Complementary Platforms

We introduce an analytical framework close to the canonical model of platform competition investigated by Rochet and Tirole (2006) to study pricing decisions in two-sided markets when two or more platforms are needed simultaneously for the successful completion of a transaction. The model developed is a natural extension of the Cournot-Ellet theory of complementary monopoly featuring clear cut asymmetric single- and multihoming patterns across the market. The results indicate that the so-called anticommons problem generalizes to two-sided markets because individual platforms do not take into account the negative pricing externality they exert on the other platforms. As a result, mergers between such platforms may be welfare enhancing, but involve redistribution of surplus from one side of the market to the other. Moreover, the limit of an atomistic allocation of property rights however is not monopoly pricing, indicating that there also exist differences with the received theory of complementarity

Two is not too many for monopoly

Betrand-Edgeworth duopoly, buyouts, price leadership, von Stackel-berg equilibria, C72, D43, L12, L13,

Intertemporal price discrimination and consumer demand

nondurable good, separable utility, nonseparable utility, L12,

Merger Review: How Much of Industry is Affected in an International Perspective?

merger control, firm size distribution, K21, L40,