Optimal Monitoring for project-based Emissions Trading Systems under incomplete Enforcement

Project-based Emissions Trading Schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between the project parties and the regulator. Given the specificities of these schemes, the regulator’s optimal monitoring strategy significantly differs from the one to be applied for capand- trade schemes or environmental taxes. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect these specificities. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s optimal spot-check frequency under the plausible assumption that the submitted projects vary with respect to their verifiability. We find that, given a limited monitoring budget, the optimal monitoring strategy is discontinuous, featuring a jump within the set of projects with lower verifiability. In this region, actual abatement is low and can fall to zero. For these cases, the sign of the slope of the strategy function depends on the actual relationship of the abatement cost and the penalty function. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability.environmental regulation, emissions trading systems, audits and compliance

Prices vs. Quantities with Fiscal Cushioning

Regulating international externalities, like climate change, raises various enforcement problems. It is often argued that international price-based regulations (e.g. emission taxes) are more difficult to enforce than quantity-based regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits). In this paper, we analyze the relative performance of price-based and quantity-based instruments when costs and benefits are uncertain and enforcement of quantity regimes is stricter than that of price regimes. We show that under these conditions, instrument choice solely based on the relative slopes of the marginal curves can yield inefficient results. If policy enforcement differs, rational policy choice should also take into account the level of the marginal benefit curve, as well as institutional parameters. In contrast to earlier analyses on "Prices vs. Quantities", we find that the choice of instrument also depends on the variance of the marginal abatement costs. Numerical simulations of our stylized model suggest that, for climate policies, quantity-regulations might well be preferable to price-based approaches after all.market-based instruments, incomplete enforcement, uncertainty, environmental regulation

Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator’s optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiability.Environmental regulation, Project-based emissions trading systems, Audits and compliance.

Analysis of interplanetary solar sail trajectories with attitude dynamics

We present a new approach to the problem of optimal control of solar sails for low-thrust trajectory optimization. The objective was to find the required control torque magnitudes in order to steer a solar sail in interplanetary space. A new steering strategy, controlling the solar sail with generic torques applied about the spacecraft body axes, is integrated into the existing low-thrust trajectory optimization software InTrance. This software combines artificial neural networks and evolutionary algorithms to find steering strategies close to the global optimum without an initial guess. Furthermore, we implement a three rotational degree-of-freedom rigid-body attitude dynamics model to represent the solar sail in space. Two interplanetary transfers to Mars and Neptune are chosen to represent typical future solar sail mission scenarios. The results found with the new steering strategy are compared to the existing reference trajectories without attitude dynamics. The resulting control torques required to accomplish the missions are investigated, as they pose the primary requirements to a real on-board attitude control system

Das arbeitsmarktpolitische Programm der Bundesregierung für Regionen mit besonderen Beschäftigungsproblemen vom Mai 1979, Sonderprogramm '79 : Anregungen für die neuen Bundesländer

"Das arbeitsmarktpolitische Programm für Regionen mit besonderen Beschäftigungsproblemen von 1979 gibt Anregungen für die Arbeitsmarktpolitik in den neuen Bundesländern. Dort liegt heute die Arbeitslosigkeit weit über dem Bundesdurchschnitt, wie seinerzeit 1979 in den Problemregionen. Die neuen Bundesländer müssen die Aufgabe des Übergangs von der Planwirtschaft zur Marktwirtschaft bewältigen, einen Strukturwandel, der noch tiefer geht als der Strukturwandel, dem sich die Problemregionen 1979 stellen mußten. Das Sonderprogramm '79 hat gezeigt, daß zur Bewältigung struktureller Anpassungs- und Umstellungsmaßnahmen der Betriebe die Förderung der innerbetrieblichen Qualifizierung einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten kann. Deshalb werden das Sonderprogramm '79 und vor allem dessen Schwerpunkt "Berufliche Qualifizierung der Arbeitnehmer in Betrieben mit Anpassungs- und Umstellungsprozessen" hier nochmals dargestellt. Dabei wird insbesondere auf die Ergebnisse und Verbesserungsvorschläge der Begleitforschung eingegangen, die gezeigt haben, daß die Förderung innerbetrieblicher Qualifizierung einen positiven quantitativen, vor allem einen qualitativen Effekt auf die Arbeitsmärkte ausüben kann. Besondere Bedeutung kommt dabei der Förderung der Qualifizierung von Arbeitnehmern in Klein- und Mittelbetrieben zu. Die Begleitforschung hat darüber hinaus ergeben, daß die - vielfach befürchtete - Mitnahme von Fördermitteln in akzeptablen Grenzen gehalten werden konnte. Es wird daher vorgeschlagen, für die neuen Bundesländer ein arbeitsmarktpolitisches Sonderprogramm zur Förderung der innerbetrieblichen Qualifizierung nach dem Vorbild des Programms von 1979 aufzulegen. Ein solches Programm könnte - wie 1979 bewiesen worden ist - schon kurzfristig positive Wirkungen entfalten." (Autorenreferat)Arbeitsmarktpolitisches Sonderprogramm, Arbeitsmarktpolitik - Erfolgskontrolle, Qualifizierung - Förderung, strukturschwache Räume, Arbeitslosigkeitsbekämpfung, Beschäftigungseffekte, Ostdeutschland, Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Life’s a breach! Ensuring ‘permanence’ in forest carbon sinks under incomplete contract enforcement

