The effect of international subsidiaries on voluntary disclosure - evidence from natural disasters

This paper documents that managers of multinational companies adjust voluntary disclosure after significant events at international subsidiaries. We show an increase in the likelihood and frequency of management forecasts following natural disasters in regions where companies operate subsidiaries. The exogenous and staggered nature of natural disasters as well as our research design choices substantially raise the hurdle for alternative explanations of our result. Further analyses suggest that the effect is particularly strong for companies that rely on equity financing. Our paper contributes to the nascent literature on transmission effects within international business groups

Intangible Capital and Leverage

We investigate the causal effect of intangible capital on leverage. To address endogeneity, we exploit patent invalidations by the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, where judges are randomly assigned to cases. Differences in judge leniency provide exogenous variation in the probability that firms’ patents are invalidated. Using this probability as an instrument for exogenous losses in intangible capital, we find a patent invalidation leads to a 14.1% reduction in leverage, suggesting that intangible capital causally supports leverage. This local average treatment effect is stronger in firms who use patents as loan collateral, in less creditworthy and in smaller firms. The deleveraging after patent invalidation is mainly driven by firms reducing short-term debt

May Bad Luck Be Without You: The Effect of CEO Luck on Strategic Risk-taking

We investigate how luck, namely, changes in a firm's performance beyond the CEO's control, affects strategic risk-taking. Fusing upper echelons theory with insights from psychology and behavioral strategy research, we hypothesize that there is a positive association between luck and strategic risk-taking and that this effect is stronger for bad luck than for good luck. We further argue that these effects vary depending on whether CEOs have experienced negative events earlier in their professional careers. Measuring luck as the exogenous component of recent firm performance, we show empirically that CEOs react to bad luck by adopting more conservative risk-taking policies while showing no reactions to good luck. This effect predictably varies with the strength of bad luck signals, and it is stronger for CEOs who have experienced negative events during their professional careers. We contribute to the literature by providing the first evidence on the role of luck in corporate strategic risk-taking