Mentalizing in value-based social decision-making: Shaping expectations and social norms

In this chapter, we take a neuroeconomic perspective to explore how the ability to understand mental states of other and predict their behaviour, termed mentalizing, is crucial in value-based social decision-making. These types of choice involve attributing value to social stimuli and motivations in order to inform decisions. Here, (1) we define the concept of value and value-based choice; then, (2) explain the ways in which mentalizing is integrated into the computation of these choices in social interaction. In (3) and (4), we outline the link between mentalizing and social expectations, and how our ability to learn from social interactions and predict behaviour shape our social norms and, therefore, our ability to make optimal decisions in social contexts. To conclude, (5) we analyse how mentalizing allows for flexibility in social expectations and for context-dependent decision-making processes and (6) how individual differences in mentalizing ability help explain variability in social decision-making. Overall, we argue that mentalizing is an essential component of social decision-making and also should be taken into account in applied settings, such as clinical and forensic

Mental files and teleology

Mentalizing like theory of mind is often not more than a cover term for social cognition that involves reasoning with mental terms, regardless of its precise nature: use of a theory, simulation, or teleology based on practical reasoning. We advocate that research should help differentiate between these options and not treat it as a uniform ability as meta-analyses show that different tasks activate different brain areas. We focus on perspective as the central aspect of the mental and find that its involvement makes an important distinction in development and in brain imaging. A large variety of tasks that require representation of different modes of presentation are mastered around 4 years. Comparable tasks for adults all activate an area in left IPL and frequently in precuneus. Processing perspective results in common development and a common brain region. To accommodate this finding, theory of mind and simulation theory need to make special assumptions. It corresponds to a natural transition from basic teleology to teleology-in-perspective

Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action

This article discusses four different scenarios to specify increasingly complex mechanisms that enable increasingly flexible social interactions. The key dimension on which these mechanisms differ is the extent to which organisms are able to process other organisms' intentions and to keep them apart from their own. Drawing on findings from ecological psychology, scenario 1 focuses on entrainment and simultaneous affordance in ‘intentionally blind’ individuals. Scenario 2 discusses how an interface between perception and action allows observers to simulate intentional action in others. Scenario 3 is concerned with shared perceptions, arising through joint attention and the ability to distinguish between self and other. Scenario 4 illustrates how people could form intentions to act together while simultaneously distinguishing between their own and the other's part of a joint action. The final part focuses on how combining the functionality of the four mechanisms can explain different forms of social interactions. It is proposed that basic interpersonal processes are put to service by more advanced functions that support the type of intentionality required to engage in joint action, cultural learning, and communication