The Staging of Venture Equity Capital and Venture Capitalist Bargaining Power

In this paper we look at the effects of bargaining power on the types of entrepreneurial projects chosen by venture capitalists and show that a wealth-constrained venture capitalist prefers to provide equity financing to a two-stage rather than to a similar single-stage project. While the venture capitalist does not have bargaining power over the entrepreneur of a single-stage project and is thus unable to extract any surplus, the venture capitalist does have this advantage in a two-stage project and, provided the project is good, can demand a portion of the surplus as a pre-condition for providing follow-on capital. This suggests that venture capitalists should stage their capital investments in order to improve their bargaining power, allowing them to earn greater profits from successful entrepreneurial projects

The Entrepreneur\u27s Choice: Venture Capital Debt Financing with Adverse Selection

This paper studies the consequences of using a debt contract to raise venture capital for an entrepreneurial project in an adverse selection setting with different quality venture capitalists. The paper considers not only the likelihood of success of a one-time project being dependent on the quality of the venture capitalist, but also the problem of a reduced ownership value of future rents from the venture if the venture capitalist takes it over as the result of default of the entrepreneur. Expressions for the face value of debt required for pooling and separating equilibria are also derived. The existence of a separating equilibrium with bad quality venture capitalists is used to show how less reputable venture capitalists can survive in the marketplace. Finally, the paper uses a numerical example to demonstrate why the entrepreneurs of more profitable entrepreneurial firms may prefer to do business with bad quality venture capitalists

Entrepreneurial Stock Brokering and Switching Costs

Stock brokers are entrepreneurs who incur switching costs when the change brokerage houses. We use Helsinki Stock Exchange data to investigate these costs by examining whether investors are loyal to their brokers when brokers move. We find that investors who have extant relationships with the new house are more likely to attract the investors from the old houses, and savvy (knowledgeable) investors are more likely to stay with their broker