Back to the Future - Decomposition Analysis of Distributive Policies using Behavioural Simulations

For policy makers and analysts, it is important to isolate the redistributive im- pact of tax-benefit policy changes from changes in the environment in which policies operate. When actual reforms are motivated by work incentives, it is also crucial to evaluate behavioural responses and the distributional consequences thereof. For that purpose, we embed counterfactual simulations in a formal framework based on the Shapley value decomposition and quantify the relative roles of (i) tax-benefit policy changes (direct policy effect), (ii) labour supply responses to the policy reforms (in- direct effect) and (iii) all other factors affecting income distribution over time. An application to the UK shows that the redistributive reforms of the 1998-2001 period have offset the increase in inequality that would have occurred otherwise. They also contribute to a strong decline in child poverty and poverty amongst single parent households. In the latter group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and half of the reduction in the depth of poverty) is on account of the very large incentive effect of policy changes.Tax-benefit policy, inequality, poverty, Shapley value decompo- sition, behavioural microsimulation, labour supply

The Distributional Effects of Tax-Benefit Policies under New Labour: A Shapley Decomposition

Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners.tax-benefit policy, inequality, poverty, Shapley decomposition, microsimulation

On Modeling Household Labor Supply With Taxation

Discrete choice models of labor supply easily account for nonlinearity and nonconvexity in budget sets caused by tax-benefit systems. As a result, they have become very popular for ex ante evaluations of policy reforms. In this paper, we question whether the degree of flexibility and the implicit household representation in these models are satisfying when confronted to the data. First, we show that attempts to interpret discrete models structurally lead to unnecessary parametric restrictions in most studies. We suggest instead a fully flexible model that retains usual assumptions on economic rationality except regularity conditions on leisure. Indeed, coefficients may account for both tastes and costs of work, possibly making 'preferences' appear nonconvex. Second, we show that the static unitary representation, implicit in most tax policy analyses, is rejected against a more general model with price- and income- dependent preferences. The latter can be rationalized in terms of collective or intertemporal models and offers promising perspectives in these directions. Simulations show that the magnitude of predicted labor supply responses to tax-benefit reforms is sensitive to the underlying household representation.multinomial logit, household labor supply, tax reform, unitary model, collective model

The Distributional Effects of Tax-benefit Policies under New Labour - A Shapley Decomposition

Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners.Tax-benefit policy; inequality; poverty; Shapley decomposition; microsimulation

A Theory of Child Targeting

There is a large empirical literature on policy measures targeted at children but surprisingly very little theoretical foundation to ground the debate on the optimality of the different instruments. In the present paper, we examine the merit of targeting children through two general policies, namely selective commodity taxation and cash transfer to family with children. We consider a household that comprises an adult and a child. The household behavior is described by the maximization of the adult’s utility function, which depends on the child’s welfare, subject to a budget constraint. The relative effects of a price subsidy and of a cash benefit on child welfare are then derived. In particular, it is shown that ‘favorable’ distortions from the price subsidies may allow to redistribute toward the child. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the State. Finally, it is shown that, in contrast to the traditional view, well-chosen subsidies can be more cost effective than cash transfers in alleviating child poverty.commodity taxation, child benefit, targeting, intrahousehold distribution, social welfare, paternalism, labeling

The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies and Parents? Bargaining

We propose a new methodology to estimate the share of household income accruing to children, i.e., the cost of children. The household behavior is represented according to the collective approach. That is, each household member is characterized by speci.c preferences. Following the principle of the Rothbarth approach, the identi.cation of the children.s share requires the observation of adult-speci.c goods. Our method di¤ers from this traditional approach in that it is compatible with economies of scale as well as with parents. bargaining. In addition, it allows de.ning a new concept of child costs that takes into account economies of scale. We illustrate the method with an application on the French Household Budget Survey.Consumer Demand; Collective Model; Rothbarth Method; Cost of Children; Scale Economies; Equivalence Scales; Indifference Scales

Extending the Collective Approach to Children: A Rothbarth-Type Measure of Child Costs Consistent with Scale Economies and Parents Bargaining

We extend the collective model of household consumption to account explicitly for child welfare and economies of scale. Each household member is characterized by specific prefer- ences and the (unspecified) allocation process is assumed to be efficient. Following the principle of the Rothbarth approach, the identification of the children's share requires the observation of adult-speci?c goods. The share of household income accruing to children in this context o¤ers a new measure of the cost of children, i.e., it differs from the traditional approach in that it is compatible with economies of scale and parents'bargaining. We illustrate the method with an application on the French Household Budget Survey.Consumer Demand; Collective Model; Rothbarth Method; Cost of Children; Scale Economies; Equivalence Scales; Indifference Scales.

Optimal Commodity Taxation and Redistribution within Households

Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less the consumption of a certain group of goods: those for which the slope of the Engel curves is larger for the targeted person.optimal commodity taxation, targeting, intrahousehold distribution

The Measurement of Child Costs: A Rothbarth-Type Method Consistent with Scale Economies

We propose a new methodology to estimate the share of household income accruing to children (i.e., the cost of children). Following the principle of the Rothbarth approach, the identification of the children's share requires the observation of at least one adult-specific good. However, our method differs from this traditional approach in that it allows measuring economies of scale in the household and indifference scales in Lewbel (2003)'s sense. We illustrate the method with an application on the French Household Budget Survey.consumer demand, collective model, Rothbarth method, cost of children, scale economies, equivalence scales, indifference scales

A Theory of Child Targeting

There is a large empirical literature on policy measures targeted at children but surprisingly very little theoretical foundation to ground the debate on the optimality of the different instruments. In the present paper, we examine the merit of targeting children through two general policies, namely selective commodity taxation and cash transfer to family with children. We consider a household that comprises an adult and a child. The household behavior is described by the maximization of the adult’s utility function, which depends on the child’s welfare, subject to a budget constraint. The relative effects of a price subsidy and of a cash benefit on child welfare are then derived. In particular, it is shown that ‘favorable’ distortions from the price subsidies may allow to redistribute toward the child. The framework is extended to account for possible paternalistic preferences of the State. Finally, it is shown that, in contrast to the traditional view, well-chosen subsidies can be more cost effective than cash transfers in alleviating child poverty.commodity taxation, child benefit, targeting, intrahousehold distribution, social welfare, paternalism, labeling