Hybrid Assessment Scheme Based on the Stern-Judging Rule for Maintaining Cooperation under Indirect Reciprocity

Intensive studies on indirect reciprocity have explored rational assessment rules for maintaining cooperation and several have demonstrated the effects of the stern-judging rule. Uchida and Sasaki demonstrated that the stern-judging rule is not suitable for maintaining cooperative regimes in private assessment conditions while a public assessment system has been assumed in most studies. Although both assessment systems are oversimplified and society is most accurately represented by a mixture of these systems, little analysis has been reported on their mixture. Here, we investigated how much weight on the use of information originating from a public source is needed to maintain cooperative regimes for players adopting the stern-judging rule when players get information from both public and private sources. We did this by considering a hybrid-assessment scheme in which players use both assessment systems and by using evolutionary game theory. We calculated replicator equations using the expected payoffs of three strategies: unconditional cooperation, unconditional defection, and stern-judging rule adoption. Our analysis shows that the use of the rule helps to maintain cooperation if reputation information from a unique public notice board is used with more than a threshold probability. This hybrid-assessment scheme can be applied to other rules, including the simple-standing rule and the staying rule

Effect of Textual Errors on The Evaluation of a Foreign Online Store

We conducted an experimental study among Japanese consumers to investigate the impact of textual errors on the perception and evaluation of an online store in a cross-border context. In particular, we proposed that the presence of textual errors would result in lower perceived ease of use, ease of communication and trust in a foreign online store. The experiment considered two types of errors, related to the use of language and to the completeness of translation. Four experimental conditions with different levels of textual errors were evaluated. We conducted a survey in Japan, obtaining a total of 1919 responses which were analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results showed that the presence of textual errors had a negative effect on all factors in the proposed model, compared to the absence of such errors. We discuss these results and their implications for foreign online vendors

Hidden particle production at the ILC

In a class of new physics models, new physics sector is completely or partly hidden, namely, singlet under the Standard Model (SM) gauge group. Hidden fields included in such new physics models communicate with the Standard Model sector through higher dimensional operators. If a cutoff lies in the TeV range, such hidden fields can be produced at future colliders. We consider a scalar filed as an example of the hidden fields. Collider phenomenology on this hidden scalar is similar to that of the SM Higgs boson, but there are several features quite different from those of the Higgs boson. We investigate productions of the hidden scalar at the International Linear Collider (ILC) and study the feasibility of its measurements, in particular, how well the ILC distinguishes the scalar from the Higgs boson, through realistic Monte Carlo simulations.Comment: the version to be published in PR

The Effect of Incentives and Meta-incentives on the Evolution of Cooperation

Although positive incentives for cooperators and/or negative incentives for free-riders in social dilemmas play an important role in maintaining cooperation, there is still the outstanding issue of who should pay the cost of incentives. The second-order free-rider problem, in which players who do not provide the incentives dominate in a game, is a well-known academic challenge. In order to meet this challenge, we devise and analyze a meta-incentive game that integrates positive incentives (rewards) and negative incentives (punishments) with second-order incentives, which are incentives for other players' incentives. The critical assumption of our model is that players who tend to provide incentives to other players for their cooperative or non-cooperative behavior also tend to provide incentives to their incentive behaviors. In this paper, we solve the replicator dynamics for a simple version of the game and analytically categorize the game types into four groups. We find that the second-order free-rider problem is completely resolved without any third-order or higher (meta) incentive under the assumption. To do so, a second-order costly incentive, which is given individually (peer-to-peer) after playing donation games, is needed. The paper concludes that (1) second-order incentives for first-order reward are necessary for cooperative regimes, (2) a system without first-order rewards cannot maintain a cooperative regime, (3) a system with first-order rewards and no incentives for rewards is the worst because it never reaches cooperation, and (4) a system with rewards for incentives is more likely to be a cooperative regime than a system with punishments for incentives when the cost-effect ratio of incentives is sufficiently large. This solution is general and strong in the sense that the game does not need any centralized institution or proactive system for incentives. (authors' abstract