225 research outputs found
\u3ci\u3eCapturing Quarantine: Student Pandemic Experience\u3c/i\u3e Journal
Journal entries submitted by the Public History 2021 spring semester class at Columbia College Chicago reflecting on aspects of the global pandemic from the student perspective commenting on their personal pandemic timeline and the other is an essay about what each student learned so far from the pandemic.https://digitalcommons.colum.edu/journals/1040/thumbnail.jp
The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29
Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently.
The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives.
These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards
Unity stronger than divisions. Ukraine's internal diversity. OSW Point of View Number 40, March 2014
Ukraine is deeply divided internally, although as a result of the changes that have taken place since its independence, the country’s internal divisions now have less and less to do with territorial divides, and the split into historical ‘sub-Ukraines’ has become less pronounced, especially for the younger generation. Ukraine is not a country of two competing regional identities, one in the west, the other in the east. The western identity, in which the unity of Ukraine is a key value, coexists with the multiple and diverse local patriotisms of the different regions in the east and the south of the country. The present protest movement has consolidated the country’s sense of unity. Its opponents have also been championing the indivisibility of Ukraine, even while they demanded a thorough decentralisation of the country, which was often mistaken for separatism. Russia has been stirring up separatist tendencies in Ukraine, but with little success. Crimea is an exception here, because in most respects it has remained unaffected by the dynamics of the social processes transforming mainland Ukraine – separatist tendencies are indeed deeply rooted in the peninsula
Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus
vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand,
the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is
an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of
Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the
present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that
Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return
to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the
leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to
avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could
be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties
in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which
is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars
Ukraine’s wartime nationalism. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 179, 28.08.2015
From the Introduction. The Euromaidan revolution and the war in Donbas that followed it have brought about deep changes in the way Ukrainian citizens think and have led to a rapid transformation of how people view the concept of national community. It began to be increasingly common for proponents of nationalism to refer to solidarity with the state instead of referring to the nation understood as an ethnic community, as they had previously done. This is due to the fact that an entire young generation has matured which takes the Ukrainian state for granted, but also because in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict most Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine have opted for Ukraine
The Ukrainian Orthodox Church's stance on the revolution and war. OSW Commentary No. 151, 27.10.2014
Volodymyr (secular name Viktor Sabodan), the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Ukraine, the
head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), which recognises the honorary primacy of the
Moscow Patriarchate, died on 5 July 2014 at the age of 79. He was replaced by Metropolitan
Onufry (secular name Orest Berezovsky), aged 70. The fact that this representative of the moderate
trend, far from politics, was elected signifies that the UOC’s previous policy will be continued
in the coming years: strengthening the Church’s independence without questioning
its canonical bonds with Moscow. Metropolitan Onufry’s task is to wait out the hard times,
rather than to embark upon an active policy.
The political developments this year have significantly weakened pro-Russian views and sentiments
among the Ukrainian public, including members of the UOC. On the other hand,
they have also contributed to the radicalisation of views within firmly pro-Russian circles.
The hierarchs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church have distanced themselves from these developments.
The reasons for this included a lack of unity among them as regards this issue,
as well as the leadership crisis linked to Metropolitan Volodymyr’sillness. The main problems
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is facing today are as follows: meeting the expectations of
those of its members who hold patriotic views (mainly the younger generation) without at
the same time antagonising its numerous members who are pro-Russian; and also continuing
to disregard the Kyiv Patriarchate and maintaining bonds with the Russian Orthodox Church.
Therefore, we may expect the UOC to continue avoiding taking a clear stance on the present
conflict, instead focusing on charity
The electoral success of the Svoboda Party - the consequences for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 97, 2012-11-26
The All-Ukrainian Association ‘Svoboda’ scored an unexpected success in the parliamentary
elections, winning support from over 10% of the voters and entering the select group
of Ukrainian parliamentary parties which operate at a national level. Svoboda’s manifesto is
nationalist and anti-liberal, in both economic and political aspects. It is in fact the anti-liberal
component of this party’s manifesto which it can thank for achieving such a big electoral success.
The faction formed by Svoboda’s 37 representatives in the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian parliament)
will have a small impact on legislative work, but their activity may add further to the
brutalisation of parliamentary life. Furthermore, Svoboda will attempt to make other opposition
groupings adopt a more radical approach, which may trigger the disintegration of the United
Opposition Baktivshchyna. A new wave of public protests is likely to emerge in Ukraine in the
coming months. Therefore, it can be expected that Svoboda will make efforts to join in or even
incite them, in order to promote its social and nationalist messages. This may contribute to increasing
the popularity of nationalist ideas and to a further radicalisation of sentiments in Ukraine
Before the parliamentary elections in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 149, 15.10.2014
The parliamentary elections to be held in Ukraine on 26 October will bring about deep changes
in the political composition of the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament. It is very probable
that after the elections only one or two of the five parties which are represented in the
parliament today will remain, and the leading positions will be taken by groupings who were
still considered marginal a year ago. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc, a party which according to
polls can count on victory, did not exist a year ago and today still remains in the construction
phase. It is likely that around two-thirds of the newly elected deputies will be people with no
parliamentary or even no political experience. On the one hand, this may be a strong impetus
to revival; but on the other the lack of experience of most of the parliamentarians may be
a problem. Another source of potential problems may be the process of consolidating the
internally unstable political parties which have emerged during the electoral campaign.
All of the parties which will count in the upcoming elections have a pro-European programme. It
is probable that the numerous supporters of an anti-Western orientation (although not necessarily
a pro-Russian orientation, as recent events have shown) will be represented by very few deputies
elected in single-mandate constituencies. On the one hand, this homogeneity within the
Rada will facilitate the country’s reforms, including work on the new constitution, while on the
other it might be a subject of permanent criticism by Moscow and its Ukrainian representatives.
The elections will take place in the conditions of a growing wave of social disappointment and
ongoing military actions in the eastern part of the country. Nevertheless, it can be expected that
the vote will be held without any major disturbances, and its course will be transparent and fair
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