As carbon sinks, forests play a critical role in helping to mitigate the growing threat from anthropogenic climate change. Forest carbon offsets transacted between GHG emitters in industrialised countries and sellers in developing countries have emerged as a useful climate policy tool. A model is developed that investigates the role of incentives in forestry carbon sequestration contracts. It considers the optimal design of contracts to ensure landowner participation and hence, permanence in forest carbon sinks in a context of uncertain opportunity costs and incomplete contract enforcement. The optimal contract is driven by the quality of the institutional framework in which the contract is executed, in particular, as it relates to contract enforcement. Stronger institutional frameworks tend to distort the seller’s effort upwards away from the full enforcement outcome. This also leads to greater amounts of carbon sequestered and higher conditional payments made to the seller. Further, where institutions are strong, there is a case for indexing the payment to the carbon market price if permanence is to be ensured. That is, as the carbon price increases, the payment could be raised and vice versa.forest carbon offsets, permanence, contract design, incomplete enforcement

Optimal monitoring of credit-based emissions trading under asymmetric information

Project-based emissions trading schemes, like the Clean Development Mechanism, are particularly prone to problems of asymmetric information between project parties and the regulator. In this paper, we extend the general framework on incomplete enforcement of policy instruments to reflect the particularities of credit-based mechanisms. The main focus of the analysis is to determine the regulator's optimal spot-check frequency given plausible assumptions of incomplete enforcement under asymmetric information on reduction costs and heterogeneous verifiability of projects. We find that, depending on the actual abatement cost and penalty schemes, optimal monitoring for credit-based systems is often discontinuous and significantly differs from the one to be applied for cap-and-trade schemes or environmental taxes. We conclude that, in a real-world context, project admission should ultimately be based on the criterion of verifiabilit

Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence' in carbon sequestration

Opportunistic behaviour due to imperfect contract enforcement is a risk in many economic transactions. In this paper, an enforcement-proof incentive contract is developed in which a buyer demands a guaranteed delivery of a good or service given a productive upfront payment, moral hazard in precaution, and the potential for opportunistic contract breach. Investing in a contract upfront is found to be restricted by moral hazard and opportunistic contract breach. This limits the size of investment up to a specific level even if an infinite scale-up of production were beneficial. A more severe moral hazard problem results in a smaller distortion. The framework is applied and extended to international carbon sequestration contracts. In comparison to alternative liability attributions, the current regime of buyer liability yields inefficiently low levels of investment in carbon sequestratio

V3C: Kontrollzentrum auf einem Laptop

Im Rahmen von "Responsive Space" wird das Missionsbetriebssystem V3C (Verlegefähiges Compact Control Center) entwickelt. V3C ist auf handelsüblicher mobiler Hardware integriert, wird autark betrieben und kann schnell an verschiedene Orte verlegt werden.Wir zeigen Design, Implementierung und Bereitstellung von V3C, berichten über den erfolgreichen Demonstrationsbetrieb des BORIS-Satelliten und beleuchten verschiedene Betriebskonzepte, insbesondere die Koppelung mit einem GEO-Relais-Link

Coasean bargaining in the presence of Pigouvian taxation

Coasean arguments against the Pigouvian perspective are well established. A central tenet in this criticism argues that a Pigouvian tax may be a source of inefficiency: if parties were to bargain in the presence of a Pigouvian tax, (allocative) inefficiencies would occur—the so-called Buchanan-Stubblebine-Turvey Theorem. By analyzing a Coasean environment where the appropriation of property rights is costly, we show Coasean bargaining in the presence of a pre-existing (Pigouvian) tax may be superior. This has implications for policy where dual regulatory environments exist, such as regulation at the state and federal level, as well as environmental liability and litigatio