Dark nudges in gambling

‘Nudge’ has come into common usage in behavioral science, the intersection of psychology and economics, for situations where a ‘choice architect’ aligns a system with consumers’ best long - term interests (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). A cafeteria designer might ‘nudge’ her customers by placing the salad bar centrally, while relegating unhealthier foods to a corner. In this editorial I argue that, in gambling, nudging works differently. Gambling’s ‘dark nudges’ are designed to exploit gamblers’ biases, as economic rationality on the part of gambling firms predicts. Gambling’s dark nudges reveal the contradictions of industry - led responsible gambling initiatives, and show how stronger regulation is required to reverse gambling’s spiralling public health costs (Korn & Shaffer, 1999; Livingstone & Adams, 2011; Markham & Young, 2015; Orford, 2005; Orford, 2010

Reference Distorted Prices

I show that when consumers (mis)perceive prices relative to reference prices, budgets turn out to be soft, prices tend to be lower and the average quality of goods sold decreases. These observations provide explanations for decentralized purchase decisions, for people being happy with a purchase even when they have paid their evaluation, and for why trade might affect high quality local firms 'unfairly'