Unraveling Short- and Farsightedness in Politics

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible pension scheme and a fixed pension scheme. In a flexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short term performance as measured by the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election. This system increases social welfare by letting officeholders self-select into those activities that most benefit society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system and assess its robustness. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result.elections, political contracts, vote-share thresholds, incumbents, selection, effort

Devisenreserven der SNB zur Finanzierung der AHV?

Im Rahmen ihrer rigorosen Mindestkurspolitik häufte die Schweizerische Nationalbank (SNB) in den letzten Jahren einen beträchtlichen Devisenberg an. In der Folge wurden in den letzten Jahren vermehrt Forderungen laut, zumindest einen Teil davon im Interesse des Schweizer Volkes zu verwenden. Eine Studie aus dem Jahr 2019 schlägt vor, die Devisenreserven der SNB in einen Spezialfonds auszulagern und mit dem jährlich anfallenden Zinsertrag zur Finanzierung der Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung (AHV) beizutragen. Dies vor dem Hintergrund, dass die Beiträge der Versicherten sowie der öffentlichen Hand die laufenden Rentenzahlungen langfristig nicht mehr decken können. Dieser Artikel untersucht die möglichen Auswirkungen einer Auslagerung der Devisenreserven zur Finanzierung der AHV auf den geldpolitischen Auftrag der SNB, die Schweizer Volkswirtschaft und die finanzielle Situation der AHV. Dazu erfolgt aufbauend auf einer umfassenden Literaturrecherche eine empirische Analyse mithilfe von problemzentrierten Interviews von fünf Expertinnen und Experten. Basierend auf den Erkenntnissen der Studie soll die Frage beantwortet werden, ob die Verwendung der Devisenreserven der SNB für die Finanzierung der AHV zu befürworten ist. Die Studie zeigt, dass durch die Auslagerung der Devisenreserven in einen Spezialfonds diverse Problemfelder entstehen können, welche den geldpolitischen Auftrag der SNB erschweren. Dies wiederum könnte sich negativ auf die Schweizer Volkswirtschaft auswirken. Auch wäre die Finanzierung der AHV mit diesem Vorschlag nicht nachhaltig gesichert. Eine Koppelung von Geld- und Sozialpolitik zu Finanzierung der AHV ist vor diesem Hintergrund nicht zu befürworten

A nurse-delivered, clinic-based intervention to address intimate partner violence among low-income women in Mexico City : findings from a cluster randomized controlled trial

Background: Rigorous evaluations of health sector interventions addressing intimate partner violence (IPV) in low- and middle-income countries are lacking. We aimed to assess whether an enhanced nurse-delivered intervention would reduce IPV and improve levels of safety planning behaviors, use of community resources, reproductive coercion, and mental quality of life. Methods: We randomized 42 public health clinics in Mexico City to treatment or control arms. In treatment clinics, women received the nurse-delivered session (IPV screening, supportive referrals, health/safety risk assessments) at baseline (T1), and a booster counselling session after 3 months (T2). In control clinics, women received screening and a referral card from nurses. Surveys were conducted at T1, T2, and T3 (15 months from baseline). Our main outcome was past-year physical and sexual IPV. Intent-to-treat analyses were conducted via three-level random intercepts models to evaluate the interaction term for treatment status by time. Results: Between April and October 2013, 950 women (480 in control clinics, 470 in treatment clinics) with recent IPV experiences enrolled in the study. While reductions in IPV were observed for both women enrolled in treatment (OR, 0.40; 95% CI, 0.28-0.55; P < 0.01) and control (OR, 0.51; 95% CI, 0.36-0.72; P < 0.01) clinics at T3 (July to December 2014), no significant treatment effects were observed (OR, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.49-1.24; P = 0.30). At T2 (July to December 2013), women in treatment clinics reported significant improvements, compared to women in control clinics, in mental quality of life (β, 1.45; 95% CI, 0.14-2.75; P = 0.03) and safety planning behaviors (β, 0.41; 95% CI, 0.02-0.79; P = 0.04). Conclusion: While reductions in IPV levels were seen among women in both treatment and control clinics, the enhanced nurse intervention was no more effective in reducing IPV. The enhanced nursing intervention may offer short-term improvements in addressing safety planning and mental quality of life. Nurses can play a supportive role in assisting women with IPV experiences

On long-term decisions in public policy : three essays in political incentives, public health, and project evaluation

This thesis analyzes long-term decisions in three distinct policy contexts, each one employing a specific methodology within the realm of mathematical modeling. Beginning in the abstract world of a game-theoretical model we study incentive mechanisms for politicians (Part I), then take empirical steps with the construction of an overlapping-generations model aimed at quantifying the long-term impact of AIDS (Part II). Finally, in Part III, we take up the tools of risk analysis and turn our attention to the more circumscribed question of whether a large-scale development project is both sustainable and profitable in the long run. In essence, Part II and III seek to generate information for policy design. Whether this information will be translated into successful policy, depends crucially on the incentives given by the institutional system to those in charge. This is the perspective we take in Part I. Our results follow. Part I: We propose a pension system for officeholders that simultaneously incentivizes performance and preserves willingness to implement long-term policies during their last term in office. Interestingly, it is the offer of a choice that realizes the incentive mechanism, by aligning the politicians’ personal interests with welfare goals. We prove that the proposed system is optimal under the assumption that implementing long-term policies is of sufficient importance for society. The strategy underlying the pension mechanism can also be generalized to improve welfare in non-last-term situations. Part II: Despite a decrease in infection rates and improved access to antiretroviral medication, Kenya still faces a long-wave of premature adult mortality due to AIDS. We find that AIDS will cause a setback in household investment in secondary and tertiary education over the next two decades. This effect, combined with the estimated increase in mortality, will have a significant impact on GDP per capita, which will persist until at least 2040. On the basis of the model, an expansion of existing medication programs is warranted purely on economic grounds. Aside from its application to other countries, the versatility of the model’s structure enables its application, when appropriately tailored, to other enduring epidemics that share characteristics with AIDS, such as malaria and tuberculosis. Part III The final project demonstrates how a classical cost-benefit setting for the evaluation of a development project can be extended to perform risk analysis. We illustrate this process using the Private Irrigation Promotion Project in Niger led by the World Bank between 2003 and 2008. Our analysis shows that the program is sustainable in the long-term, taking into account risks posed by unfavorable variations in crop prices, input prices, and crop yield, as well as deterioration of irrigation infrastructure and general financial shocks

Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics

The absence of a deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for the polity. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving the willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible and a fixed pension scheme. While in the fixed scheme, performance has no impact on the pension, the pension increases with short-term performance in the flexible scheme, using the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election as a performance indicator. Such a pension choice improves the well-being of citizens since officeholders are encouraged to invest in those activities that are beneficial for society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result

Unraveling short- and farsightedness in politics

The absence of the deselection threat in incumbents’ last term in office can be negative or positive for society. Some politicians may reduce their efforts, while others may pursue beneficial long-term policies that may be unpopular in the short term. We propose a novel pension system that solves the effort problem while preserving willingness to implement long-term policies. The idea is to give politicians the option to choose between a flexible pension scheme and a fixed pension scheme. In a flexible pension scheme, the pension increases with short term performance as measured by the vote share of the officeholder’s party in the next election. This system increases social welfare by letting officeholders self-select into those activities that most benefit society. We analyze the properties and consequences of such a system and assess its robustness. Finally, we extend the pension system with choice to non-last-term situations and derive a general welfare result