It is not just about power, but about the type of power - relational governance in the context of a transiton economy

The paper analyses how intermediary’s bargaining power affects relational governance in the context of a transition economy, namely the case of Kosovo. There has been limited research and understanding about bargaining power and relational governance in developing and transition economies. Multinomial logistic regression is employed to investigate the factors affecting relational governance, which is operationalized as categorical variable: 1) Spot market transaction, 2) verbal contract and 3) written contract. The results of the study point out that intermediaries’ exercised power over farmers affects the farmers’ contracting decisions in different ways. When they exercise power over farmers’ margin, it reduces the likelihood of farmers’ participation in either verbal or written contracts, while power over product quality related activities increases the likelihood of farmers engagement in written contracts. Another key finding is that for products that require a specific standard and quality, written contracts are more likely than verbal ones

To Contract or not Contract: Implications for Farmer–Buyer Trading Relation Performance

The paper analyses the value chain coordination of greenhouse vegetables in Albania, which has a strong export orientation. Based on a structured farm survey, the study constributes to the value chain literature of the vertical coordination of agricultural products by addressing the question of how chain governance modes differ in terms of exercised power and farmers’ satisfaction (an indicator of performance) with the trading relationship. The results point out that farmers operating with agreements show higher levels of satisfaction with the trading relationship than do farmers selling on the spot market. On the other hand, those operating with agreements are under higher levels of exercised power over product quality

What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits

This study focuses in testing the power of reciprocity and leadership as collective action incentive structures and cooperation economic benefits in explaining collective action initiation in the context of a post-communist transition economy. The paper is based on a structured survey targeting Albanian export-oriented farmers. Different from most previous studies, this paper uses both regression analysis and machine learning procedure which is better suited for analysing non-linear relationships. The empirical findings are at odds with common sense that non-cooperation is the dominant strategy, because the presence of tolerant reciprocators and leadership resources provide promising incentive structures for collective action development. KEYWORDS: Albania, collective action, collective action benefits, incentive structures, leadership, power, reciprocit

Introducing quinoa in Turkey:farmers perception in the region of Adana

In order to look for a more diverse and sustainable cropping system with high value crops in the Mediterranean region of Turkey, the drought and salt tolerant crop quinoa was analysed as an alternative to the current major crops, for instance wheat. This study investigates the conditions for growing quinoa in Adana, and how they are perceived among farmers in the region. A combination of qualitative and quantitative research was employed to group farmers into segments according to their willingness to adopt quinoa. Findings from this study indicate that farmers in Adana perceive quinoa as a crop likely to be adopted in their cropping system if they can gain market access with the new crop. Farmers’ previous knowledge regarding the crop, concerns about drought and salt risk and farm characteristics also appear to be determining the farmers’ attitude towards new crops

Contract farming in transitional economies: A stakeholder theory perspective

In transitional economies, contract farming is widely recognized as a means for addressing numerous market failures affecting small farmers. Reviewing the scholarship on contract farming, we show that its traditional understandings have been framed by the narratives of transaction cost economics and power dynamics. We critically evaluate these narratives and demonstrate how stakeholder theory, with its relational understanding of business, offers a more comprehensive understanding of contract farming. We argue that a stakeholder theory perspective underscores the trust-based and collaborative nature of successful contract farming arrangements. It highlights the importance of informal and moral stakeholder relationships that compensate for the limitations of weak enforcement mechanisms and inadequate legal frameworks in transitional economies. This way, a stakeholder theory perspective on contract farming highlights its strategic management and business ethics dimensions, offering valuable guidance for cultivating successful stakeholder relationships

What explains collective action: The impact of social capital, incentive structures and economic benefits

This study focuses in testing the power of reciprocity and leadership as collective action incentive structures and cooperation economic benefits in explaining collective action initiation in the context of a post-communist transition economy. The paper is based on a structured survey targeting Albanian export-oriented farmers. Different from most previous studies, this paper uses both regression analysis and machine learning procedure which is better suited for analysing non-linear relationships. The empirical findings are at odds with common sense that non-cooperation is the dominant strategy, because the presence of tolerant reciprocators and leadership resources provide promising incentive structures for collective action development

To Contract or not Contract: Implications for Farmer–Buyer Trading Relation Performance

The paper analyses the value chain coordination of greenhouse vegetables in Albania, which has a strong export orientation. Based on a structured farm survey, the study constributes to the value chain literature of the vertical coordination of agricultural products by addressing the question of how chain governance modes differ in terms of exercised power and farmers’ satisfaction (an indicator of performance) with the trading relationship. The results point out that farmers operating with agreements show higher levels of satisfaction with the trading relationship than do farmers selling on the spot market. On the other hand, those operating with agreements are under higher levels of exercised power over product quality