Antibacterial Properties Of Laser Surface-Textured TiO2/ZnO Ceramic Coatings

Bacterial attachment on surfaces cause fouling, which reduces the hygiene status and effectiveness of equipment. Preventing bacterial attachment on surfaces through surface modification is a potential solution to fouling and has thus become a key research area. In this study, the effect of different ZnO contents (wt%) and picosecond laser surface texturing on the antibacterial properties of TiO2/ZnO ceramic coatings were investigated. The attachment and viability of Escherichia coli (E. coli) bacteria on laser surface-textured and non-textured TiO2/ZnO ceramic coatings were explored. Bacterial growth in an immersion suspension was evaluated using the optical density method. The number of colony-forming units on laser surface textured TiO2/ZnO coatings was found to be lower than that on non-textured coatings, which indicates that laser surface-textured coatings demonstrate strong antibacterial properties. Furthermore, the number of viable E. coli bacteria on laser surfacetextured TiO2/ZnO coatings was observed to be lower than that on non-textured coatings. This finding also demonstrates that laser surface texturing enhances the antibacterial properties of TiO2/ZnO coatings. Overall, laser surface texturing increased the surface areas of the coatings and improved the effectiveness of ZnO as an antibacterial agent. These results prove that laser surface texturing is a successful method for fabricating antibacterial surface

DEVELOPING A CONSENSUS MAIKING GAME OF NIMBY-TYPED PUBLIC PLANNING

The purpose of our study is to develop a consensus making game of NIMBY typed public planning, and to examine whether this game can be applied for understanding the idea of "veil of ignorance" as a measure to facilitate consensus-making in a NIMBY-type situation. The policy of siting repositories for radioactive waste by the Fukushima nuclear accident became difficult to introduce because of disagreement of the residents. In order to facilitate risk communication between administrations and residents, we develop a game to seek consensus of the policy. Twelve players take either mayor\u27s or resident\u27s role of six communities. The mayors discuss and propose evaluative criterias for judging options of siting repository, and the residents discuss and evaluate the options with the criterias proposed by the mayors

FAIRENESS ON DECISION-MAKING PROCESS OF MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AND SITING OF REPOSITORY IN FRANCE

The purpose of our study is to estimate procedural fairness and distributive fairness of past decision-making process of the management policy for high‒level radioactive waste (HLW) and siting of repository in France. We conducted normative analysis by document review and interview survey with CLIS members and a sociologist participated in the public debate on HLW management policy in 2005 by CNDP. The results show that prior clarification when and how decision‒making of HLW management policy and siting of repository will be carried out in the step‒wise approach is important to enhance the legitimacy of the process. With regard to distributive fairness between generations, it is important to carefully consider responsibility of current generation and decision right of future generation in terms of equity and equality in the fair decision‒making process, because HLW management policy might depend on concept of distributive fairness between generations. It is necessary to carefully debate both interregional distributive fairness of negative legacy and economical distributive fairness in the fair decision‒making process, because they are inextricably linked together.本研究は文部科学省科学研究費基盤B（課題番号24402042，研究代表者 広瀬幸雄教授）の補助を受けて実施された

The Detrimental Effects of Punishment and Reward on Cooperation in the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game

Background. Many studies have shown that sanctions promote cooperation in social dilemma situations. However, it has also been suggested that sanctions have a negative effect. The interactions among people and systems need to be considered to examine the consequences of sanctions. Aim. We examined whether rewards and mutual punishment increased non-cooperation. We regarded illegal industrial waste dumping as a social dilemma in which everyone bears the burden of the cost of illegal dumping, legal treatment is cooperative behavior, and illegal dumping is non-cooperative behavior. Method. We used the Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game. This game simulates the structure of industrial waste treatment (incomplete surveillance, various industries with different roles and payoffs, cost of cooperation, etc.) in addition to the social dilemma structure. Players take on roles in industrial waste treatment, negotiating and dealing with other players, and treating industrial waste. We set three conditions. In the reward condition, players can earn rewards by rapidly treating industrial waste. In the mutual punishment condition, players can mutually monitor and punish each other. In the control condition, neither reward nor punishment exists. Results. Non-cooperation occurred more frequently in the reward condition than in the control condition. Conversely, there was no difference in non-cooperation between the mutual punishment and control conditions. Players under the reward condition did not gather information proactively, and information on benefits was not shared. Conclusion. This study showed that sanctions caused non-cooperation. Social dynamics should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of sanctions. Gaming allows us to examine social consequences, including social dynamics, which leads to discoveries not possible through traditional methods

