Union Organisation: A Bargaining Unit Analysis

The paper develops a model of trade union behaviour based on the concept of the viable bargaining unit. Bargaining unit viability rests on five conditions; membership level, service level, membership participation, employer recognition and facilities. Viability is achieved by mobilisation of both members and employers. Trade unions may be seen as portfolios of viable and inviable bargaining units. From this, six propositions about trade union structure and behaviour are derived, concerning scale, growth, the impact of statutory recognition provisions, the emergence of conglomerate unions, governance structures and relations with employers. Employer dependence is a crucial element in the model and a simple game theoretic approach is used to discuss employer co-operation. A key conclusion is that viability at the union level is achieved by diversifying portfolios of bargaining units and securing co-operative relations with employers.Unions, structure, strategy

High Performance Workplaces: the Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy Evidence on the EU Directive Establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees

This paper contains evidence submitted on the DTI green paper 'High Performance Workplaces: The Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern Economy: A Discussion Paper'. This follows on the EU Directive establishing a General Framework for Informing and Consulting Employees. The comments proceed as follows. The first section places the development of representative systems in Britain in a broad historical perspective, arguing that there have been a number of missed opportunities in the past in this area. The second section then maps the current situation - it deals with what British workers obtain by way of representation in general and information and consultation in particular. This is compared broadly in the third section with arrangements in three other major countries, the US, Germany, and France, where we suggest there are important lessons to be learnt. The fourth then deals with what British workers say they want. In the fifth section, we speculate about various scenarios and likely future developments. In the final section, answers are provided to some of the specific questions posed in the consultative document.

Union Organization in Great Britain

Union membership and density in Britain has experienced substantial decline since 1979. The fall in private sector membership and density has been much greater than in the public sector. The size of the union sector, measured by employer recognition, has shrunk. Membership decline has been accompanied by financial decline. Much of the decline occurred before 1997, under Conservative governments. Since 1997 and the return of a Labour government, the position has in some respects stabilized. Currently, unions have a substantially reduced economic impact, but a continued, if limited, role in workplace communication and grievance handling, often as part of a voice regime including non union elements.British trade unions, union structure, union membership

Comparatively Open: Statutory Information Disclosure for Consultation and Bargaining in Germany, France and the UK

Information provision is an important part of all mechanisms which give employees voice atwork. This paper considers the law on information disclosure for joint consultation andcollective bargaining in three countries, Germany, France, and the UK, chosen for theirdistinctive legal and institutional arrangements, within a common European Union context. Itis argued that there is coherence between the law and institutions in Germany; in France,despite extensive legal support for information provision, the law and institutions complementone another less; in the UK, there are contradictory approaches and new dilemmasconfronting the traditional system. Although European Directives harmonise statutoryminima, there are few signs of common disclosure practice emerging across the threecountries.Collective bargaining, information disclosure, unions, Germany, France, UK

New Model Unions: Options for the 21st Century

The purpose of this short paper is threefold. First we discuss the underlying properties of the dominant organisational model for trade unions in Britain. Second, we look at options for changing this organisational model. Third, we conclude by looking at what this might imply for the future operation and organisation of trade unions and their engagement with their members

Accounting for Collective Action: Resource Acquisition and Mobilization in British Unions

The paper uses two data sources to map trends in resource availability for trade unions in Britain. Union resources exist on the one hand in the form of subscription income and accumulated assets shown in union accounts and, on the other, establishment level resources provided by employers and union members. The paper documents a substantial decline in both forms of resource across the period 1990 -2004 and attempts to explain both the reasons for this decline and its consequences for employee representation in Britain

Trading Places: Employers, Unions and the Manufacture of Voice

Using nationally representative workplace data for Britain we show that over the last quarter century union voice - especially union-only voice - has been associated with poorer climate, more industrial action, poorer financial performance and poorer labour productivity than nonunion voice and, in particular, direct voice. On the other hand, union-based voice regimes have experienced lower quit rates than non-union and "no voice" regimes, as theory predicts. Over that time, while the workplace incidence of voice has remained constant, with roughly 8 workplaces out of 10 providing some form of voice, there has been a big shift from union to non-union voice, particularly direct employer-made voice. Thus employers are prepared generally to bear the costs of voice provision and manifest a reluctance to engage with their workforce without voice mechanisms in place. The associations between non-union voice mechanisms and desirable workplace outcomes suggest that these costs may be lower than the benefits voice generates.worker voice, trade unions, quits, employment relations, labour productivity, financial performance, industrial action

The Right to Know: Disclosure of Information for Collective Bargaining and Joint Consultation

The legal obligation on employers to provide information to employees has grown since the early 1970s. At that time, the emphasis was on disclosure for collective bargaining. In the 1980s and 1990s, the emphasis shifted more to disclosure for joint consultation. In the context of new legislation, the possibility of further interventions from Europe, and a greater commitment to openness in other areas of company and public life, disclosure of information for collective bargaining and joint consultation at work is again on the agenda. This article focuses on disclosure for both of these processes. Disclosure for collective bargaining is the most developed and potentially significant area of the law from an industrial relations perspective. Disclosure for joint consultation, however, has been the most dynamic area in recent years. Voluntary information provision by firms has also been a significant part of developing human resource management practice. The paper therefore provides a broad examination of the law on disclosure. The UK provisions are conceptualised as constituting an agenda-driven disclosure model; i.e. the trigger for their use lies within the bargaining agenda. By contrast, the provisions stemming from European initiatives are event-driven; i.e. they are triggered by specific employer initiated events that affect employment contracts in other ways irrespective of the representative context. In the final sections, we attempt a broader evaluation of the intent and impact of the legislation and assess the pros and cons of the different approaches.Disclosure of information, collective bargaining, joint consultation

Why Do Voice Regimes Differ?

In this paper we seek to explain the emergence of different voice regimes, and to do so by using approaches from institutional economics. In particular we analyse the emergence of different voice regimes as a contracting problem; a ¿make¿ or ¿buy¿ decision on the part of the employer. A unique feature of the model is that the firm, having chosen its particular employee management regime, faces switching costs if it attempts to alter its original make or buy decision. A particular dimension of the employee management regime decision is the use of the union as agent or supplier of voice, or elements thereof. We argue that there are circumstances in which the employer may, on grounds of cost or risk, seek to subcontract aspects of the management of labour to a union and, further, that this (along with the presence of switching costs) helps explain the continued recognition of trade unions in many firms. In other circumstances, however, the employer may seek to construct voice mechanisms without union involvement. Workplace data from Britain are used to test these and other implications of the model.trade unions, voice, transaction cost economics, switching costs

Employee Voice and Private Sector Workplace Outcomes in Britain, 1980-2004

Non-union direct voice has replaced union representative voice as the primary avenue for employee voice in the British private sector. This paper provides a framework for examining the relationship between employee voice and workplace outcomes that explains this development. As exit-voice theory predicts, voice is associated with lower voluntary turnover, especially in the case of union voice. Union voice is also associated with greater workplace conflict and poorer productivity. Nonunion voice is associated with better workplace financial performance than other voice regimes.employee voice, trade unions, productivity, industrial action, quits, labor-management relations