Economics, Governance, and Politics in the Wine Market European Union Developments

Economics, Governance, and Politics in the Wine Market follows developments in European agriculture policies on wine legislation and market trend orientation between political power and market structure, from their inception through recent reforms.This political economic analysis seeks to explain the implementation of wine policies applied to production management in Europe. Gaeta and Corsinovi use The Public Choice model to describe bargaining and trade-off in agriculture wine policy by governments, producers, and critical industrial organizations. They argue that market problems cannot be analyzed without an understanding of the motives and processes behind upstream policy decisions. With the book's theoretical approaches and famous case studies, readers become agricultural wine experts capable of navigating the current complex wine market of the European Union

Public Choice theory as a tool for CMO wine reform analysis

The purpose of this paper is a partial reconstruction the role of agricultural lobbyist and national alliances, determining the effort of re-opening the common market organization of wine (CMO) Reg. 479/2008. The case considered is the liberalization of replanting rights chosen as a tool of Public Choice (P.C) analysis. The paper is divided into three parts. The first is a brief summary of P.C literature and methodological applications. The second a study of the structure, behavior and the relationship of the main actors involved in the policy genesis of the CMO. Third analyzes the effects that lobbyist actions have generated in the case of vineyard liberalization.The methodological approach is the P.C. model derived from Pokrivcak et.al.(2006).This is partially used in this discussion, to explain the general idea and concept of bargaining and trade-offs in wine policy by the mayor actors in a simplified scenario

The Public Choice theory as a tool for CMO wine analysis

The objective of this work is to reconstruct the role of agricultural lobbyist and the national alliances, in determining the outcome of the process of the latest wine common market (CMO) regulations entered into force on 1st August 2009 (Reg. 479/2008), and how these have changed the Commission\u2019s initial proposals. Four example of public decisions have been discussed: grubbing up vineyards and liberalization of replanting rights; the abolition of market measures (the case of distillation measures); quality policies (designations of origin) and new rules of wine labels. The approach to the models of Public Choice, included for the first time in a specific context such as the wine sector, has served to focus attention on the processes and the interactions between the politicians and the agricultural associations.The most important innovation in this work is the inclusion of different organizational forms of political interests and wine business representation. It covers not only traditional collective action but also individual action and third party representation. This is fundamentally different from the usual focus on collective action in isolation from other organizational form (Coen, 1997)

The alignment of European Law in pre-candidate countries: the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina wine law

The purpose of this paper is to examine mechanism of Europeanisation trough the creation process example of a new wine law in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), combining domestic wine regulations and EU legislative frameworks. We will analyze criteria and implications of Europeanization process, focusing on mechanism of assistance to candidate and pre-candidate countries. The aim is to understand the genesis of the conflict that hinders the development process and represents a barrier to trade liberalization. Adoption of law in BiH, as well as ordinances and regulations for its implementation and enforcement, is a precondition for a harmonized legal framework and competitive rules for the agriculture sector. For the analysis, we used dimensions of integrations and institutionalism theories as lenses to explore this processes. This approach is the one of the theoretical perspectives that has won converts and provided in many cases a useful tool for analyzing EU integration

Mitochondrial enzyme GLUD2 plays a critical role in glioblastoma progression

Background: Glioblastoma (GBM) is the most frequent and malignant primary brain tumor in adults and despite the progress in surgical procedures and therapy options, the overall survival remains very poor. Glutamate and α-KG are fundamental elements necessary to support the growth and proliferation of GBM cells. Glutamate oxidative deamination, catalyzed by GLUD2, is the predominant pathway for the production of α-KG. Methods: GLUD2 emerged from the RNA-seq analysis of 13 GBM patients, performed in our laboratory and a microarray analysis of 77 high-grade gliomas available on the Geo database. Thereafter, we investigated GLUD2 relevance in cancer cell behavior by GLUD2 overexpression and silencing in two different human GBM cell lines. Finally, we overexpressed GLUD2 in-vivo by using zebrafish embryos and monitored the developing central nervous system. Findings: GLUD2 expression was found associated to the histopathological classification, prognosis and survival of GBM patients. Moreover, through in-vitro functional studies, we showed that differences in GLUD2 expression level affected cell proliferation, migration, invasion, colony formation abilities, cell cycle phases, mitochondrial function and ROS production. In support of these findings, we also demonstrated, with in-vivo studies, that GLUD2 overexpression affects glial cell proliferation without affecting neuronal development in zebrafish embryos. Interpretation: We concluded that GLUD2 overexpression inhibited GBM cell growth suggesting a novel potential drug target for control of GBM progression. The possibility to enhance GLUD2 activity in GBM could result in a blocked/reduced proliferation of GBM cells without affecting the survival of the surrounding neurons