Psychological interventional approach for reduce resource consumption : Reducing plastic bag usage at supermarkets

A field study was conducted to investigate the reduction of plastic bag usage at supermarkets. Many behaviors leading to potential damage to the environment may be unintentional. This study applied a dual motivation model to plastic bag usage and examined the effects of an intervention aimed at promoting pro-environmental behavior. A voice prompt intervention was implemented in Japanese supermarkets. In the first (control) week, shoppers were given free plastic bags by the cashier. In the second (intervention) week, cashiers asked shoppers whether they wanted plastic bags. We collected observational and questionnaire measures of variables that predicted free plastic bag usage during the intervention. The results supported a dual motivation model of behavioral change. The voice prompt decreased the usage of plastic bags by both discouraging unintentional usage and encouraging an intentional reduction in usage. Possibilities for interventions designed both to attenuate unintentional motivation and to promote intentional motivation are considered

Even Unreliable Information Disclosure Makes People Cooperate in a Social Dilemma : Development of the “Industrial Waste Illegal Dumping Game”

This study explores whether information disclosure can cause co-operation in a social dilemma, even when people can disseminate false infor-mation. In the past, illegal dumping increased in Japan despite the strengthen-ing of penalties and surveillance laws, due to practical limitations in monitoring and surveillance. To resolve this, the tracking sheet used to trace the trading and processing of the wastes must be traceable in order to detect illegal dumping. This means that manifests must be written precisely in order to be effective but if maintaining a tracking log has some function other than surveillance this may not be the case. To examine this issue we used the “In-dustrial Waste Illegal Dumping game” (Ohnuma & Kitakaji, 2007) which sim-ulates the disposal of industrial waste and is structured as a social dilemma with asymmetry of information. In this study we utilised two conditions: a dis-closure and a control condition. Under the disclosure condition, players had to enter the amount of commission or disposal in the landfill but did not have to fill in the correct amount. Although players could read the report, they could not know who performed illegal dumping or how much they contributed. Therefore, this disclosure did not have an effective surveillance function and could not help detect non-cooperation. However, the results showed that the amount of illegal dumping was reduced, and information on payoffs was shared more in the disclosure condition than in the control condition. Moreo-ver, players collected and shared their information more in the disclosure con-dition than in the control condition. The study thus indicates that the function of disclosure is not surveillance, but information sharing which is essential for voluntary cooperation.ISAGA/JASAG2015 the 46th ISAGA conference | Japan Association of Simulation & Gaming hosts 17–21 July 2015 Kyoto, Japan　post proceedingsへの掲載予

Social Dilemma as a Device for Recognition of a Shared Goal : Development of “Consensus Building of Wind Farm Game”

This study explores the processes required to achieve consensus on controversial issues that involve social dilemmas and developed the “Con-sensus Building of Wind Farm Game” (WinG). A social dilemma is a conflict between personal profit and public benefits wherein the results of individuals pursuing their own profit means that public benefits decline; thus, ultimately, individuals lose their profit. Shared recognition of a common goal is crucial in resolving social dilemmas; however, in actual practice, developing such a shared recognition is difficult due to conflicts among stakeholders. To help identify effective resolutions to this problem, we examined a case of planning for a wind farm, which often involves controversy, even though many people generally agree to the plan. WinG was developed to simulate the type of con-flicts among stakeholders when planning a wind farm. There are five types of players (stakeholders) in WinG and each has a different goal and is provided with different information. All the players are required to maximize their in-dividual goals within the time limit, however at the same time, from the view-point of public benefit, an optimal achievement point is hidden in the game that results in the second best outcome for all the players. Through negotia-tions, bargaining, and debate, the social dynamics of achieving (or failing to achieve) a consensus were observed in WinG. Analysis from 10 games showed that shared recognition of a common goal was related to consensus, while on-ly information sharing was not sufficient.ISAGA/JASAG2015 the 46th ISAGA conference Japan Association of Simulation & Gaming hosts 17–21 July 2015 Kyoto, Japa

The Effects of Social Ties and Local Environment on Appropriate Waste Station Maintenance of Household Waste : A Case Study in Sapporo

“Waste stations”, where residents dispose of household waste, are usually maintained by the residents themselves; however, not all stations are well maintained. It was hypothesized that the level of waste station maintenance would correlate with the degree of social ties in the community, and would be influenced by local environment in the area around the waste station. A combination of observational and survey research methods were employed to test these hypotheses. Self-reported inappropriate disposal behavior and social ties were measured using a questionnaire survey, while the level of maintenance of waste stations and local surrounding environment were recorded using observational methods. Data from 508 residents, assigned to 102 waste stations in 23 local areas of Sapporo, Japan, were analyzed. Sequential regression analysis indicated that social ties in the community was the stronger predictor of the management level of waste station than the self-report disposal behavior. Furthermore, multi-level model tests revealed that the level of management of waste stations was predicted by the local surrounding environment, which provided spatial reminders of community interactions. This indicates that managing the local surrounding environment is an important intervention to encourage appropriate waste station management

Can the veil of ignorance create consensus? : a qualitative analysis using the siting for a contaminated waste landfill game

This study aims to demonstrate the significance of the discussion under the “veil of ignorance” in building consensus about the Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) issue. The Siting for a Contaminated Waste Landfill Game simulating conflicts related to the site selection of a contaminated waste landfill created by the accident at Fukushima nuclear power plant was developed with the veil of ignorance implemented as the prevailing social structure. The game involves two types of players: mayors, who are aware of the interests of their regions but can only engage in discussion; and citizens, who are unaware of the specific concerns of their regions (i.e., under the veil of ignorance) but are tasked with engaging in discussions and making the final decision. The transformations in the ideas of the players were examined through this game relating to building consensus. Ten games were conducted, and no unfair decisions were discerned under the veil of ignorance. A qualitative analysis of the open-ended questions revealed that a) the participants focused on fair viewpoints and avoided obsessions with regional interests after the discussion, and b) the diversity of actors and the multiple value dimensions were consistently emphasized before and after the discussion. Hence, this study succeeded in demonstrating that by participating in discussions under the veil of ignorance, the participants were able to form a shared recognition of the multiple-decision process, which the involvement of a diversity of actors and values was crucial for the formation of a consensus on the NIMBY issue

Public acceptance model for siting a repository of radioactive contaminated waste

The disposal of designated radioactive contaminated waste resulting from the Fukushima nuclear accident is a primary issue in Japan. However, residents often strongly oppose siting a repository of designated waste; therefore, a possible site remains undecided. The NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) aspect, whereby people refuse to build a repository in their hometown, has led to strong opposition. This study examined a public acceptance model for the siting investigation of a repository of designated waste. The model proposes that the antecedents of the three types of fairness, namely, procedural, distributive, and interpersonal fairness, determine public acceptance in addition to affecting evaluation of designated waste. The study investigated the differences of influences of the three types of fairness between residents in possible siting areas and in a non-siting area to compare the cognitive process toward the NIMBY issue. The respondents included 1016 residents in possible siting areas (Miyagi, Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki, and Chiba Prefectures), and 1006 residents in a non-siting area (the Tokyo metropolitan area). All respondents completed a web-based questionnaire. The results revealed that the influence of procedural fairness on public acceptance in the non-siting area was stronger than it was in the possible siting areas. Conversely, the influence of distributive fairness was stronger in the possible siting areas than it was in the non-siting area. Furthermore, affect evaluation through antecedents of fairness was more influential for public acceptance in the possible sites than it was in the non-siting area. Therefore, the findings suggest that the strong opposition due to the NIMBY aspect was caused by the differences between the process of fairness and the concept of fairness that people emphasize