Interventionist policies and market failures of European wine regulations

he authors, seeks to explain the implementation of the EU wine policies applied to production management with the aim to understand what determines interventionist policies and their (possible) market failures. These \u2018markets failures\u2019, according to the authors, are shown follow two examples: gain of competitiveness for third countries wine producers respect those the EU, due to an increase of EU constraints, and price volatility, especially for bulk wine

I diritti di reimpianto e l'ipotesi di liberalizzazione: un tentativo di analisi nell'area Chianti Classico di un discusso strumento di Politica Agraria - Replanting Right and Liberalizations: an Attempt to Analyze a Controversial Instrument of Agricultural Policy in the Chianti Classico area

The decision to abolish planting rights system by 2015 at the latest has generated much debate among EU Member States and the EU Commission. Opponents claim that abolishing planting rights will have several negative effects, such as an increase in production and a decrease in the prices. On the other side the reform supporters, argue that it will benefit the sector and enhance its competitiveness. In times where the Common Agricultural Policy is being discussed, the liberalization of planting rights seems to be justifying more a political objective rather than a market objective. This paper simulates the effects of liberalization on wine prices, production and land values in the Chianti Classico wine denomination using the Nerlove\u2019s approach (1956-1958). The work also investigates the IGT quota production within the area that could become Chianti Classico wine after the liberalization. In summary, as any economic reform, abolishing planting rights is likely to create both winners and losers \u2013 which itself implies the desirability for compensations during a transition process. The magnitude of these effects is likely to differ strongly if the EU decides to leave the control to MS, Interbranch Organisation and Consortium board or not. In particular, the effects will depend on (1) how restrictive policy measure to control the production shall be taken by the Consortium; (2) how easy it will expand IGT vineyards in Chianti Classico with the \u201cprotectionism policies\u201d; (3) how the wine producers could be control the bulk wine prices

The Dynamic of Wine Supply and Price Formation in Chianti Classico Denomination

Chianti Classico wine is one of the most important and oldest Italian red wine Denomination of Origin. In the wine sector its brand, the Black Rooster, is the most famous and know in the world. The structure of the DO is characterized by significant prices fluctuations of bulk wine, constant production and high land values. This situation has created uncertainty in farm investments and it has contributed to increase the supply in terms of surplus or stock. The particularity is also that DO is represented by formal institutions, contracts, branch and agreements and regulations between different producers\u2019 categories. The purpose of this work is to reconstruct and explain the supply chain and bargaining during the bulk wine selling and price performance in one of most important and oldest Italian red wine Denomination of Origin (DO): Chianti Classico employing the Structure \u2013Conduct and Performance (SCP) framework. The paper analyzes the DO structure and farmer\u2019s conduct with the aim to understand the logic behind the price formation and their performance. The interdependence among the different firms shows a singular character on the collective dynamics, collusion systems and informal rules observed that regulate the bulk wine prices (through unspoken agreement), supply control instruments and territorial systems

I diritti di reimpianto e l\u2019ipotesi di liberalizzazione: un tentativo di analisi nell\u2019area Chianti Classico di un discusso strumento di politica agraria.

The decision to abolish planting rights system by 2015 at the latest has generated much debate among EU Member States and the EU Commission. Opponents claim that abolishing planting rights will have several negative effects, such as an increase in production and a decrease in the prices. On the other side the reform supporters, argue that it will benefit the sector and enhance its competitiveness. In times where the Common Agricultural Policy is being discussed, the liberalization of planting rights seems to be justifying more a political objective rather than a market objective. This paper simulates the effects of liberalization on wine prices, production and land values in the Chianti Classico wine denomination using the Nerlove\u2019s approach (1956-1958). The work also investigates the IGT quota production within the area that could become Chianti Classico wine after the liberalization. In summary, as any economic reform, abolishing planting rights is likely to create both winners and losers \u2013 which itself implies the desirability for compensations during a transition process. The magnitude of these effects is likely to differ strongly if the EU decides to leave the control to MS, Interbranch Organisation and Consortium board or not. In particular, the effects will depend on (1) how restrictive policy measure to control the production shall be taken by the Consortium; (2) how easy it will expand IGT vineyards in Chianti Classico with the \u201cprotectionism policies\u201d; (3) how the wine producers could be control the bulk wine prices